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ABSTRACT
Senator Huey P. Long and radio priest Father Charles E. Coughlin were powerful forces
in the public sphere of the United States in 1930. Often accused of being demagogues and
Fascists, both men brought to the American people a message designed to relieve the suffering
that had taken the country during the Depression. This message was rooted in the tradition of
American Populism in which they had both grown up. The rhetoric of both men espoused faith
in simple solutions and blamed Wall Street financiers, wealthy industrialists, and corrupt
politicians for the hard times that had come. Just as interesting as the substantive content of their
message and more essential to an understanding of Long and Coughlin as demagogues is the
rhetorical style both men utilized throughout their discourse. Inherently anti-intellectual, Long
and Coughlin’s rhetorical style sought the submission of the audience to the rhetor by
undermining the individual auditor’s capacity for free thought and individual expression.
Seeking to isolate and explain this rhetorical style in terms of it political function within the
public sphere, this thesis examines Long and Coughlin’s discourse through close-textual
analysis. The two texts considered are Long’s speech announcing the founding of the Share Our
Wealth Society, “Every Man a King,” and Coughlin’s speech announcing the founding of the
National Union for Social Justice. Both speeches exemplify the anti-intellectual style in that
they function to over-identify with the audience, capture the audience in a cult of unthinking
affirmation, and to systematically incapacitate the audience’s intellect so as to disable their
ability to question. Delivered over radio, Long and Coughlin’s discourse is the antithesis to free
dialogue in an interactive public sphere. Engaging people on a seemingly individual level, Long
and Coughlin created a mass public that they ultimately rendered unable to think. In doing so,
both men posed a threat to democracy.
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PREFACE
Democracy is a way of personal life controlled not merely by faith in human nature in general
but by faith in the capacity of human beings for intelligent judgment and action if proper
conditions are furnished. . . . For what is the faith of democracy in the role of consultation,
of conference, of persuasion, of discussion, in formation of public opinion, which in the long-run
is self-corrective, except faith in the capacity of the intelligence of the common man to respond with
commonsense to the free play of facts and ideas which are secured by effective guarantees of
free inquiry, free assembly and free communication? 1
--John Dewey, “Creative Democracy: The Task Before Us”
You can laugh at Father Coughlin and you can snort at Huey Long—but this country was never
under a greater menace. 2
--Hugh Johnson, NBC Broadcast on March 4, 1935

Few Americans have polarized American attitudes to the degree that Senator Huey Pierce
Long and radio host Father Charles Edward Coughlin did. Millions of Americans paid them
homage worthy of a saint. Millions more expressed their disgust and scorn of both men, often
fearing their rise in American politics as presaging an American-type of Fascism. The
demagogy both men fashioned and afflicted on the already fragile state of American democracy
in the Depression years of the early 1930s is thus not only a valuable case study of demagogy
and democracy—it is an essential case study. The rise of Long and Coughlin marks one of the
largest political movements in American history. An understanding of both men’s success in
appealing to the American public is essential for Americans to comprehend if they are to
understand the threat that rhetoric similar to that of both men still poses to the mainstay of
American democracy.
The menace Roosevelt loyalist Hugh S. Johnson identified in the rhetoric of Long and
Coughlin warrants scholarly attention insofar as it threatened the sort of democratic scheme
described by Dewey—a scheme that places faith in dialogue and an open discourse that is united
with the development and exercise of a heightened intellectual capacity. Long and Coughlin
were at odds with this scheme, as are the potential inheritors of their rhetorical skill of which
proponents of democracy must still be wary. Both men represented a new, but modified
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populist-type movement that was rooted in the rather conservative populism of the 1890s, in the
fiery messages of politicians like William Jennings Bryan and in American traditions that can be
traced back as far as the Jacksonian Era. These new Depression-era populists criticized the New
Deal and the Roosevelt Administration for failing to act quickly. According to Long and
Coughlin, the Administration had fallen miserably short of meeting promises to turn the
Depression around and was not serious about fixing what both critics saw as a rather simple set
of economic problems. They explained these problems to be the results of the Administration’s
cautious intellectualism and elitist tendencies, and responded with vitriolic accusations of
Roosevelt being in alliance with big business. 3 It is fair to treat the men as leaders of a single
broad movement in that both “drew from similar political traditions and espoused similar
ideologies.” 4 Though Long and Coughlin’s early careers differed tremendously from one
another and were started in separate regions, “as time went on, their constituencies increasingly
overlapped and merged.” 5 Though both initially endorsed Roosevelt, they later claimed that the
president was not truly committed to the egalitarian faith in the “common man” and had become
out of touch with the interests of the yeoman farmers and laborers on whose backs national
prosperity rested. This criticism and the men’s repeated calls for dreamy panaceas would lead
them to become reactionaries, the embodiment of the authoritarian and dogmatic set of attitudes I
will propose to group together under the label “anti-intellectual”—a term borrowed from the
work of historian and social critic Richard Hofstadter. 6
For Hofstadter, anti-intellectualism is a recurring trend in American life that demands
public acknowledgement, attention, and understanding. It is characterized by a resentment of
experts and thinkers, a scorn for intellectual approaches to problem-solving, a desire for easy
solutions, and a disgust and mistrust of complexity. Anti-intellectualism, as I will expand upon
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it, is often accompanied by popular appeals, provincialism and xenophobia, conspiracy theory,
authoritarian leadership, false dichotomies, and a stifling of free thought and expression. It is my
contention that this anti-intellectual attitude bears a commensurate anti-intellectual style that
warrants rhetorical study, and that this style defined much of the public address of what I will
identify as the Depression Populism that ran rampant in the early 1930s. In its adoption and
utilization of an anti-intellectual style, Depression Populist discourses functioned as systematic
means of social control aimed at channeling mass discontent into a single unthinking body politic
prejudiced against the intellectual and his or her values—the values of free thought, liberation,
and dialogue highlighted by Dewey in the epigram that opens this thesis. As such, these
discourses comprise a distinct rhetorical genre of anti-intellectual speech that can be both
isolated and explained in terms of its political function.
The Rhetoric of Depression Populism & Its Anti-Intellectual Style
The rhetoric of Depression Populism moved societies and communities increasingly
closer to a dangerously oversimplified, nationalist, and ultimately anti-intellectual attitude that
had far-reaching consequences. The increased hostility toward the public intellectual and expert
by rising authoritarian and nationalist attitudes and approaches to the public scene paralleled
attitudes in Europe that preceded, and which ultimately gave birth to the regimes of Hitler,
Mussolini, and Franco. Needless to say, the movement demands rhetorical study so that an
understanding of its unique occurrence in time can be attained and moral judgment rendered so
as to avoid the perils that inevitably come with anti-intellectualism’s rise, so heeding the familiar
warning of history repeating itself. From the assumption that certain rhetorical forms will
emerge to form constellations of persuasive force at certain points in history, 7 the importance of
this study rests in the development of an understanding of these constellations and their impact
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on democratic dialogue—in particular those constellations that may be characterized as antiintellectual. The purpose of this thesis is twofold: first, to consider anti-intellectualism within
the public sphere insofar as its rhetoric effects modes of democratic participation, thus extending
Hofstadter’s work into the realm of rhetorical studies, and second, to carry my isolation of an
anti-intellectual style into patterns of speech that may well exist outside of Depression Populist
discourses, thus demonstrating the interaction of form, style, and genre vis-à-vis the isolation and
explanation of a recurrent feature in democratic discourse.
The importance of the first purpose rests on the assumption that rhetoric is a powerful
and dynamic force in society that influences the people who experience it. Rhetoric that prompts
people to think not for themselves but rather in systems of thought created by skilled but
manipulative rhetors has a direct impact on democratic society. If premised on the participation
of freethinking individuals who are enabled to form opinions and act on those opinions absent
the existence of hegemonic or coercive rhetorical forces, then the anti-intellectual style is
obviously anathema to democracy. In studying how democratic dialogue, and consequently,
democracies as a whole are put in danger when such a rhetorical force is exercised within the
public sphere, this study becomes profoundly critical. It will demonstrate the ways in which the
anti-intellectual style functions to secure for its auditor-citizen a false sense of agency—coaxing
citizen-auditors into agreement with demagoguery via a rhetorical coercion that is driven by
resentment for the intellectual, the thinking man.
This thesis will expand the work of Richard Hofstadter by pushing his work further
forward into the realm of rhetorical studies—specifically, public sphere studies. Hofstadter’s
Anti-Intellectualism in American Life contributes to our historical understanding of the
resentment of the intellectual and expert while providing a positive picture of where the
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intellectual and expert might stand in a more democratic America that is more solidly in line with
the interconnected values of free dialogue and education. Rhetorical studies have long assessed
public discourse in terms of its affect on a “public sphere”—“a realm of our social life in which
something approaching public opinion can be formed.” 8 This study aims to show how the public
sphere can be manipulated by demagogues like Long and Coughlin, how individual thought is
indeed stifled by this manipulation, and how this stifling affects a democracy of communicating
equals and thus negates the actual existence of a free and open public sphere—of a freedom in
dialogue. In agreement with Dewey that democracy is creative and necessarily involves the
engagement of individuals who actively enact democratic principles, I conclude that any proper
assessment of democracy “conceives of citizenship as a mode of public engagement.” 9 Hence,
democratic societies must be evaluated in terms of the discourse that they produce, and which,
ultimately, binds them together as “communicating communities.” 10 In drawing attention to
citizenship as a process, a discourse theory recognizes the fluid, multimodal, and quotidian
enactments of citizenship in a multiple public sphere.” 11 Hence, Hofstadter’s work will be
extended into the realm of public sphere studies, alerting auditor-citizens to the dangerous nature
of the anti-intellectual style.
The second purpose of this study stems from my agreement with rhetorician Edwin
Black’s approach to the study of rhetorical effect. The anti-intellectual style extant in
Depression Populism will be treated in a broad sense that looks not to its securing of specific
effects in specific situations, but rather to its extension across time so that Depression Populist
rhetoric may be assessed in terms of “all the differences . . . it has made in the world and will
make, and how the differences are made and why.” 12 Hence, this thesis also aims to provide
insight into anti-democratic dialogue as it has occurred, and will likely recur, in the United
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States. The anti-intellectual style not only perpetuates itself and festers into sores that scar
American democracy, but also propagates to become a driving force for the sort of intolerance,
foolhardy ignorance, and stultifying authoritarian arrogance that is democracy’s very antithesis.
I will argue that several of the characteristics found in the anti-intellectual style are not unique to
the 1930s and can be discovered in many of the texts we as citizens encounter in our present
time. The rhetoric of Depression Populism thus becomes a cautionary tale of sorts.
To accomplish both these purposes, this thesis will employ a close-textual approach to
the discourse of both men. This approach considers the rhetorical forms used by both Long and
Coughlin and from an intense analysis of these forms derives the internal dynamic that holds
each particular discourse together—their use of an identifiable anti-intellectual style. Two
speeches will be considered for this analysis: Long’s February 23, 1934, NBC radio address,
“Every Man a King,” and Coughlin’s November 11, 1934, address “The National Union for
Social Justice.” Each speech vigorously attacks the Roosevelt Administration and introduces the
platform of the organizations Long and Coughlin founded: the Share Our Wealth Society and the
National Union for Social Justice, respectively. Both speeches are “rhetorical standards” of each
man’s discourse, representative and illustrative of the anti-intellectual style that coursed through
Depression Populist discourse. 13 From an isolation and discussion of the rhetorical function of
each speech, the discourse of both men can be assessed in terms of its political impact on
democratic modes of participation in the public sphere.
This thesis consists of five chapters. The first of these discusses the nature of the study
on a theoretical level, addressing its place in studies of demagogy and democratic theory.
Providing an historical explanation of the exigence for anti-intellectual rhetoric in the
Depression, the second chapter addresses the history of Depression Populism—its formation as a
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distinct, yet ostensible, ideology, as well as its role in the politics of both Long and Coughlin,
their audience, and the public sphere in which they spoke. The third and fourth chapters consist
of contexts and analyses of Long’s “Every Man a King” and Coughlin’s “The National Union for
Social for Social Justice” addresses. This analysis is concluded in a fifth chapter discussing the
political impact of Long and Coughlin’s discourse, and which will assess the anti-intellectual
style’s force in a democratic polity. The power of the anti-intellectual style as definitive of a
recurrent genre of anti-intellectual discourse threatens the very heart and soul of democracy—the
notion that real democracy is not simply the casting of one’s vote at a polling place, but the
constant engagement of the individual in the community. 14 It is in “everyday enactments of
citizenship” 15 that democracy is experienced, that society is kept intact while moving
progressively forward to the betterment of both individual and community.
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CHAPTER 1
DEMOCRACY, DEMAGOGY,
& ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM
The broad masses of a people consist neither of professors nor of diplomats. The scantiness of their
abstract knowledge directs their sentiments more to the world of feeling. That is where their positive
or negative attitude lies. It is receptive only to an expression of force in one of these two directions
and never to a half-measure hovering between the two. Their emotional attitude at the same time
conditions their extraordinary stability. Faith is harder to shake than knowledge. . . . Anyone who
wants to win the broad masses must know the key that opens the door to their heart.
Its name is not objectivity, but will and power. 1
--Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf

Much has been made of Long and Coughlin’s rise at a time when Fascism was storming
Europe. Comparisons between both men and Hitler were frequent in the press, there being
concern that the demagogy of either might give “rise to an American leader who would exploit
the extraordinary license given by democracy to an entrepreneurial politics built on plebiscitary
excitements.” 2 The most vocal of these critics was Raymond Gram Swing, whose 1935 study of
the movement was one of the first and fiercely fixated itself on the notion that Long, Coughlin,
and others were the American equivalents of Fascism. 3 Sinclair Lewis’ best-selling 1935 novel,
It Can’t Happen Here, also reflects such angst. In it, Lewis tells the story of Buzz Windrip, a
Democratic populist who comes to power in much the same way Hitler or Mussolini did. The
fear of Fascism gripped the American imagination throughout the 1930s, and though there were
important differences between its rise in Europe and the rise of Long or Coughlin, there are
important similarities as well.
Kenneth Burke said of Hitler that an understanding of the “medicine” he concocted is
imperative “if we are to forestall the concocting of a similar medicine in America.” 4 This thesis
follows in a similar vain. Despite critical disparities between the rise of Hitler and the rise of
Long and Coughlin, all three men were leaders of mass movements that actively charmed their
followers into a blind and unthinking conception of reality. The harms occurring in the former
case are well-known and documented, but the dangers in the latter are less so and yet more
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particular to an American understanding of the problem. Not only are the old populist idioms
Long and Coughlin used to address their audience uniquely American, but so is the way they
came to power. They took their message to the people as part of some self-imagined, and
certainly ostensible, Jeffersonian renaissance. 5 While Long and Coughlin did speak to the
“common man,” they did so not in a way that empowered the yeoman farmer, the railroad
worker, and the industrial assemblyman. Rather, their rhetoric worked to subjugate their
audience, casting their followers into a spell of personality, emotion, and unreason. One of the
reasons why Long and Coughlin—and, as I would conjecture many European fascists—were so
successful is because they seemed to empower the people. But, alas, all is not always as it seems.
The rhetoric of the Depression Populism adopted by Long and Coughlin deserves
rhetorical study insofar as it was not merely symptomatic of, but worked to affect and, in fact,
direct, the history of Depression Populism as a broad political movement. Long and Coughlin
were at the forefront of this movement, founding and defining it. Other activists, including
Long’s sycophantic follower, Gerald K. Smith, were also involved to a lesser degree. It was
Long and Coughlin who, after both men’s denunciation of Roosevelt, controlled its ranks. Their
ideology was more than mere Depression dissidence. 6 Longites and Coughlinites sought “to
defend the autonomy of the individual and the independence of the community against
encroachments from the modern state.” 7 Ironically, however, Depression Populism worked
against this value scheme. Instead, it subjugated the individual and the community—not to the
modern state, but to the demagogue. Long and Coughlin saw themselves as the people’s leaders,
and often compared themselves to such figures as George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, John
the Baptist, and most often, Christ. If the people gave them the power, Long and Coughlin
would enact change for their benefit. Democracy thus was relegated to the elevation of a single
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chosen individual to watch over all in some Hobbesian conception of the public good. This
teleological basis for action is echoed perfectly in one of Coughlin’s many declarations: “If
necessary, I shall dictate to preserve democracy.” 8 No longer was democracy an end in itself—
rather, it was a value that could be trumped by the thought of a single individual designating
himself superior to the masses, deciding single-handedly his political authority to be in their
interests.
Perhaps this teleological justification for authority is what renders Long and Coughlin
such difficult figures to judge, and why opinions, even among academics, tilt so strongly one
way or the other in passing judgment on the character of each man. 9 This study will avoid
judgment of Long and Coughlin as people and instead exercise such judicial authority in
evaluation of their discourse. In looking to Long and Coughlin’s discourse, this study will “find
projected . . . the image of a man.” According to Edwin Black’s idea of a discourse’s “second
persona,” a discourse should be judged by “what the rhetor would have his real auditor become.”
The second persona will “exert on [the auditor] the pull of an ideology. It will move, unless he
rejects it, to structure his experience.” 10 Accepting Black’s notion of a discourse’s second
persona, this thesis will address what the discourses of Long and Coughlin did to those who
listened to them. How did these discourses structure their experiences? How did Long and
Coughlin achieve their effect? What were the political ramifications of having achieved it?
These are the questions this study seeks to answer. Though not Fascist in its ideological
orientation, Depression Populism was purely authoritarian in its political structuration—in both
the way it came to power and expressed itself á la its rhetorical force
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Assessing the Force of Words: Past Rhetorical Study of Long and Coughlin
Coughlin’s founding of the Union Party in 1936 and its chosen presidential candidate,
William Lemke, was Depression Populism’s end-result—the fizzled conclusion of a movement
that before Long’s death in September of 1935 had struck fear in the heart of the popular
Roosevelt Administration. A poll conducted by the Democratic National Convention in spring
of 1935 found that Long could win eleven percent of the American electorate, taking six million
votes nationwide. 11 Coughlin was also included in the poll even though he had not expressed
any presidential ambitions. Further, his stature as a Catholic priest would make him an unlikely
candidate to begin in with an election just eight years after Al Smith’s crushing defeat. Even so,
Coughlin fared surprisingly well in the poll. He received as much as two percent of the popular
vote in the New England, Great Lakes, and mid-Atlantic regions where his radio broadcast
reached. Both men had the power to influence the re-election of President Roosevelt, who polled
at fifty-four percent to an unnamed Republican candidate’s thirty percent. Roosevelt staffer
Frank Murphy wrote that “it was easy to conceive a situation whereby Long… might have the
balance of power in the 1936 election,” 12 and the Administration had for a while been worried
of Coughlin’s ability to detract voters from among Roosevelt’s key constituencies.
Both men were in the public eye long before the 1936 campaign. As of 1934, Coughlin’s
Sunday radio sermons were reaching ten million people and he was receiving more mail than any
other person in the United States, including Roosevelt. 13 Long also reached huge audiences of
millions of people when he spoke on NBC, and his Share Our Wealth Society reported as many
as 7,682,768 members in April of 1935. 14 Always attracting national press and audiences that
competed with the President, Long and Coughlin were a major force in public politics. Yet,
despite their threat and the fact that both men amassed their power through their use of language,
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little rhetorical study has been done of either. What rhetorical study has been done has failed to
provide an adequate explanation of their political success.
Ernest Bormann’s 1953 dissertation on Long is a comprehensive undertaking that
succeeds in isolating several of the rhetorical forms Long used in the eleven national radio
broadcasts he delivered from March 27, 1933, to July 19, 1935. However, Bormann’s analysis
fails to go beyond naming these disparate forms and never seeks to discuss their cumulative
effect on Long’s audience. In addition, though Bormann aims to study “the speaking practices of
men who have handled the tools of mass communication in an irresponsible way,” 15 he falls
short in this mission due to his own strict adherence to a neo-Aristotelian mode of criticism.
Bormann’s isolation of a series of disparate rhetorical forms never leads to a discussion of the
political effect those forms work together to achieve, and as a result he concludes that “Long’s
speeches differ little from speeches by Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, or Dwight
Eisenhower.” 16 Bormann further concludes that “the uniqueness of demagogy lies outside the
sphere of what might be called the craftsmanship of speech-making,” resting instead “in the
character of the speaker.” 17 Such miscalculations are due to Bormann’s inattention to Long’s
style and his treatment of it as subordinate to and separate from Long’s character.
Other studies of Long follow in a similar vain, relegating Long’s style to a list of
rhetorical forms and discussion of his biographical background, his speech training, the content
of his speeches, and the specific effect of the speech he gave in templates even simpler than the
one Bormann applies. In 1955, Elton Abernathy chronicled Long’s career, crediting his political
advancement to his oratory. 18 Abernathy cites Long’s reliance on ethical and emotional proof,
writing that he used “logical proofs sparingly, or not at all. He was partial to argument from
authority, frequently quoting at length from the Bible, William Green, Pope Pius, Josephus, or
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Socrates.” 19 Abernathy never moves beyond such broad and generic observations. Harold
Mixon makes more lively observations in a 1981 article on Long, but his analysis is even less
focused, including a series of discussions pertaining to the various themes of Long’s speeches he
identifies as “flag issues.” 20 Paul Gaske, also seeking to explain Long’s demagogy as Bormann
and Mixon were, pays particular attention to Long’s February 23, 1934, radio address, “Every
Man a King.” 21 Gaske uses Kenneth Burke’s motivational pattern of guilt, victimage,
redemption, and salvation, but does so in such a way that his findings are confined to Burke’s
model to a degree that preempts any substantively comprehensive understanding of Long.
The two most valuable rhetorical studies of Long are recent, and both take an explicitly
functional approach to Long’s discourse. The first of these is Robert Iltis’ 1989 dissertation,
“Beyond Devil Tokens: The Style of Huey P. Long.” Iltis aims to give an account of “the textual
dynamics of Long’s speaking and writing; that is, interpretation of the interrelationships among
the parts of a given discourse as those parts function toward the end of the whole.” 22 Seeking to
explain the “rhetorical function” of Long’s strategies, Iltis examines a Long broadside against the
1916 Employer’s Liability Act from Long’s days as a small town lawyer in his home town of
Winn Parish, Louisiana, as well as Long’s famous “Every Man a King” address. 23 However,
despite Iltis’ intention to explain parts of Long’s discourse as the “function toward the end of the
whole,” 24 he never seems to clearly isolate what this end is. The closest Iltis comes to an answer
is that Long moved beyond mere scapegoating in his rhetorical appeals “by placing blame on the
economic system rather than on wealthy individuals.” 25 Although Iltis falls short of his goal of
explicating how the whole of the rhetorical forms Long utilizes function to achieve this end, his
study is insightful in terms of its close-textual approach that allows him to carefully consider the
political effects of Long’s use of various forms. Despite its fragmentary treatment of these
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effects and failure to provide a comprehensive explanation of what Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and
Kathleen Hall Jamieson characterize as the “internal dynamic” that fuses a speech or group of
speeches together, 26 Iltis’ dissertation is a valuable contribution to Long scholarship.
Michael Signer’s 2001 dissertation, “The Demagogue: Ancient, Modern, and
Postmodern” also provides an excellent analysis of Long’s discourse. Signer contends that
Long’s discourse is representative of what he terms the “modern demagogue.” His mission is to
explain demagogy in ancient, modern, and postmodern times with the paradigm examples of
Cleon, Long, and Ronald Reagan, evaluating how each demagogue is different and how each
must be treated given his particular sociopolitical context. Although Signer is a political scientist
and not a rhetorical critic, he nonetheless pays careful attention to rhetorical forms that Long
uses and how they function to control Long’s audience. Signer considers the modern demagogue
to function with a “theatricality that is mechanized and routinized, yet public and explicit, and
who incites ungovernability that is more private than institutional, and no longer
unpredictable.” 27 Signer’s analysis goes beyond that of Iltis, linking the combined rhetorical
strategies both Iltis and Signer discuss to a demagogic function of social control. While his
analysis is not as focused as Iltis’, Signer employs the skills of a rhetorical critic well to provide
a better understanding of how the demagogue wields his rhetorical power to gain control.
There has not been as much rhetorical study of Coughlin’s discourse as there has been of
Long’s. First, and most famously, is Alfred McClung and Elizabeth Briant Lee’s 1939 study of
Coughlin published by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. The Lees’ study intended to
educate “uncritical Americans” to the woes of modern propaganda, shedding “light on the
devices propagandists use in their efforts to swing us to their ways of thinking and acting.” 28
Extracting examples of what they concluded were “tricks of the trade” found in Coughlin’s
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discourse, the Lees hoped to provide Americans with the capability to recognize propaganda,
which they considered to be “a new means for rendering a country defenseless in the face of an
invading army.” 29 While the Lees’ study is valuable in terms of isolating these general
attributes, it falls short of providing deeper answers as to what made Coughlin’s speeches so
effective.
David Terrance Coe’s 1970 dissertation, “The Analysis and Criticism of the Rhetoric of
Father Charles E. Coughlin” was the first comprehensive examination of Coughlin’s rhetoric and
followed the neo-Aristotelian model for criticism. While Coe isolates numerous rhetorical forms
used by the radio priest, it shares the same failings as Bormann’s study of Long. John Gerard
Doran’s 1974 dissertation, “The Analysis and Criticism of the Rhetoric of Father Charles E.
Coughlin,” attempts to more greatly explore Coughlin’s use of his priestly ethos and his use of
topics via content analysis. Doran dismisses the notion of Coughlin as a Fascist-style
demagogue, concluding instead that he was a skillful manipulator who was not attached to any
particular brand of ideology. For Doran, “Coughlin’s own image of himself was that of a
Catholic priest obedient at all times to his superiors. Beyond that he was confused and eclectic
in what he did and said. He is a complex man. You cannot write him off as a ‘Populist’ and be
done with him.” 30 However, Coughlin spoke out of more than just mere expediency, and while
Doran’s explanation of his use of a priestly ethos is contributory, the whole of Doran’s study is
short-sighted in its contribution to a holistic understanding of Coughlin as a political actor. This
failure is due to Doran’s inability to examine style and form as having ideological consequences.
A more contemporary study of Coughlin can be found in Susan Zickmund’s 1993
dissertation, “The Shepherd of the Discontented: A Rhetorical Analysis of the Discourse of
Father Charles E. Coughlin.” Zickmund’s study is the most complete of any of the Coughlin
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studies, tracing the priest’s rhetoric as it evolved throughout his radio career. Coughlin’s career
is examined from the start of his radio career in 1926 when he began to offer Mass on Detroit’s
local radio station and deliver religious sermons. Following a consideration of the radio priest’s
early career, Zickmund then assess his later and more controversial radio sermons from his
denunciation of communism and capitalism as errant of Christian tenets to his obsession with
monetary policy and vitriolic criticism of Roosevelt. The study is complete and precise, though
its focus is scattered and principally aimed toward Coughlin’s arguments, use of various
disparate rhetorical forms, and ability to control his audience via his priestly standing. It is in the
discussion of this standing where Zickmund makes her most interesting arguments, concluding
that “Coughlin strove to embody the role of the revealer of truth and reality.” 31 However,
Zickmund pays little attention to the political effect of this strategy. The most recent study of
Coughlin is Ronald H. Carpenter’s 1998 book Father Charles E. Coughlin: Surrogate
Spokesman for the Disaffected. Carpenter makes a number of different arguments in each of the
book’s chapters that are too numerous to recount here. However, throughout all of Carpenter’s
he never attempts to reveal the internal dynamic of which Campbell and Jamieson theorize.
Arguments are made as to how Coughlin developed his priestly persona and his credibility as an
economic expert, though much of the book is more historical than rhetorical—recounting various
arguments Coughlin made in response to different exigencies. 32
A review of past rhetorical studies of Long and Coughlin reveals two fundamental
shortcomings, at least one of which is true of each study addressed. First, discourses must be
studied in terms of the broad effect they have on their audience, the critic paying attention to
both how and why the discourse secures this effect. Second, findings as to the broad effect of a
specific discourse should be treated as a potentially recurring political force. This means that the

Freedom in Dialogue 10

found effect should be assessed in terms of the impact it has on political society. Where past
studies have fallen short in one or both of these critical imperatives, this thesis will reveal
answers in accordance with both.
Rhetoric, Genre, & Style: Approaching the Discourse of Long and Coughlin
Robert Hariman writes that “to the extent politics is an art, matters of style must be
crucial to its practice.” 33 Since “the modern human sciences have not yet produced a strong
account of what every successful politician knows intuitively—political experience, skill, and
result often involve conventions of persuasive composition that depend on aesthetic reactions,” 34
rhetorical studies are essential to an understanding of how political power is subjectively gained
on moral and aesthetic grounds. Neither of these grounds is conducive to the empirical study in
which political scientists so often focus their efforts, hence enters the value of rhetorical study.
Hariman’s approach to politics is true to Richard Weaver’s understanding of rhetoric as
“operating at the point where literature and politics meet, or where literary values and political
urgencies can be brought together. The rhetorician makes use of the moving power of literary
presentation to induce in his hearers an attitude or decision which is political in the very broadest
sense.” 35 In approaching Long and Coughlin’s discourse, it is first important to address rhetoric
as a force in society, as well as to highlight an appropriate approach to its study that considers its
recurrent potential and that accounts for and defines what precisely is meant by “style.”
Rhetoric as a Force in Society
Rhetoric is a mode of action that negotiates the social reality existing between
individuals. 36 According to Carroll C. Arnold, “a basic characteristic of rhetorical engagement
or relationship under conditions of orality is that each party retains its dominion over self but
commits himself to ally (often fitfully) with the other in closure-encouraging, closure-making
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activity. Because the alliance is sustained orally, the burden of sustaining it to the listener’s
satisfaction falls upon the person-as-action of the speaker.” 37 The notion of persons-as-actions
drives Arnold’s characterization: people are always developing, always caught in the constant
flux of Heraclitan becoming. In this light, rhetoric can be viewed as a series of ongoing speechacts. 38 J.G.A. Pocock defines “speech-acts” as “actions on language, expropriating the inherited,
already constituted framework in order to modify or transform it. . . . It is this process of
constant interaction between speech and language, action and structure, that constitutes ‘a
discourse.’” 39
Rhetoric structures experience. The significance of this to a historical and political study
of Long and Coughlin is vast, for it points to the necessity that a study of the discourse of both
men, insofar as it is explicative of the effect both men had on their audience, must tie itself to the
idea that rhetoric is a subjectively relational phenomenon. As such, rhetoric is not merely
symptomatic of historical and political events, but essential to their cause, “exhibit[ing] a ‘worklike dimension’ as acts of meaning-production in which given forms and contents are set into
new patterns of relationship in order to constitute a new meaningful reality.” 40 The value of
rhetorical study to an understanding of history and politics lies in the understanding of rhetoric as
a transformative force. 41 Historians and political scientists who have studied Long and Coughlin
in the past have neglected this fact, as have many of the rhetorical critics who have failed to unite
and extend their findings in terms of effect. 42 Despite its comprehensiveness and insight into
both men and the historical context of their rise to power, historian Alan Brinkley’s study of
Long and Coughlin commits this fallacy. Aiming to isolate a common ideology both men
shared, Brinkley calls for scholars to consider the movement in terms of its “vision,” or rather as
driven by an ideology more serious than “a demagogic attempt to delude the public with empty,
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impractical promises.” 43 What Brinkley fails to note is that the “vision” of which Long and
Coughlin spoke was rhetorical, existing as a creation of meaning between speaker and audience.
What he further misses is that the demagogy of both men was the means to communicating and
securing this vision in the psychology of their audience.
Rhetoric as Genre
If rhetoric is a mode of action forming “new meaningful realities,” then the heuristic
value of studying these realities lies in “emphasizing the symbolic and rhetorical contexts in
which rhetorical acts are created,” linking “a class of similar artifacts . . . [to] an undercurrent of
history.” 44 Accepting that “a rhetorical technique will almost always stand as a live possibility at
any point in history,” 45 a study of Long and Coughlin must be able to extend its findings across
time if it is to succeed as a critical endeavor. Hence, the discourse of Long and Coughlin should
be viewed as belonging to a genre. My use of the term stems from the work of Edwin Black. A
genre is best defined as a constellation of rhetorical forms that synchronically function together
to accomplish a rhetorical purpose. This definition warrants further discussion and explanation.
For Black,
the terms ‘genre’ and ‘form’ have the same relationship to one another as do the Collection
and Division of Platonic dialectic. That is, the genre of a thing is its class—a statement of its
relations to all other commensurable things. The form of that thing is its inherent structure—
a statement of its constituents and their relationship to one another. Genre refers to the place
of the thing in the universe and to its generation as an adaptive and relational entity. Form
refers to the constitution and individuality of the thing and to its formation as an entity
sufficiently autonomous to be identifiable. Taken together, the words ‘genre’ and ‘form’ are
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complementary in that ‘genre’ refers to external relations and ‘form’ refers to internal
relations. 46
Being concerned with the former, my focus is the “genre” of the various rhetorical forms—
syntactical devices, metaphors, grammatical inventions, etc.—as they function together to
accomplish a rhetorical purpose. 47 Essentially, it is the external relations of forms that are up for
discussion when I discuss Long and Coughlin’s rhetoric as “genre.”
Rhetoric as Style
Considering genre, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson theorize that
these “constellations of rhetorical forms” are held together by an “internal dynamic” fusing all
elements of the genre together. 48 They also note that “a constellation of elements bound together
dynamically need only exist in a single instance to establish a genre or generic potential,” 49 a
notion that is critical to the methodology I have adopted in approaching Long and Coughlin’s
discourse. This internal dynamic binds the constellation that I will refer to as “style.” As Black
instructs, “the function of [these] properties defines the style.” 50 A rhetorical critic must do more
than merely ascertain the existence of the constellation; they must probe at its functional value.
It is not the presence of various rhetorical forms that defines style, but rather the function that
binds those forms together—it is style that establishes genre. 51 Hence, the anti-intellectual style
works to constitute an anti-intellectual genre of speech. Throughout the study I will use “style”
instead of “genre,” except in my explanations linking the two terms.
Approaching rhetoric as style, the rhetorical critic is empowered “to focus on elements of
political composition that are indeed important to participation and outcome, without producing
a merely formal understanding or reinforcing unreflectively a particular standard or judgment.” 52
Where so much rhetorical criticism inevitably falls short is in its inability to treat style as a

Freedom in Dialogue 14

primary determinant of social reality and citizenship. Treating style as such enlightens not only
general understandings of rhetoric, but also the historical situations and political phenomena
rhetoric transforms. While historians and politicians have focused on style before, their
treatment of it is generally imprecise and lacking in the sophistication rhetorical criticism can
offer. An example of such imprecision can be observed in Richard Hofstadter’s treatment of the
“paranoid style.” Hofstadter defines style as “the way in which ideas are believed and
advocated” before revealing his intention to use “political rhetoric to get at political
pathology.” 53 In treating style as only symptomatic of ideology, Hofstadter’s conclusions, while
enlightening, lack the coherent force that a rhetorical treatment of style as a political function
could otherwise achieve. Instead of analyzing style as revelatory of political reality, the better
approach would be to analyze it as determinative of political reality. While modern scholars
struggle with the nexus between rhetoric and politics, the Greeks understood it well. Sophists
treated style as important and studied it with due diligence, instructing students of politics as to
which style might be used to attain what political effect. 54 If taken, the Sophistic view of style as
a strategic means chosen to attain a specific end makes it much easier to comprehend style in
terms of its functional value. While the Sophists’ focus was more instructional and speakercentered, the modern scholar of rhetoric should also adopt an audience-centered and critical
approach to style as a mechanism driving modes of social action. Questions asked by the
rhetorical critic should be rooted in this orientation. 55
Demagogy, Democracy, & Anti-Intellectualism in the Public Sphere
Examining the demagogic threat Long and Coughlin posed to American democracy
requires a general understanding of the relation between demagogy and democracy, as well as a
critical approach to realizing the danger. As Signer argues early in his study, demagogy is
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inherent to democracy. Prompting irrational action by the hoi polloi, demagogy involves “no
foreign agents, no exogenous causes or political viruses. . . . The demon is local and indigenous.
It is as if a body politic, with its own hands, attacks itself.” 56 As political philosophers since
Plato have taken note, the demagogue “may transform a state and lead to a demand for
despotism.” 57 Democracy’s fundamental faith in the access of citizens to government decision
making and its investment in the mechanism of majority rule result in the possibility that a
majority of citizens may elect to surrender their freedom and render themselves subject to some
popularly-favored leader. The majority may trade autonomy for devotion to a charismatic
leader. Fear of such folly of the masses motivated the framers to carefully devise a system of
checks and balances to slow the unwieldy and dangerous nature of democracy from the irrational
hoi polloi. Familiar with the warnings of Cicero, Hamilton writes in Federalist No. 1 that
a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the
people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency for
government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road
to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned
the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying obsequious
court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants. 58
While it is true that, as Signer notes, what emerges as ochlocracy easily becomes tyranny, this
study aims to take a more specific view of the problem, reframing democracy in much the same
way the framers did.
Realizing that pure democracy is undesirable due to the constant threat posed by a rising
tyrannous majority, the framers instead sought a deliberative democracy guided by a firm
commitment to constitutionalism. Such commitment was to bring about a democracy that was
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both reflective and responsive, producing the necessary forethought and debate critical to the
creation of sound public policy. 59 Political and legal theorists from Aristotle to Mill to Rawls
have long recognized the necessity of good argument and debate in democratic societies. Such
commitment has led some scholars, for example Bertolt Brecht, to go so far as to urge citizens’
alienation from the rest of their peers so as not to compromise the autonomy resulting from
private deliberation. 60 Accepting the premise that democracy must be deliberative to function
properly, this study treats demagogy as counter to and contemptuous of this end. However, this
study also seeks a more specific conception of the problem.
One of the problems with demagogy is the difficulty of isolating what exactly it is that
defines a demagogue. While so many critiques of demagogy end up doing little more than
hurling arguments ad hominem, this study seeks a process-oriented approach that assesses
demagogy in terms of the rhetorical style that so often accompanies its rise to power. This is not
to say that all of what may be characterized as demagogy shares a common style. However,
what is often generally lambasted as demagogy often utilizes a rhetorical style that is
instrumental to securing a specific political effect. Instead of automatically labeling speech
demagogic, a better approach is to consider why it is so—to look at the function the speech, to
examine how it produces its desired effect. Merely to demean speech as demagogic serves no
valuable purpose, often confusing ends with means while attaching no precise meaning on what
exactly the label entails. This study proposes to better define demagogy as a means to achieving
whatever end the demagogue wants. Thus, demagogy should not be determined based on its
effect—the riots it may incite, the intolerance it might imbue, the passions it potentially raises.
Rather, demagogy must be defined as means to an end, the means being the submission of the
demagogue’s audience to whatever he or she desires after rendering them dull and unthinking,
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their intellect disabled and will to question authority crushed. Demagogy is, inherently, antiintellectual.
Historian Richard Hofstadter identifies anti-intellectualism as a plague in American
politics (as well as perhaps the politics of other nations), a trend that runs the gambit of
American civic life. According to Hofstadter, anti-intellectualism targets the “egghead”
intellectual and the use of intellect in general. To understand what Hofstadter means by antiintellectualism, it is critical to understand his conception of “intellect.” For Hofstadter,
“intellect” is different from “intelligence.” Intelligence is
an excellence of mind that is employed within a fairly narrow, immediate, and predictable
range; it is a manipulative, adjustive, unfailingly practical quality—one of the most eminent
and endearing of the animal virtues. Intelligence works within the framework of limited but
clearly stated goals, and may be quick to shear away questions of thought that do not seem to
help in reaching them. Finally, it is of such universal use that it can daily be seen at work and
admired alike by simple or complex minds. 61
In contrast, intellect
is the critical, creative, and contemplative side of the mind. Whereas intelligence seeks to
grasp, manipulate, re-order, adjust, intellect examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes, criticizes,
imagines. Intelligence will seize the immediate meaning in a situation and evaluate it.
Intellect evaluates evaluations, and looks for the meanings of situations as a whole.
Intelligence can be praised as a quality in animals; intellect, being a unique manifestation of
human dignity, is both praised and assailed as a quality in men.” 62
While intelligence is universally valued, Hofstadter postulates that intellect is less so. Indeed,
intellect, and consequently the intellectual, are frequently objects of scorn. 63 Concluding that
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intellectuals exist as experts and ideologues, Hofstadter concludes that “they intensify the
prevalent sense of helplessness in our society.” 64 While the intellectual as an expert is often
despised “by quickening the public’s resentment of being the object of constant manipulation,”
the intellectual as ideologue is despised “by arousing the fear of subversion and by heightening
all the other grave psychic stresses that have come with modernity.” 65 For Hofstadter, the
resentment of intellect and the intellectual is in part a response to modernity, of increasing
uncertainty in an increasingly uncertain world. Hofstadter’s explanation of the origins of antiintellectualism is revelatory of its often reactionary tones as manifest in Protestant evangelical
fundamentalism, McCarthyism, and Nazism.
As “man is not only made by history—history is made by man,” 66 coexistent with the
anti-intellectual attitude Hofstadter describes is an anti-intellectual style which perpetuates antiintellectualism as a social force. Thus, to understand anti-intellectualism, one must take up
those tasks Erich Fromm assigns to social psychology: “Its task is to show not only how
passions, desires, anxieties change and develop as a result of social process, but also how man’s
energies thus shaped into more specific forms in their turn become productive forces, molding
the social process.” 67 Hofstadter has much to say in general about anti-intellectualism as a
social pathology, discussing its origins and explaining its effects. However, he does not so much
endeavor to explain the “more specific forms” anti-intellectualism takes to become a “productive
force.” These forms are best studied in approaching anti-intellectualism as rhetorical style.
The anti-intellectual style, as I will expand upon it, consists of a series of rhetorical forms
held together in constellations to function as a means of social control, a way of targeting the
intellect, incapacitating it, and forcing submission to whoever succeeds in so doing. Its broad
effect is to divert the individual auditor from private, reflective thought, and to instead turn the
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auditor’s attention to the personality of the demagogue as an all-empowering force vis-à-vis an
over-identification with the rhetor. Approaching demagogy in terms of an anti-intellectual style
allows the critic to react not to the demagogue as a person, but rather to demagogy as a
rhetorical/social process. Hence, the difficulty that is so often faced passing judgment on the
demagogue is assuaged, the focus no longer centered on dislike of the demagogue’s mere
outward personality tics or set of policies or intentions. While personality is inextricably linked
to style, focusing on personality in a shallow way without relation to style results in short-sighted
criticism. As Signer notes, “it is not uncommon when criticizing a demagogue for the appetites
of the critic to take her over. This process can prevent the critic from comprehending how the
demagogue actually works. . . .” 68 The problem is avoided if demagogy is viewed as a means to
power to be rejected flatly regardless of any teleological justification; no matter what the aim of
the rhetor, demagogy exercising the anti-intellectual style poses a categorical harm to society,
rendering it categorically objectionable. Reconceptualizing demagogy in terms of style remedies
a critical problem and achieves what should be the critic’s ultimate goal: determining how
demagogy works.
This anti-intellectual style was utilized by Long and Coughlin, and will be assessed in
terms of its political impact on the public sphere. The public space where public opinion is
fashioned by way of public deliberation, the public sphere is studied so as to “examine the
recursive relationships between social organization and discursive practices.” 69 In turning
attention to the effect Long and Coughlin’s discourse had on their audience—in understanding
their rhetoric as productive force—this study examines how the anti-intellectual style structured
political experience and effected modes of democratic participation during the Depression
Populist era. The impact of the anti-intellectual style on the citizen’s ability to participate in
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democratic politics will be contrasted to Dewey’s notion of democracy as creative and
quotidian—“a way of personal life controlled not merely by faith in human nature but by faith in
the capacity of human beings for intelligent judgment and action if proper conditions are
furnished.” 70 If, as it is for Dewey, “the problem of the public” is “the improvement of the
methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion,” 71 then the anti-intellectual style
must be judged in its relation to this problem. Doing so fulfills what is an essential need for
democratic publics, a necessary task if will and power are to be resisted and freedom maintained.
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CHAPTER 2
DEPRESSION POPULISM &
THE ORIGINS OF ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM
The case against intellect is founded upon a set of fictional and wholly abstract antagonisms.
Intellect is pitted against feeling, on the ground that it is somehow inconsistent with warm emotion.
It is pitted against character, because it is widely believed that intellect stands for mere cleverness,
which transmutes easily into the sly or the diabolical. It is pitted against practicality, since theory
is held to be opposed to practice and ‘purely’ theoretical mind is so much disesteemed. It is pitted
against democracy, since intellect is felt to be a form of distinction that defies egalitarianism.
Once the validity of these antagonisms is accepted, then the case for intellect,
and by extension for the intellectual, is lost. 1
--Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life
Can freedom become a burden, too heavy for man to bear, something he tries to escape from?
Why then is it that freedom is for many a cherished goal and for others a threat? 2
--Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom

The dissidence that swept the United States following the economic collapse of the late
1920s found its most virulent form of expression in the tradition of American populism. It was
in a transformation of this broad-based democratic tradition into an ideology much more sinister,
and ultimately anti-democratic, that Long and Coughlin molded their ideas. In the public sphere
of the 1930s, both men would find distinct voices that would move America closer than it ever
had been to the dark clutches of authoritarianism. The anti-intellectualism of the political styles
of both men was the principal force driving their rhetorical success.
Though H.L. Mencken described Long as “simply a backwoods demagogue of the oldest
and most familiar model—impudent, blackguardly, and infinitely prehensile,” 3 such a treatment
looks mockingly past the enormous amount of influence he wielded. Similar assessments of
Coughlin do the same. Both men’s popular appeals rendered them able to challenge a president
with one of the strongest electoral mandates in American political history. Antithetical to
rational dialogue—and a dominant force in the mind of 1930s America—Long and Coughlin’s
rhetoric cannot be dismissed as simple demagogy. To heed Einstein’s familiar warning that
everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler, the demagogy of both men
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must be considered as systematic means to gain social control of an audience already
preconditioned to give up their freedom.
The Depression Populism that grossly typifies Long and Coughlin’s sociopolitical
ideologies was effective in securing a brand of “big man” politics premised on the submission of
its followers to the leader. Facilitating such submission, the rhetoric of Long and Coughlin
negotiated a social reality among their followers in which intellect was demeaned and cast off as
a cause of America’s economic woes. However, and more interestingly, not only was the
substance of both men’s rhetoric explicitly hostile to intellect—it was stylistically so as well.
Adopting an anti-intellectual rhetorical style, Long and Coughlin ultimately incapacitated the
intellect of their audience after capturing their minds with a comforting vision of reality that
played to their prejudices and eased them of their anxieties. Rendered passive to this unfolding
yet completely satiating vision of a world that was much more complicated than either man
allowed, both men’s followers cast aside intellectual capability and embraced a blissful
ignorance that described itself as moral. Placing their own morality as superior to and
inconsistent intellectual capability, they were able to wholeheartedly slip into the trap of Long
and Coughlin’s style and assume themselves better people for so doing. What made the antiintellectual style satisfying to the appetites of Long and Coughlin’s audience is one of the
principal questions that must be answered if the anti-intellectual style is to be properly
understood in terms of genre.
If a genre links a “class of artifacts” to “an undercurrent of history,” 4 an understanding of
anti-intellectualism as genre should first make sense of the situations in which that undercurrent
becomes manifest. Hence, to understand anti-intellectualism as style, the rhetorical critic must
also consider anti-intellectualism as the product of political, cultural, and social situations. More
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specifically, anti-intellectualism ought to be analyzed in terms of “how passions, desires,
anxieties change and develop as a result of the social process,” evolving to become “specific
forms” with “productive force.” 5 In other words, one of the tasks of this thesis is to understand
the sorts of situations in which the anti-intellectual style might find an audience. Such is the
purpose of this second chapter. What makes anti-intellectualism appealing to large groups of
people? How does the scorn of intellect relate to other social compulsions that conjointly come
into existence, i.e., the desire to submit to authority almost unthinkingly? What were the
conditions of the 1930s that allowed the anti-intellectual style to capture the minds of so many
Americans so quickly and to infect the public sphere with the voracity it did?
The response of many Americans to the angst of the Depression was distinctly antiintellectual, a reaction to the travails of the 1930s. Part of this reaction was the need so many had
for simple solutions to explain complex circumstances, to seek certain and absolute answers in
times when little was certain or absolute. Intellect—always seeking to question, probe, and
thoroughly analyze—rarely provides such security and often undermines it. Rejecting
intellectual values meant rejecting the uncertainty and tolerance of ambiguity that accompanies
intellectual exercise. In addition, anti-intellectualism offered those hurt most by the Depression,
the “almost-haves,” an outlet for the discontent and frustration that must have daily eaten away at
their being. If panaceas could be prescribed and the wretched upper-class held responsible for
their lofty and irresponsible wastrel ways, then Longites and Coughlinites would gain some
certainty in a time when uncertainty so occupied Americans’ thoughts as to render existence
unbearable. The anti-intellectualism of Depression Populism offered itself as a solution to
America’s vast and complicated problems, taking advantage of a situation that found so many
Americans willing to grab onto whatever certainty was available no matter how bad its dogmatic
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bite. In turn, the anti-intellectual style functioned as an opiate on which millions of Americans
would find themselves dependent for some four to six years. To understand the function of the
opiate, one must first understand the addict and nature of the dependency.
The “Almost-Haves,” Depression Populism, & the Grounding of Anti-Intellectualism
Determining to whom Long and Coughlin’s message appealed has been as serious, as
surprising, and as sobering a task for historians as it was for journalists in the 1930s. As Alan
Brinkley notes, “observers attempting to diagnose the nature of the two movements and
expecting to find only the destitute, the indigent, and the ignorant, often expressed surprise when
they discovered, as the New Republic did in 1935, that Long and Coughlin seemed to be rallying
the “‘lower middle class,’ ‘small businessmen and professionals,’ in a ‘militant and honorable
protest.’” 6 Far from the poorest of the poor, the majority of Long and Coughlin’s adherents were
men and women of the lower middle class who were likely to have lost significant savings in the
financial collapses precipitating the Depression. Similar to the audiences Hitler found in
Germany and Mussolini discovered in Italy, 7 a large section of Long and Coughlin’s audiences
were “men and women clinging precariously to hard-won middle-class lifestyles; people with
valued but imperiled stakes in their local communities.” 8 This lower middle-class, “lacking
institutionalized roles on the political scene, . . . looked in times of crisis to a leader whose
boldness and aggressiveness would combat the power and arrogance of the ‘big shots’ and
bureaucrats while not threatening the capitalist system to which they prescribed.” 9 The potential
of the lower middle-class to fall prey to such leaders prompted Reinhold Niebuhr to refer to them
as “pawns for Fascism.” 10 Though both Long and Coughlin operated in different regions of the
country, their rhetoric appealed to the same groups of people across these very different areas.
Rather than dividing the United States into north and south, urban and rural, industrialist and
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agrarian, Long and Coughlin struck a deeper commonality that resounded across these historical
divides and bridged together a lower middle-class resistance that defied regional differences.
Long appealed first to the struggling yeoman farmers of his native Northern Protestant
Louisiana. Then, as the Depression wore on, he targeted these appeals to hard-pressed agrarians
across the South who increasingly found themselves with less and less. In his 1928 gubernatorial
race, Long united Louisiana Catholics and Protestants in a storm of discontent. Yet, he also
offered solutions and simple explanations in complex times. By talk of his candidacy he
conjured a hope that he might just be the prodigal son Louisiana needed to pull the state out of
what V.O. Key characterized as “a case of arrested development.” 11 Winning the 1928 race
overwhelmingly, Long rose from his previous position of railroad commissioner to the
governor’s mansion. In the next four years he would build what was perhaps the most
comprehensive state political machine the United States has ever experienced. Eventually,
Long’s successful politicking would win him a large following across the South and West that
included not just agrarians, but struggling professionals and businesspersons whose livelihoods
the Depression seriously threatened. Taking a Senate seat in 1932, Long became a household
name, a champion of the common man who made headlines across the country. Poised to
influence the 1936 re-election campaign of President Roosevelt, Long was assassinated on the
evening of September 7, 1935.
Coughlin’s original audience was altogether different. The radio priest’s broadcasting
career started when he brokered a deal with Detroit radio station WJR to transmit his sermons
from the small parish he would make famous—the Shrine of the Little Flower. Coughlin’s first
broadcast occurred on the third Sunday in October in 1926, and, according to his 1933
authorized autobiography, his hopes were high that he might “let the Little Flower have her day
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in preaching the Gospel to every creature.” 12 Originally a small, local, and devout Catholic
group, Coughlin’s listeners gradually grew to consist of a larger and more diverse following that
extended throughout the Midwest, and eventually to the Middle Atlantic and New England
regions. From his modest start, Coughlin moved from administering Mass and delivering
religious sermons to giving political speeches that were broadcast by thirty-three stations and
reached as many as forty million people. 13 Of Coughlin’s Sunday sermons, Brinkley writes:
In urban neighborhoods throughout the East and Midwest—not only Irish communities, but
German, Italian, and Polish; not only Catholic areas, but Protestant and, for a time, even
Jewish—many residents long remembered the familiar experience of walking down streets
lined with row houses, triple-deckers, or apartment buildings and hearing out of every
window the voice of Father Coughlin blaring from the radio. You could walk for blocks, they
recalled, and never miss a word. 14
As Coughlin moved toward more secular issues, first by speaking more broadly about issues of
social justice, and then by denouncing Communism, and then by discussing economic issues
most directly, his audience burgeoned, reaching the lower middle-class as it extended from urban
to rural communities, from Minnesota and Missouri to New York and Baltimore. 15
Long and Coughlin rose first as forces within their own individual regions. However, as
they came onto the national stage, their respective audiences merged similar groups from
different regions of the country in a common, though loosely-defined, ideology. Although
Long’s audience was more agrarian and Coughlin’s audience more urban and industrialist, these
very different audiences were united in their suffering. Both groups were brought together
through the middle-class resentment and angry rhetoric of Long and Coughlin. Intellectuals
were often viewed by the mass of society as controlling societal wealth and living in a world far
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removed from the material conditions of reality. Demonizing the intellectual was an easy way to
explain the Depression and assuage lower middle-class angst.
Roosevelt staffer and devotee Hugh S. Johnson is sometimes accused of linking the men
together in his attacks on both in March of 1935. 16 Nevertheless, the national press had pointed
out the connection long before. 17 The comparison was only made more explicitly, and more
frequently, after Johnson’s denunciation. After the middle of 1934, when Coughlin made a final
break with the Roosevelt Administration, both men’s audiences seemed to align more as both
gained more national attention. The Johnson attacks in 1935 enhanced this effect, and at
Coughlin’s National Union for Social Justice rally that May, there were newsboys successfully
selling copies of Long’s American Progress. 18 Though Long fans often admired Coughlin and
Coughlin fans often admired Long, neither man was very trusting of the other. 19 While I am
arguing that both men were part of a broad-based national movement, their organizations were
very much separate from each other. That said, there is no doubt that both men were connected
in the American mind, and it is from this connection that historians like Brinkley are able to
claim that Long and Coughlin shared the same ideology. What was this ideology that was able
to overcome differences that had existed long before the Depression and the emergence of either
man on the national stage? What were the set of ideas able to unite lower middle-class
Americans that had before the Depression stood so disunited?
Deriving a specific ideology from the writings of Long or Coughlin, as Brinkley notes, is
a difficult task. However, Long and Coughlin did both share a common ideology that I term as
Depression Populism. According to Brinkley, both men
provided, first, an affirmation of threatened values and institutions, and a vision of a properly
structured society in which those values and institutions could thrive. They suggested,
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second, an explanation of the obstacles to this vision, a set of villains and scapegoats upon
whom it was possible to blame contemporary problems. And they offered, finally, a
prescription for reform, resting upon carefully restricted expansion of the role of
government. 20
Depression Populism, more than anything, was a reaction to modernity, to the displacement
experienced by those that suffered most in the midst of the Depression and thought it a result of
modern capitalism gone awry. While many on the left embraced socialist and Marxist
agendas, 21 the Longites and Coughlinites embraced a vision of America constructed by a
sentimentalizing of community and a juxtaposition of this vision with the evils of modern
capitalism. In no way did Long or Coughlin even come close to resembling the New Left
dissident groups that were, by contrast, staunchly devoted to the idea of the intellectual as a
positive force in society. Instead, Long and Coughlin resumed old arguments, many of which
were borrowed from America’s Populist heritage, and retailored them to the circumstances of the
1930s and, more significantly, to their own needs and designs for grabbing power.
Much of the Depression Populist ideology was reconstructed Jeffersonian idealism, a
replaying and redefinition of the Hamilton-Jefferson tensions that are so fundamental to an
understanding of American populism at its most basic level. Though America by the Depression
had certainly taken the more Hamiltonian route, the Jeffersonian ideal of a republican-agrarian
class of common men was still very much in the minds of many Americans. Indeed, as it did in
the economic violence of the American industrial revolution following the Civil War, this vision
rose to a new dominance with what seemed the failure of modern capitalism in the 1930s. No
longer the agrarian republic the Jeffersonian puritan might imagine, egalitarian ideas of a
morally-upright yeoman class still held sway with those who might take advantage of the old
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arguments and transform them into something revolutionary, or rather, reactionary. Despite the
frequent citing of the framers by both Long and Coughlin, and contrary to their assertions that
they sought to restore community and the dignity of the common man after capturing America
back from the wealth and spoil of the capitalist American aristocracy, neither man’s movement
was at all democratic—not in organizational structure, certainly not in rhetorical approach, and
absolutely not in any genuine ideological sense. Long and Coughlin took romanticisms of the
past, repackaged them, and appointed themselves leaders of a reactionary ideology aimed
ostensibly at the recreation of a past that both men knew could not be realistically attained.
While the fault of Brinkley’s study lies in his inattention to style and the renegotiation of
social reality that both men were able to accomplish with similar aims, he does a remarkable job
extracting an ideology from the historical contexts of both men’s rhetorical careers. In paying
especial attention to the audiences both men appealed to and partially created, or at least
solidified, Brinkley’s work is invaluable to an understanding of just how and why Long and
Coughlin’s audiences were willing to submit to the demagogy of both men so easily.
Demagogues no doubt exert a remarkable force over their audience, though they do not merely
wave a magic wand to cast a spell over their audience. The audience must already be primed and
partially formed by historical and social circumstances to fall victim to the demagogue’s magic.
While it is no doubt the rhetorician’s job to understand the spell concocted, he must understand
that the spell does not come to wield its power in a vacuum. The power both men acquired from
their audience the audience was already, at least partially, preconditioned to give up.
The demagogue, for Fromm, “will usually exhibit in a more extreme and clear-cut way
the particular personality structure of those to whom his doctrines appeal; he can arrive at a
clearer and more outspoken formulation of certain ideas for which his followers are already
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prepared psychologically.” 22 Just as the follower is somewhat predisposed to the leader’s ideas,
so is he or she somewhat predisposed to his or her style. The style of the leader, in Long and
Coughlin’s case, distinctly anti-intellectual, beyond mere content functions as a productive social
force. The anti-intellectual style takes these predispositions and shapes them into a constellation
of rhetorical forms designed to gain social control, wielding authority over the audience and
forcing its submission. Gerald K. Smith, Long’s obsessive follower and president of the Share
Our Wealth Society, admitted as much in an interview with the New Republic: “We did not
create a state of mind; we merely discovered and recognized a state of mind that has been created
by conditions.” 23
Depression Populism: The Transformed Result of an American Tradition
The vision of man Long and Coughlin proclaimed to uphold was that of the common man
and woman struggling against powerful forces far beyond their control. However, both the selfrighteous senator and the fiery radio priest promised that these powerful forces could be brought
down easily if only simple reform were passed: the limiting of large fortunes, the
remonetarization of silver, and guaranteed sums of wealth to be promised by the government.
Long and Coughlin, like the activists of the People’s Party before them, pitted the common man
and toiling worker against the wealthy industrialist and the corrupt politician. The difference,
however, was that while the People’s Party and other Populist movements before the 1930s
stressed local organization and a grassroots politics that bore a bottom-up structure, Long and
Coughlin articulated a national movement that centered on personalities. Long and Coughlin
demanded public investiture in their ability to procure necessary reforms. Unlike the Populists
of the 1890s, reform was to emerge from an input of interests that were articulated and
aggregated from a centralized political organization working on behalf of the people’s interests.
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In contrast to earlier Populist movements such as the Farmer’s Alliance, Long and Coughlin
omitted community structures, local leaders, and local participation in politics. The elimination
of intermediary institutions and the focus of leadership and authority in the cult of personality
demanded complete political subordination. As in the case of Long’s Louisiana, reform was to
tickle down to the people, the result of a top-bottom political structure that would be anathema to
the Populist of the 1890s.
On the Senate floor, in a demonstration of his supposed legislative sincerity, Long once
said, “All I care about is what the boys in the creek think of me.” 24 Similarly, Coughlin, in his
response to Johnson’s 1925 denunciation, claimed to be fighting for the impoverished, the
disadvantaged, and the respectable common man. Telling Johnson that “these inarticulate people
for whom I speak will never forget you and your Wall Streeters,” Coughlin claims his own
purpose to be “motivated by the love of God and by the love of my inarticulate fellow men.” 25
Both men asserted that they were representing the ill-defined poor mass of people with whom
only they could understand and empathize. It also is indicative of both men’s transformation of
the Populist ideology. Historian David M. Kennedy concludes that Long and Coughlin both
spoke in what was
an American-made idiom. It was audible to listeners as far back as Alexis de Tocqueville in
the days of Andrew Jackson. It swelled to a roar in the day of the People’s Party upheavals of
the 1890s and never fully subsided. Often cast in the rough cadences of untutored, rural
American speech, the populist dialect gave voice to the fears of the powerless and the
animosities of the alienated. . . . It was a always a language of resentment, of raw class
antagonism, edged with envy and grudge. In the charged atmosphere of the 1930s, it could
easily become a language of reprisal. 26
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While Kennedy’s observation does seem to largely be true, the resentment and fear driving Long
and Coughlin’s reaction to the status quo broke with the Populist tradition insofar as it took the
Durkheimean anomie that populism seemed intent to cast off and used it instead to exploit the
inarticulate masses Long and Coughlin claimed to so truly represent. Instead of local activism
and individual agency, they encouraged an amorphous brand of mass politics. The common man
was to be celebrated and mobilized, but at the expense of intellect and rational debate.
Foundations in American Populism
In order to understand how Long and Coughlin used the populist political tradition to suit
their own purposes, it is first important to gain an understanding of American populism as a
cultural force and in what state it resided in the American mind. This requires a reconsideration
of populism, which was still strong in the historical memory of Long and Coughlin’s audiences.
Historian David Hicks claims “The Populist philosophy thus boiled down finally to two
fundamental propositions; one, that the government must restrain the selfish tendencies of those
who profited at the expense of the poor and needy; the other, that the people, not the plutocrats,
must control the government.” 27 For Hicks, populism was an economically-determined response
to long-standing oppressive practices that put farmers at a serious financial disadvantage.
However, Richard Hofstadter finds core psychological elements in the Populist ideology
that anticipates many of the arguments advanced in this thesis. According to Hofstadter,
populism was a response to financial sufferings and status decline: it was a response to the
social stigma experienced by many disadvantaged farmers. Concerned with “rank in society,”
the farmer was concerned that “he was losing in status and self-respect.” 28 Populist politics was
thus a means to reinforce the values of the farmer and counter emerging claims of urban
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superiority. 29 As a result, populism, for Hofstadter, “seems very strongly to foreshadow some
aspects of the cranky pseudo-conservatism of our time.” 30
Triggered by a sense of class resentment, populism “has survived in our time, partly as an
undercurrent of provincial resentments, popular and ‘democratic’ rebelliousness and
suspiciousness, and nativism.” 31 Though Hofstadter’s findings have been harshly criticized and
many of his conclusions softened as a result of subsequent study, 32 the dark underside of
populism he identifies does seem to have some truth to it. The farmer and modest workman’s
confrontation with modernity produced some degree of psychological distress and populism was
rooted in this distress and involved clear psychological patterns. Rendered powerless by the
growing “bigness”of agricultural markets and price determinations beyond the farmers’ control,
there were compelling reasons for the farmer to embrace views or explanations that would at
least provide some comfort for the anxious farmer. Populism was more than economic protest.
It provided the distressed agrarian some psychological satisfaction. Looking closely at the social
psychology of populism, there was indeed solace to be taken in celebrating the common man and
lauding the agrarian foundations of American democracy. It provided political organizations
designed to counter the threat of industrialism. However romanticized, populism was a source of
some psychological security—an attempt to regain a sense of efficacy at the grassroots level visà-vis community organization.
Though Hofstadter’s interpretation of the Populist ideology is challenged by many
historians, that this pseudo-conservative proclivity appeared so blatantly in Long and Coughlin’s
ideology some thirty years later does seem to bolster the validity of Hofstadter’s interpretation.
Both Long and Coughlin grew up in lower middle-class backgrounds in areas that were
influenced by the Populist tides of previous generations. Both were inculcated with ideas from
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this dark underbelly of populism that will be explored more thoroughly in my discussion of antiintellectualism. Fromm postulates the leader’s character “shows more sharply certain traits to be
found in his followers” in that “by the accidental circumstances of his upbringing and his
individual experiences these same traits are developed to a marked degree which for the group
result from its social position.” 33 The creeping pseudo-conservatism of populism was certainly
present in both Long and Coughlin’s upbringing, and both men most certainly inherited many of
its features.
Long grew up in Winn Parish, Louisiana, a community with a strong Populist tradition.
Throughout the late nineteenth-century, Winn Parish was well-known for its staunch
commitment to equalitarian principles and resistance to the status quo. “Jacobin clubs” were
present throughout the parish, and Populist publications, speeches, and other political activities
abounded. 34 After the decline of the People’s Party, citizens in Winn Parish found other political
avenues by which to exert their social and political activism. Winn was one of the few parishes
in Louisiana to have a strong Socialist Party and in 1908 proudly elected a socialist to
Congress. 35
Like Long, Coughlin’s early experiences presage the later identification he will have with
his audience and the well-worn Populist ideology. Coughlin emerged from humble beginnings,
growing up the son of a church sexton in Ontario. His parents were committed to him becoming
a priest, and as a result, he received a traditional Catholic education and became acquainted with
the Thomist social justice doctrines of Pope Leo XIII. 36 As Coughlin’s authorized
autobiography fondly records, he grew up in “an ordinary Catholic home” in a friendly, closeknit neighborhood defined by “baseball and football, broken window panes, and the many
escapades which are experienced in the normal boy’s life. . . .” Coughlin would later mesh
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Catholic social justice theory with the populism and lure of small-town community that still
permeated Detroit and the rest of the Midwest across which he would come to broadcast. 37
Both Long and Coughlin spoke in language “steeped in the dominant themes of their
nation’s history. . . . [They] flourished precisely because they evoked so clearly one of the oldest
and most powerful American traditions.” 38 Repudiating the centralization of authority, they
argued vehemently for
the wide dispersion of power [that] had formed the core of American social and political
protest, the nation’s constricted version of a radical tradition, for more than a century. The
American Revolution had reflected a profound fear of distant, inaccessible power; and
American politics through the first half of the nineteenth century has been permeated with the
ideology of republicanism, which rested upon a vision of virtuous and independent citizens
living in a nation of general economic equality and broadly distributed authority. The defense
of the yeoman farmer, the sturdy freeholder, and the society of small, independent
communities of which they were a part underlay two of the dominant political visions of the
early nineteenth-century: first, Jeffersonian and then, in somewhat different form, Jacksonian
democracy. 39
The People’s Party of the 1890s evoked these same themes of faceless and foreboding
centralized power, as did Long and Coughlin, to form “an elaborate explanation of the inequities
of a modern industrial economy.” 40 From this view, economic problems had more to do with
personal greed, government avarice, and a whole host of conspiracies and “sins” against the
common man rather than through one’s own fault. 41 If only the people, guided by their inward
morality, could rule, many of these problems would disappear.
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Further, American Populist prejudices were manifest in the careers of both men and
described as such by the press. In his biography of Coughlin, Charles Tull asserts that the radio
priest “championed inflation, was anti-British and anti-Semitic, and drew large support from the
so-called Populist Midwest.” 42 Tull is not explicit in his assessment of Coughlin’s position as in
line with the old populism of the 1890s; but the New York Times declared after Coughlin’s
Madison Square Garden address on May 22, 1935, that the event was a “reincarnation of the
multitude that swarmed the old Garden to hear William Jennings Bryan in his arraignment of the
gold standard in 1896.” 43
Also parallel to the populism of the 1890s, Long and Coughlin’s messages mirrored the
regional differences in the populism of the Bryan’s People’s Party. Long’s message, like the
Southern populists before him, was broader in scope and attacked the maldistribution of wealth
and accumulation of fortune. Coughlin, on the other hand, like the Midwestern populists he
succeeded, focused more specifically on fiscal and monetary issues. 44 The priest demanded
monetary reform, “eschewing revolution” and coming in accord with the feeling of past populists
that “they could improve their lot with their own hands if opportunity were to be equalized. . .
.” 45 Both Long and Coughlin wholeheartedly subscribed to the old Populists’ egalitarian dictum,
holding true to Liah Greenfeld’s assessment of America as “a rigorously monotheistic nation,
equality being its one true god.” 46
Depression Populism and Ostensible Ideology
Whether the Populists of the People’s Party are seen as primarily “cranky pseudoconservatives,” or as passionate citizens fighting for economic and political rights and the
germinal beginnings of the New Left, 47 Long and Coughlin’s messages can in no way be used to
equate either man as a propagator of the old Populist ideology. While Long and Coughlin took
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what arguments suited their purposes from the old Populist cause, they did not in reality propose
a Populist agenda. Much of Depression Populism’s espoused ideology was only ostensible,
shielding Long and Coughlin’s true purpose—the accumulation of power. Like Hitler, Long and
Coughlin gave the people what they want. To them, “The important thing is not what the genius
who created an idea has in mind, but what, in what form, and with what success the prophets of
this idea transmit it to the broad masses.” 48 This is not to say that Long and Coughlin did not
believe in what they preached or were not guided to some degree by the ideas of Populist
thinkers and politicians before them. They most certainly were to some extent. It is to say,
though, that this is not the complete story.
Whether conscious or not, Long and Coughlin acted against the positive tenets of
Populism which historians fond of the movement are so willing to document. While “Populism
developed among people who were deeply rooted in social and economic networks of rural
communities,” 49 Long and Coughlin’s movements did not. Depression Populism took the
egalitarian-republican ideals of Jefferson, Jackson, and the People’s Party, and transformed them
into a popular appeal. Its message was designed to capture the sympathies of those who longed
for the power the movements of Jefferson, Jackson, Gompers, and Bryan truly did bring to the
people. Depression Populism brought no such power. It was in many ways but an attempt to
gain power, a lie deceptively shrouded in the memory of an ideology that once was connected
with “the rhythms of family and community life in the country-side, with the face-to-face
networks of rural trade and the rounds of ‘swap work’ among neighboring farmers, with the
tilling of crops and relations of production on the land (including the relations between
landowners and laborers), with the bonds and divisions of rural people and townsmen. . . .” 50
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It may be valuable at this point to contrast Depression Populism with the many other
ideologies of the Left that challenged the New Deal. The ideology Long and Coughlin espoused
had little in common with the agenda of the Left. Compared to the League for Independent
Political Action and the Farmer-Labor Party (which was more consistent with the Midwestern
Populist heritage than either Long and Coughlin were to Populist ideals they advocated),
Depression Populism was distinctly anti-liberal, distinctly anti-democratic, and distinctly antiintellectual. Indeed, members of these other dissident groups took measures to separate
themselves from, in the words of Wisconsin Congressman Tom Amlie, “irresponsible
demagogues.” 51 Amlie was not alone in describing what I define as Depression Populism as a
“‘new mass movement’ being ‘directed by the Longs, the Coughlins, and the other essentially
anti-democratic elements.’” 52 Most ironically, instead of strengthening community and
grassroots politics, Depression Populism ripped asunder many of these parochial bonds and
undermined the actual power the ordinary man exercised. However, before getting too far ahead
in my analysis, it is important to first consider the organizational structure of the Long and
Coughlin movements.
Long and Coughlin ran their organizations with tight-fists. The Share Our Wealth
Society and the National Union for Social Justice were anything but democratic grassroots
organizations. Depression Populism
adopted the rhetoric of populist localism, but little of its substance. Nowhere in their
messages was there any vision of the active building of local economic institutions; nowhere
did they suggest that an individual or a community could counter the strength of the modern
consolidated economy through independent, local efforts. What was most conspicuously
absent from the Long and Coughlin movements, in short, and what differentiated them most
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clearly from their populist forbears, was a genuine belief in possibilities. Neither the leaders
nor the followers would admit it, even to themselves, but there was in their vision a thinly
veiled sense of resignation, an unspoken belief that it was by the 1930s already too late for a
fundamental restructuring of American society. 53
Jefferson resisted the role of a strong and centralized federal government. Jackson quashed the
evil and alien danger posed by the National Bank. Bryan denounced big government and
business interests in an economy and was hostile to laissez-faire economics and pro-business
governments. All three, though, emphasized individuals taking independent roles in their
organizations. In contrast, Long and Coughlin called for the people to hand over authority to
their own highly-centralized organizations. In doing so, Long and Coughlin argued, the people
might unite and truly regain power. Yet, always in the background, existed a lack of sincerity on
the part of both men, of realization that so much of their radical agenda was little more than
farce. Perhaps this is what made critics like Raymond Gram Swing so nervous about the
possibility of Long and Coughlin’s popular support, grounded in so little substance, aligning
with corporate capitalism and forming a fascist movement in the United States. 54
Both Long and Coughlin’s national organizations demonstrate well the anti-democratic
nature of their mission. In the case of the National Union for Social Justice, “The vagueness of
goals and Coughlin’s tightly held power suggested to many that the NUSJ was an authoritarian
enterprise strongly reminiscent of European fascism.” 55 Indeed, Coughlin “appointed the
executive board, wrote the constitution, drafted resolutions, proposed legislation, established
committees, dictated rules and regulations, and appointed national officers. Initially, he stated, ‘I
am the Union for Social Justice.’” 56 Long’s organization and distaste for democracy is evident
in any study of the political machinery he constructed in Louisiana. As even his sympathetic
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biographer T. Harry Williams acknowledged, Long “exulted in the use of power, and he erected
in Louisiana a power structure that had no counterpart in any other state. He sometimes took
shortcuts to attain his ends and seemed to scorn the slow procedures of democracy.” 57 As for the
Share Our Wealth Society, Long and the sycophantic Smith wielded control over the several
Share Our Wealth chapters that sprung up across the country. Any chapter “would receive
‘official’ recognition merely by writing Senator Huey P. Long, Washington, D.C., and informing
him of its existence, the names of its officers, and the number of its members.” 58 Like the NUSJ,
Share Our Wealth policy and purse strings were controlled by a central headquarters, and all of
the Society’s funding came from the Long machine in Louisiana. 59 The organization’s Baton
Rouge headquarters would also issue the organization’s press releases and propaganda. When
Long called for letters from his followers, they were to be addressed not to his followers’
congressional offices or other politicians, but to him. 60
Dictators and Desperation: Anti-Intellectualism & the Rise of the Authoritarian
Long and Coughlin’s authoritarian personalities were reflected in the structure of their
organizations and personal attitudes. Brinkley argues that Long, Coughlin, and their followers
operated out of a sense of desperation more than anything else. According to Brinkley, they had
lost faith in “possibility.” No longer could they convince themselves without mass delusion that
circumstances were going to get better—thus, enter Long and Coughlin. Both leaders tried to
offer explanations “of when and why society went astray and how restoration can be
accomplished.” 61 However, these explanations rarely went beyond diatribes against the
moneyed aristocracy and the “bigness” of corrupt government and business. Never did solutions
move beyond panaceas. As Raymond Gram Swing assesses, Long and Coughlin’s movements
resemble Fascism insofar as they seemed designed to “give a lift” to the despondent, 62 to provide
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some hope in a time when to hope seemed all but possible. The desperation Brinkley identifies
and the design Swing deduces as the function of Long and Coughlin’s rhetoric is rooted, as
Fromm might explain, in a “feeling of isolation and powerlessness.” 63 Fromm quotes Julian
Green:
I knew that we counted little in comparison to the universe, I knew that we were nothing; but
to be so immeasurably nothing seems in some way to both overwhelm, and at the same time
to reassure. Those figures, those dimensions beyond the range of human thought, are utterly
overpowering. Is there anything whatsoever to which we can cling? . . . We peer down into a
huge dark abyss. And we are afraid. 64
While many never confront this sense of powerlessness, Fromm argues that this sense of anomie,
or “moral aloneness,” is nonetheless present. 65 Feelings of isolation and powerlessness cause
people to recoil and escape from the burden of negative freedom that is created when the
“primary,” or parochial bonds of traditional society that do not differentiate the self from society,
are ripped asunder by modernity. It is my contention that the anxiety of the Great Depression
and people’s sense of total loss and displacement in their surroundings increased these feelings in
the years just prior to Long and Coughlin’s rise on the national scene.
Returning to the “cranky pseudo-conservatism” Hofstadter identified in Populism, it is
again crucial to this analysis to consider the Depression Populism of Long and Coughlin as a
psychological response to the anxiety brought forth by modernity. Traditional social positions
thrown into question, Depression Populism was in part an attempt to regain control of a world
dominated by economic and social uncertainty. As was the case for the Populist, the past was a
source of comfort for those alienated by modernity and their seeming insignificance in an
economy destroyed by reckless capitalism. In a way, the crash of the stock market and the
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financial collapse of the country proved to many with whom the historical memory of Populism
remained that its earlier claims might just be true. The wealthy banker and industrialist again
seemed responsible. As the people found themselves suffering from an anxiety likely much
greater than that experienced in the late nineteenth-century, these earlier claims provided
convenient explanations of societal woes, and again, powerful mechanisms for social
empowerment and psychological security. Hofstadter writes of the earlier Populist response as
“mean[ing] to diminish, if possible to get rid of, status differences in American life, to
subordinate educated as well as propertied leadership.” 66 The pseudo-conservatism Hofstadter
characterizes as reactionary and irrational seeks to marginalize differences in individual intellect.
Considering the American mythopoesis that all individuals, with the proper effort, have
the opportunity to achieve Alger’s American dream, the American Populist tradition thinks it is
intelligence (not intellect) and moral rightness that secures this dream—the ability of the
common man to succeed. In the Depression, the common man and woman had not succeeded
and some explanation had to be found. Depression Populism’s explanation greatly parallels the
explanation of the People’s Party for the agrarian’s suffering. In addition, the same hope for
populistic democracy is espoused in both ideologies. Rule by the common man was again seen
as the proper means to secure the American dream in both the political and economic arena. The
intellectual, seen in cahoots with forces opposed to the American dream, 67 was attacked.
Coughlin, deriding intellectual arrogance, declared “The divine intelligence of the international
bankers has found its deserved place with the theory of the divine right of kings. Both are putrid
corpses.” 68 The anti-intellectualism Hofstadter identifies as manifest in the Populism of Jackson
and Bryan is again manifest in the anti-intellectualism of Long and Coughlin:
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If the people were to rule, if they aspired to get along with as little leadership as possible from
educated and propertied classes, whence would their guidance come? The answer was that it
could be generated from within. As popular democracy gained strength and confidence, it
regained strength and confidence, it reinforced the widespread belief in the superiority of the
inborn, intuitive, folkish wisdom over the cultivated, oversophisticated, and self-interested
knowledge of the literati and well-to-do. Just as the evangelicals repudiated a learned religion
and formally constituted clergy in favor of the wisdom of the heart and direct access to God,
so did advocates of egalitarian politics propose to dispense with trained leadership in favor of
native practical sense of the ordinary man with its direct access to truth. This preference for
the wisdom of the common man flowered, in the most extreme statements of the democratic
creed, into a kind of militant anti-intellectualism. 69
Instead of the conspiratorial, corrupt, and insincere intellectualism of Wall Street bankers,
Washington insiders, and industrial moguls, the simple intelligence of the common people
provided the answers. Nothing more was needed to reverse the threatening trend of monopolistic
capitalism.
Historian Daniel C. Bennett describes Depression demagogy as seeking “to play on the
discontents and to intensify the original irrational elements within them.” 70 In so doing, the
Depression demagogue “sought to seduce his followers into an emotional attachment to his
person that would effectively block any group awareness of either the real sources of
unhappiness or the real means of solution.” 71 Anti-intellectualism enters the picture insofar as it
is the intellectual and the quality of intellect Hofstadter describes that threatens society’s attempt
to anesthetize itself from social anxieties and the feelings of isolation and powerlessness Fromm
describes. The intellectual, by his or her very nature, “puts some portion of an apparently stable
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world in peril, and no one can wholly predict what will emerge in its place.” 72 As Hofstadter
describes, “intellect is always on the move against something: some oppression, fraud, illusion,
dogma, or interest is constantly falling under the scrutiny of the intellectual class and becoming
the object of exposure, indignation, or ridicule.” 73 The intellectual does not let society get away
with delusion. As a result, movements centered on delusion often attack and disable the
intellectual class before any other. 74 More than merely targeting the intellectual, however, these
movements target intellect itself as subversive and dangerous.
Intellect and the Authoritarian
The tenth of Coughlin’s Sixteen Principles of Social Justice, the platform of Coughlin’s
National Union for Social Justice, declares that it is “in the duty of government to facilitate and
protect. . . against the vested interests of wealth and of intellect.” 75 Identifying intellect as a coconspirator with wealth, Coughlin pits intellect against the common man. That such an
antagonism could be so wholly accepted under the persuasion of the authoritarian results in a
number of ideological consequences warranting scholarly attention. Three of these ideological
consequences come immediately to the forefront: the power of prophet in times of desperation,
the need for middle-class atonement and the need to find a scapegoat upon which to pin the woes
of the Depression, and the need to separate the moral from the intellectual and place moral
intelligence in a position of governance. All three considerations involve approaching
authoritarianism and anti-intellectualism as two phenomena that occur in response to social
anxiety.
As Burke notes in his study of Hitler, the “prophet” provides “a ‘positive’ view of life.
They can again get the feel of moving forward, towards a goal (a promissory feature which
Hitler makes much).” 76 When hope is hard to muster up and one feels powerless, one may well
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“attempt to become a part of a bigger and more powerful whole outside of oneself, to submerge
and participate in it.” 77 Thus enters the false prophet. The false prophet provides his or her
followers with “a new security and a new pride in the participation in the power in which one
submerges. One gains also security against the torture of doubt.” 78 The United States was deep
in the Depression by the time Roosevelt took office in March 1933 and Long and Coughlin
began to appear on the national scene. Skepticism of the modern capitalist system and even of
the basic structure of American government was plentiful, and Americans found themselves in
an economic condition that did not seem to be improving. Though Roosevelt remained popular
throughout his first term, as Long and Coughlin became increasingly critical of the president’s
policies as slow-moving and overly-cautious they picked up an audience that had become
disenchanted with the seeming stagnation of America’s economic, social, and psychological
condition. Long and Coughlin spoke to any who found their “present and future painful to
behold. . . . In a situation of acute anomie, they will, under pressure of anxiety . . . , attempt a
solution which sets up the family pattern of political relationships.’ They will seek succor in a
single figure who claims to be able to control the environment.” 79
Long and Coughlin both became false prophets. Powerful and prophetic, Iltis writes of
Long’s style as “juxtapos[ing] a calming preacherly voice to his impassioned characterization of
the source of the nation’s trouble. He builds and releases tension through style.” 80 As Fromm
writes, such a release of tension is indicative of the calm that comes when security is gained and
doubt conquered. That the catastrophe of the Depression can be easily explained and a solution
just as easily prescribed would certainly seem ludicrous to the rational man or woman. Yet, to
the follower of Long or Coughlin, sorely in need of a way to regain control of reality and enter
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on some path of seeming progression, such false prophecy offered an escape from burdens too
heavy to bear.
Second, the authoritarian impulse offered alongside its anti-intellectual corollary a way
for Long and Coughlin to explain the failure of the lower middle-class in a society devoted to the
ideology of rugged individualism and the Protestant work ethic. 81 As Burke also astutely
identifies in the rhetoric of Hitler,
if one can hand over his infirmities to a vessel, or ‘cause,’ outside the self, one can battle an
external enemy instead of battling an enemy within. . . . This device is furthermore given a
semblance of reason because the individual properly realizes that he is not alone responsible
for his condition. There are inimical factors on the scene itself. And he wants to have them
‘placed,’ preferably in a way that would require the minimum change in the ways of thinking
to which he is accustomed. 82
For Burke, this strategy of Hitler is “purificative” and atones the audience of any guilt they might
have regarding their inability to succeed. Ceding responsibility of financial failure from oneself
to scapegoats—whether industrialists, bankers, corrupt politicians, greed, modern capitalism,
etc.—allowed Long and Coughlin’s followers to mollify their guilt with “minimum change” to
their ways of thinking. As has been noted of their largely lower middle-class following, Long
and Coughlin’s audience did not oppose capitalism but merely sought to find a way to resolve
their own failures in the capitalist system with their acceptance of the capitalist mode of life.
The intellectual posed a threat to this resolution. By contrast, the intellectual demanded a level
of self-reflection that the failed capitalist could not tolerate instead of merely allowing the failed
capitalist to blame his or her failure on the Rockefellers or the Federal Reserve. Intellect was a
threat to the psychological comfort of the lower middle-class. The authoritarian offered comfort.
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Third, and most significant, is the need of Long and Coughlin to push their audience to
separate moral qualities from intellectual qualities while elevating the former over the latter.
Thomas Jefferson once wrote, “State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former
will decide it as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by
artificial rules.” 83 Jefferson was no means anti-intellectual, but he was speaking to the attitude
that somehow intellect was antagonistic to morality. This attitude was integral to the Populist
mythology of the common man. As historian Charles Sellers observes of Jackson’s “rotation in
office” policy, the intent was to keep a good supply of the moral common man in office before
they could be infected with the corruption of bureaucratic expertise. 84 Jackson sought to find
good, common, moral men for office, and became one of the first politicians to attack the idea of
the Washington insider.
America has long accepted the idea that morality is somehow opposed to intellect and
that the two work against each other. The origin of this idea can be traced in part to the
Protestant antinomian impulse and its coupling with the rise of evangelism and the conversion
experience. The Great Awakening and subsequent religious movements continually pit morality
against intellect. It is important to note that it can easily be drawn on and used to suit the forces
of authoritarianism. Long and Coughlin both spoke in a fashion that took advantage of this
traditional antagonism and elevated the moral above the intellectual. What America needed,
according to Long and Coughlin, were not pretentious Washington intellectuals, but men of
morality and common sense. Billy Sunday once preached, “Lord save us from this off-handed,
flabby-cheeked, brittle-boned, weak-kneed, thin-skinned, pliable plastic, spineless, effeminate,
three-karat Christianity.” 85 Similarly, Long and Coughlin argued that America need be saved
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from the same intellectualism. If “Moral warfare makes men hard,” 86 as Sunday once declared,
then cautious thought makes them soft.
In addition to this pitting of morality against intellect, Long and Coughlin’s ability to
portray themselves as on the moral side of the equation is significant. In locating themselves on
the side of morality and their enemies on the side of intellect, both men were able to make it
seem as if their rise to power was one in the same with the people’s rising to power. Swing
writes that “for his supporting public Long is the under-dog southern farmer and villager, the
suppressed, ignored, and privileged person. He is the personification of their aspirations and
their prejudices.” 87
Long’s followers, not unlike the priests Nietzsche identifies in the Genealogy of Morals,
saw themselves as morally superior to the moneyed aristocracy they resented. Swing continues:
Resentment lies in the hearts of many because of the hardship they bore as children, the
dreary hours of work they endured, the advantages they saw given to others but were not fated
to enjoy. Hitler tapped that resentment in building up his great German host. Huey Long has
tapped it in Louisiana and he is confident that he can tap it in the other forty-seven states. 88
Coughlin’s audience, like Long’s, perceive themselves as morally superior. While they might
not be able to compete in terms of intellectual prowess, which varies between men, the
egalitarian faith in the common man and woman accompanied by the mythology of his or her
morality was, as Greenfeld notes, a powerful religion in itself. Hence, the leveling quality of the
idea of an inward-derived morality of the common man created the notion of a disconnect
between morality and intellect. This disconnect also fostered the distinction between intelligence
and intellect that Hofstadter observes. Whereas “Intelligence works within the framework of
limited but clearly stated goals, and may be quick to shear away questions of thought that do not
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seem to help in reaching them,” intellect “examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes, criticizes,
imagines. . . . Intellect evaluates evaluations, and looks for meanings in situations as a whole.” 89
Intellect is thus more challenging and can often be perceived as ego even when exercised for the
benefit of community. For societies fearful of challenge and complexity, intellect is terrifying
and can be threatening to the religion of equality. Thus, intellect is characterized as immoral and
condemned as useless and troublesome, something exterior, worldly, and corrupting. Juxtaposed
to the purity of a deeper, more truthful and inward morality of equals, the corrupting power of
intellect is at once both a foil and an explanation for a society that has been led astray grown
corrupt when faced with the challenges of modernity.
Moving Minds Through Text: Rhetorical Analyses of the Anti-Intellectual Style
The next two chapters of this thesis will aim to illustrate the anti-intellectual style utilized
by Long and Coughlin. The third chapter will assess Long’s famous “Every Man a King”
oration, and the fourth will examine Coughlin’s address, “The National Union for Social
Justice.” I will examine both speeches through close-textual analysis, focusing “on subtleties of
style that are highly individuated.” 90 In addition, I will show how each individual discourse
functions “in a particular world” so that “the very identity of any given text as inextricably
interwoven with its world” can be understood. 91 As we are studying style in terms of its political
function, we must understand how text interacts dynamically within its context, both determined
by and determining structure simultaneously. A close-textual analysis seeks to understand a
discourse as “strain[ing] simultaneously toward autonomous coherence and transparent reference
to the world in which it appears.” 92 While the referential dimension has a tendency to dominate
the observer’s assessment at first assessment, the critic seeks out
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the embedded artistic strategy that makes its referential surface appear plausible and natural.
In fact, when the artistic imagination engages with the public world, when discourse cannot
invoke suspension or disbelief, artistic strategy and referential content become virtually
consubstantial. 93
In assessing both Long and Coughlin’s speeches as rhetorical standards representative of other
texts they delivered, the following chapters will extract an anti-intellectual style that pervades all
of Long and Coughlin’s discourse and which may be extended across time in terms of all the
differences it has made and will make.
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CHAPTER 3
THE KINGFISH &
“EVERY MAN A KING”
Huey Long is the mirror of both the weakness and the strength of American democracy.
He represented the chaos and childishness of its thought, but also the power of aroused might. 1
--Carleton Beals, The Story of Huey P. Long

Raymond Gram Swing, an accomplished journalist, had interviewed Hitler and Mussolini
prior to meeting Long. Upon interviewing him, Swing described the senior senator from
Louisiana as “the embodiment of the appetite for power.” 2 Long advanced quickly in politics,
and his search for and ability to gain power in Louisiana put him in the office of railroad
commissioner in 1918. After spending six years positioning himself in Louisiana fragmented,
one-party politics, Long ran for governor in 1924 in a three-way race and lost. He immediately
commenced an organizing for the 1928 race. Four years later, he won the governor’s seat and
began referring to himself as the Kingfish, the nickname apparently derived from a blackface
character from the popular radio serial “Amos ’n’ Andy.” 3 The Kingfish had no intention of
halting his political ambitions upon capturing the governor’s mansion. After defending himself
from impeachment in 1929 on charges of abusing his office, Long soon launched a race for the
United States Senate. He captured a place in national politics when he won Louisiana’s Senate
primary in September 1930. Not taking his Senate seat until January 1932, Long waited so he
could install a puppet governor to maintain his power in the state. From his position in the
Senate, Long launched the Share Our Wealth Society and, using many of the same strategies by
which he secured power in Louisiana, stormed national politics to secure a large enough
following to make him a threat to President Roosevelt in the 1936 election. The Kingfish was
not to be trifled with.
Throughout his career, Long’s abilities to identify strongly with his political followers
and stir up passions strong enough to get them out to vote were always at the heart of his
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political power. Centered more on rhetoric and less on policymaking, Long’s political career is
one of appealing to key constituencies, securing their vote, and maintaining their loyalty while
climbing from office to office. The Kingfish’s ascension up the political ladder was pushed by
his populist politics and the fact that he was an electoral force to be reckoned with. While this
was true from his early career in Louisiana, upon entering the national political scene it became
widely thought that Long could use the same strategies that elected him governor of Louisiana to
elect him President of the United States. Considering Long’s famous February 1934 “Every
Man a King” address, I will analyze the Kingfish’s ability to attract large followings from a
uniquely rhetorical perspective. Announcing the creation of the Share Our Wealth Society,
“Every Man a King” marks a pivotal point in Long’s career. A rhetorical watershed, it was with
this address that Long would make most public his disgust with Roosevelt and his intention to
function outside party politics.
Largely deliberative and intended to expand Long’s audience and strengthen his message
that it was a concentration of wealth and an entrenched “plutocracy” that was destroying
America, “Every Man a King” must be considered within the larger context of Long’s political
career. Once demonstrating how “Every Man a King” fits within the Kingfish’s national
ambitions, I will then perform a close-textual analysis of the address that approaches the
discourse as comprised of numerous integrated rhetorical forms organized into a united
functioning whole. Concluding this analysis, I will remark on the anti-intellectual style found in
“Every Man a King.” It is at this point that I will identify the political function the antiintellectual style works to accomplish.
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The Rising Threat of Huey P. Long, Candidate of the People
It is likely that Long had presidential ambitions from a point early in his career. In
February of 1930, after dining with former President Coolidge, Long suggested to a reporter a
caption for a photograph taken of the two of them: “The ex-president of the United States, and
the future one.” 4 By the time of his assassination in 1936, it was clear that the Roosevelt
Administration considered him a serious political threat. Indeed, it has been commonly
acknowledged that it was Long and worries over the 1936 election that prompted Roosevelt to
make his quick famous turn to the left in 1935. Indeed, one Democratic senator in 1935 told the
New York Times, “We are obliged to propose and accept many things in the New Deal that
otherwise we would not because we must prevent a union of discontent around [Long].” 5 His
challenge of Roosevelt was in turn the driving force behind the Second New Deal. Knowing
populist politics and ideology well, Long was familiar with how to appeal to Louisiana’s
working town folk and farmers who had long been neglected by the dominant established politics
of the Old Regulars. Starting his career outside Louisiana’s ruling political class, Long became
adept at pulverizing the status quo and thinking outside of the traditional political norms of
Louisiana’s political elite. This quality did not leave him when he entered national politics, and
indeed, it played a large part in catapulting him onto the national stage.
The Kingfish in Louisiana
As noted in the last chapter, Long’s brand of politics and ideology paralleled that of many
of the old Populists he grew up with in the red mud hills and pine forests of Louisiana. He often
borrowed Populist terminology, such as his resurrection and prolific use of the word “plutocrat”
and frequent use of it. 6 Long also refashioned Populist slogans, as he did most famously with
“Every Man a King,” Bryan’s 1900 campaign slogan. 7 In addition, the stridency of his Populist
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message and his aggressive politicking might well be a result of the violent nature of historically
aristocratic Louisiana’s age-old response to Populism. As V.O. Key noted in his study of
Southern Populism, the state’s “Populism was repressed with a violence unparalleled in the
South,” 8 perhaps explaining the Kingfish’s (as Long was often famously known) political
aggressiveness and confrontational political style. Reflecting his ties to Louisiana’s Populist
tradition, upon winning the Louisiana gubernatorial race in 1928 Long’s electoral success
matched almost perfectly the success of the Populist-Republican ticket of John Pharr in the 1896
gubernatorial race, the new governor winning almost the exact same districts by very similar
margins by the use of very similar strategies. 9
A product of Winn Parish, he would start his political career there after attaining a law
degree from Tulane. Long made his first significant set of political waves when he protested
Louisiana’s Employers’ Liability Act, a workmen’s compensation law passed by the Louisiana
General Assembly in 1914. The Act had angered a number of trial lawyers who naturally saw
their profits cut. Initiating a full-scale attack in 1916 against the Liability Act, Long delivered
stump speeches across Louisiana and authored a number of broadsides to be distributed
throughout the state. During this campaign, argues Robert Iltis, “His early argument and style
prefigured his later political rhetoric. In these early discourses, Long both played at provoking
class conflict and argued for conventional political change.” 10 After winning a number of fairly
high-profile trials in compensation cases, at twenty-five he ran for railroad commissioner in
1918, the only state office which did not have a minimum age requirement for election.
As railroad commissioner, Long’s political dynamism showed itself most brightly when
he turned on Governor John M. Parker, whose election he had helped secure in 1920.
Considering Parker to be “a sellout on the issue of taxation,” 11 Long soon became disenchanted
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with Parker and his unwillingness to strongly take on Standard Oil and other oil and gas
companies in Louisiana that for years had managed to pay little in severance taxes. Denouncing
Parker, Long accused the governor of being a slave to corporate interests and a traitor to the
people. Parker tried to mobilize the Louisiana General Assembly to impeach Long in 1921,
“winning valuable publicity for Long and drawing attention to Parker’s failure to deal effectively
with the corporations.” 12 Long used this publicity to run for governor in 1924. Though he
finished third, Long won a surprising thirty-one percent of the vote, just ten points below the Old
Regular winner. 13
Running again in 1928, Long accomplished an overwhelming victory. He won the
parishes in the north of Louisiana that he had taken in 1924 and also won the majority of Cajun
parishes. 14 Most notably, he united Louisiana’s Protestant north and Catholic south despite past
political cleavages between the two groups. This was largely accomplished through his classbased campaign. With Long, economics became a more important voting factor than religion.
Clearly Long could appeal to large numbers of voters and actually get them out to vote. As a
result, his political confidence grew, and Louisiana’s Old Guard elite in turn became even more
wary of his dominating authority. During his years as governor, Long, ever the class warrior,
pushed for high severance taxes, tackled big business, built roads, bridges, and schools, and
largely worked to build the kind of infrastructure V.O. Key had attributed to Louisiana’s political
retardation. His emphasis on the end rather than the means often put him at odds with
Louisiana’s Constitution. Pushing much of this progressive legislation through Louisiana’s
bicameral legislature, Long often walked uninvited into legislative meetings. In one instance,
Long was confronted by a political opponent who waved a copy of the Louisiana constitution at
the Kingfish and proclaimed Long’s actions to be unconstitutional. Long simply declared, “I’m
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the constitution around here now.” 15 To a certain extent, he was. In early 1929, just a few
months into his term, came the breaking point.
Trying to pass a very large refinery tax that pitted the huge force of Standard Oil and the
Old Regulars against him, Long almost met his political end. On April 27, 1929, nearly six
months before Black Tuesday, Long was summoned to appear before the state senate to answer
eight charges of impeachment that had been brought against him by a majority vote in the House.
The senate required a two-thirds majority to convict Long. Though most senators were known to
oppose the controlling forces of the governor, he needed only fourteen of thirty-nine senators to
defeat the charges. 16 At the same time, many of Louisiana’s powerful opinion leaders turned on
Long as well. The state’s major newspapers, which had largely endorsed him after his
inauguration, now supported his impeachment. 17 Nevertheless, with the political skill that
defined him, Long managed to get fifteen senators to sign a “round robin” before the final vote.
Pledging their support for the governor in return for patronage, the round robin effectively ended
the impeachment campaign. The round robin secured Long’s dominance in Louisiana politics
until his assassination. 18 He faced impeachment twice and survived both times, each time
coming out stronger than before.
Reaching Outside Louisiana
After solidly defeating the Old Regulars in 1929, it was clear that Long was in Baton
Rouge to stay. He turned his attention to national politics. Long moved to make political
inroads across the whole South as the region, still recovering from Reconstruction, faced the
increasing hardships of the Great Depression. Positioning himself for a run for the United States
Senate against incumbent Joseph Randsell, Long moved to attack the concentration of wealth in
the nation as a whole. He began to strengthen his rhetoric against big business and Washington
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inefficiency. These attacks would become more intense and more nationally-relevant once his
electoral fate was sealed. When the September 9 primary came along, the Kingfish swept the
1930 election and booted out his Old Regular opponent. Then, instead of taking his Senate seat,
Long remained in the governor’s seat until he could find a replacement to run as a puppet in the
1932 gubernatorial election. When asked about leaving the Senate seat vacant for a year, Long
responded that it was vacant anyway with “Old Feather Duster” Randsell in it. 19
The stock market collapse gradually brought the country into deep depression, and
Long’s strong and confident voice became a great comfort to many both in and outside
Louisiana. His first real emergence outside Louisiana politics occurred when he took on low
cotton prices in 1931. Urging cotton farmers across the south not to grow any cotton in 1932,
Long’s plan was to cause a cotton shortage that would lead to the 1931 crop being more lucrative
than what money could be wrought from the 1931 and 1932 crops combined. 20 Though the
Cotton Holiday, as it became known, was defeated, it was in many ways a political success for
Long. At its defeat, Long claimed the plan was lost because of other state governors’ corrupt
alliances with big business interests. Taking to the radio often throughout the campaign, Long
appeared frequently in newspapers across the South and “show[ed] himself willing to take bold,
forceful action to deal with the Depression, in marked contrast to the more timid and
conservative Southern leaders.” 21 It is likely that Long recognized “his only possible route to the
White House was by having the disadvantaged, across the South and then across the nation,
recognize him as their champion. His defeats would be their defeats, but he would keep on
fighting until the money power was toppled and a better society built.” 22
In January 1932, Long appointed Oscar K. Allen, nicknamed “O.K.,” as his successor.
Allen subsequently won the Democratic primary that month and Long, his power secure at home,
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took his seat in the United States Senate. Despite his new responsibilities, Long was largely
absent from the Senate at first, spending a good bit of his time back home in Louisiana still
storming into state legislative meetings. 23 However, as Brinkley notes, when the Kingfish did
take the Senate floor he proved “shameless in his pursuit of publicity, and so adept at getting it,
that he was soon attracting more attention from the press and the galleries than most of the rest of
his colleagues combined. Other Senators envied and resented him; some attempted futilely to
restrain him; but no one seemed to have any effect.” 24
His legislative platform, upon taking office, was largely based on a redistribution of
wealth across the nation. In April 1932, Long came into direct public conflict with Arkansas
Senate Minority Leader Joe T. Robinson. Delivering a speech entitled “Our Bloated
Plutocracy,” Long informed Robinson that he would be resigning his committee assignments and
might well run as a Farmer-Laborite or Republican if the Democratic Party did not do something
to curb the concentration of wealth that was destroying America. Labeling Robinson part of “the
outer guard of Wall Street,” Long permanently estranged himself from the soon-to be majority
leader (Robinson would rise to this post upon Roosevelt’s election). 25
To further irritate Robinson, prove his vote-getting ability, and draw a national audience,
Long campaigned in July 1932 for Hattie Caraway, the widowed wife of former Arkansas
Senator Thaddeus Caraway. Mrs. Caraway had taken her husband’s seat in November 1931 and
had come to form a close relationship with Long after the Kingfish “cultivated Mrs. Caraway and
became her friend and adviser.” 26 Before the August 9 election, Long’s sound trucks blazoned
Arkansas as he gave stump speeches across the state. Mrs. Caraway would speak in a very softmannered, delicate voice; and Long, as if the principal figure in some circus act, would come out
and deliver a speech that would appeal to Arkansas’ “predominantly small-farmer economy” and
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“arouse into full-fury. . . resentment vaguely felt by the farmers, to weld it, really, into a genuine
class protest.” 27 At the end of the campaign, Caraway ran away with an election no one had
expected her to win before Long entered the picture. Taking the election a whopping forty-seven
percent of the vote, Caraway became the first woman elected to a full-term in the Senate. 28 Out
of the thirty-one counties Long toured, Caraway won 52.7 percent of the vote compared to the
37.4 percent of the vote she won in counties where the Long machine did not appear. 29 It was as
much Long’s victory as Caraway’s, and it must have terrified members of Robinson’s strongly
conservative Senate bloc. The Kingfish again seemed to be defying traditional politics by
organizing a Senate campaign in another state.
After securing Caraway’s re-election, Long returned to Louisiana to campaign for his
long loyal friend John Overton throughout the rest of August and September. Campaigning
against Senate incumbent Edwin Broussard, Overton was elected as the junior Senator of
Louisiana. During the campaign, Broussard, instead of attacking Overton, spent much of his
time criticizing the Long dictatorship. 30 Upon securing Overton’s victory, Long announced,
“I’ve done all I can for Louisiana, now I want to help the rest of the country!” 31 Helping the rest
of the country would soon come to mean allying himself closely, at least ostensibly, with New
Yorker Franklin Roosevelt. Long helped win Roosevelt’s nomination at the June Democratic
National Convention. When Roosevelt’s nomination was almost lost after failing to win the
necessary number of delegate votes, Long rallied the Southern states for the soon-to-be
president. In the process, he was reported as shaking his fist at Mississippi Senator Pat Harrison
yelling, “If you break the unit rule, you sonofabitch, I’ll go to Louisiana and break you.” 32 With
Long’s help, Roosevelt commandingly won the nomination.
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Every Man a King
A staunch supporter of Roosevelt initially, Long soon became “easily the most outspoken
member of the Senate, interjecting himself into every debate and often bringing legislative
progress to a virtual halt for days and weeks on end.” 33 The Kingfish declared that “the
president-elect has not only been nominated, has not only been elected, but he has assumed the
leadership of this Nation in order that he might carry out the one great necessary decentralization
of wealth in America.” 34 Assuming this mandate, Long made every effort to impede the lame
duck Congress in the winter of 1933. The most notable example of this effort is his protestation
of Senator Carter Glass’ Bank Bill. Long delayed a vote on the bill in the Senate through a
filibuster, essentially defeating the legislation. 35 After introducing three bills to place ceilings on
personal incomes, private fortunes, and inheritances, Long made his first national radio broadcast
on NBC on March 17, 1933, five days after Roosevelt delivered his first “fireside chat.” 36 Long
“present[ed] himself as a champion of the common man, working selflessly to help a popular
President fulfill his campaign promises.” 37 It would be the first of many speeches to follow in
which “Huey was in effect placing himself on a level with the President.” 38 Gaining national
notoriety for his spontaneous antics and Southern charisma, Long was a national figure in
congressional politics almost upon entering office. The man who had met the French
ambassador just a year before in green pajamas now sat in the United States’ highest deliberative
body.
After the March address, Long began increasingly to attack portions of New Deal
legislation and various Roosevelt appointments, though always claiming to have a good
relationship with the president. Relations with Roosevelt soon went awry, however, as
dissension between the two popular figures intensified month by month. Upon attempting to
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defeat the creation of the National Recovery Administration, it became clear that Roosevelt and
Long’s alliance was on thin ice. 39 Though Long never publicly denounced the president,
afterward Roosevelt cut ties with Long by no longer consulting the senator on the distribution of
federal patronage in Louisiana. 40 Long was slow with a precise response. Then, in October
1933, he retaliated with vitriol in a New Orleans press conference: “While you are at it, pay them
my further respects up there in Washington. Tell them they can all go to hell.” 41
Compounding the deterioration of his relationship with Roosevelt over the summer and
fall of 1933, Long suffered a tremendous embarrassment when he got into a brawl at the Sands
Point club in Long Island. Following an incident at a urinal, Long apparently became involved
in a bathroom brawl. With reporters present at the party, the brawl resulted in a number of
photographs taken of the drunken senator with a black-eye. The photographs ran across the
country. Indeed, the incident became so well-known that it appeared two years later in the
Lynds’ famous sociological study of Middletown, Indiana: “Huey Long did not have as good a
standing in Middletown as Father Coughlin. . . . People here dislike him morally, and they hold
against him that rowdy fist-fight down at the Sands Point Casino on Long Island.” 42 To make
matters worse, it also appeared that he was losing control of his own political machine in
Louisiana. The Old Regulars saw an opportunity to strike at Long in the late months of 1933;
and in January 1934 the Long-supported candidate lost in the New Orleans mayoral race.
Yet, Long and his machine rebounded. His political capital hurt by both affairs, the
Kingfish labored hard to clean up his image as a drunk and a philanderer. In October 1933, the
public-relations campaign was off to a good start when Long published his self-laudatory
autobiography, Every Man a King. The book depicted Long as “sincere and selfless,” “directed
toward aiding the common people of America.” 43 In addition, he restarted publication of his
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propagandist newsletter. Demonstrating his national political ambitions, the newsletter was
renamed the American Progress instead of just the Louisiana Progress.
Moving once again toward the national spotlight, Long managed a tremendous comeback
when he announced the creation of the Share Our Wealth Society on February 23, 1934, in his
second national broadcast entitled, after his book, “Every Man a King.” According to Long
biographer T. Harry Williams, the idea was completely Long’s and came to him
at three o’clock one morning in his rooms at the Mayflower Hotel. Excited and wanting
someone to discuss it with, he telephoned his secretary (Gerald K. Smith) and another
assistant to come over immediately. He explained his plan to them and then sat down and
sketched on sheets of yellow foolscap paper the whole design of the society—its name, motto,
structure, and the principles it would advocate. 44
Breaking with Roosevelt in October of the year before, the creation of the Share Our
Wealth Society was “the decisive signal that Long was not merely attempting to pressure and
cajole the Administration and the Democratic Party, but was planning to supplant it.” 45 The
“Every Man a King” address and its announcement of the Share Our Wealth Society reenergized
the Long organization both in Louisiana and across the nation. It also organized Longites from
Louisiana to Georgia to Pennsylvania into a united political movement and afforded the senator
an opportunity to intensify arguments that it was a concentration of wealth in America that had
brought about the Depression. Long’s claims that the Roosevelt Administration was merely
aggravating the depression in making numerous backdoor deals with big business gained him a
following that extended beyond the South, beyond mere agrarians. As Long continued to make
these claims, his audience reached the West, some parts of the North, and members of the lower
middle-classes from agrarian, industrialist, and small professional backgrounds.
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The plan called for the confiscation of fortunes that exceeded three or four million dollars
and an increase in annual income and inheritance taxes. 46 The government would redistribute
this money and redistribute it across the nation so that “Every family would not make less than
$2,000 or $3,000 per year.” 47 In addition, Share Our Wealth proposals would encourage the
redistribution of stock and other goods, provide increased benefits for veterans, shorten the work
week to thirty hours, and perhaps create as much as a month’s paid vacation for all workers.
According to Long, each family would be guaranteed a combined earning of $5,000. Never
explaining the financial possibility or economic impact of the plan in any detail, all Long would
say is “I am going to have to call in some great minds to help me.” 48 Never did Long seem to
doubt the feasibility of the plan. The wealthy aristocracy whom the Kingfish had long been
saying owned all the wealth would have more than enough money to fund the plan once it was
transferred.
“Every Man a King”: A Rhetorical Analysis
“Every Man a King” exemplifies well the anti-intellectual style. Arranged into five
major sections, the first three of these sections establishes a need argument for the Share Our
Wealth plan, developing an argument that consists of two premises and a conclusion. The fourth
section presents the remedy Long is proposing. The fifth section crystallizes Long’s proposal in
terms of his need and remedy and, most importantly, emphasizes what is likely the real intent of
his speech: the acquisition of political capital vis-à-vis the people’s identification with him as a
political savior. Just as anti-intellectual speech is not necessarily deliberative, neither does it
follow this five-section arrangement. However, both of the speeches this thesis analyzes are
deliberative and do follow this five-section arrangement. This analysis will examine many of the
forms utilized in “Every Man a King” in order of their arrangement. As both Black and Leff
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discuss, such chronological analysis is performed in an effort to recreate the experience of the
audience. 49 I will make observations as I move from section to section.
America In Decay: Social Inequality and the Framers’ Intention
Long’s address opens with a rhetorical question, a method used throughout the speech to
strengthen the audience’s sense of agency and cause the auditor to question what they have
understood to be the truth so that he may substitute his own version for theirs: “Is that a right of
life, when the young children of this country are being reared into a sphere which is more owned
by 12 men than it is by 120,000,000 people?” 50 Immediately upon starting, Long phrases his
argument in terms of rights, concepts that are easily understood by and resonate with
Americans. 51 Throwing in the notion of an equality in which rights originate, Long asks the
rhetorical question if the fundamental right to life is being honored when the lives of twelve men
is valued higher than the lives of 120,000,000 people. Transitioning from this general
contradiction of what seems a fundamental American principle, Long quickly moves to introduce
himself as a powerful figure who understands the people and the nature of their simple problems.
In his introduction, Long asserts that he regrets he “will not be able to discuss in detail so
much as I can write when I have all the time and space that is allowed for the subjects,” thus
asserting from the very beginning a forthright honesty and authority on the subjects he will be
discussing. Then, moving to identify with his audience in establishing a down-home credibility,
he contends, “my friends, that we have no difficult problem to solve in America, and that is the
view of nearly everyone with whom I have discussed the matter here in Washington and
elsewhere throughout the United States—that we have no very difficult problem to solve.”
While Long never says to whom it is he has talked, he breaks down the wall between the
audience and himself by referring to them as “friends.” The effect is that friends do not

Freedom in Dialogue 73

rigorously question friends, there being an element of trust in such a relationship. By
characterizing his audience as “friends,” the Kingfish moves to weaken the questioning capacity
of his audience. He is going to “tell it like it is,” to illuminate the real problems the country faces
as a best friend would do another a favor.
From the beginning, Long asks his audience to accept him into the club of the common
man as just another one of the ‘good ole boys.’ Informing his audience that the problem
befalling America is not at all difficult to solve, Long appeals to his audience insomuch as he
offers them hope that, though they may not be able to understand their desperate condition, he
can. The authoritative tone he takes throughout the rest of the speech is thus set up from its very
beginning. Long declares:
It is not the difficulty of the problem which we have; it is the fact that the rich people of this
country—and by the rich people I mean the super-rich—will not allow us to solve the
problems, or rather the one little problem that is afflicting this country, because in order to
cure all the big fortunes, that we may scatter the wealth to be shared by all the people.
Previewing what will ultimately be his solution, Long then moves to establish the first premise of
his need argument.
Establishing a division between the interests of “the super-rich” and ordinary people, the
“us” he refers to, Long reinforces this division in his next paragraph:
We (the “us” previously established) have a marvelous love for this Government of ours; in
fact, it is almost a religion, and it is well that it should be, because we have a splendid form of
government and we have a splendid set of laws. We have everything here we need, except
that we have neglected the fundamentals upon which the American Government was
principally (sic) predicated [Emphases added].
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According to Long, the government of the United States characterized as “religion,” as
“splendid” in its form and in its laws, is under threat. The collective “we” he introduces is also
in danger. Using the word “splendid” to complement “religion,” Long introduces what will be
central metaphor throughout his address. “Splendid” connotes a sense of worth, of something
valuable that is built to endure the ages. Yet, here the “splendid form” seems subject to tarnish.
Through this metaphor of America as splendid religion, the first premise of the Long’s central
need argument is introduced. Long tells his audience that our government, our splendid creation
and inheritance, has been neglected, that its very foundation is at risk. For Long, “our”
government is now in conflict with the interests of the “super-rich,” leading Long to his second
rhetorical question: “How many of you remember the first thing that the Declaration of
Independence said?” Long will use the allusion to Declaration of Independence as a
representation of America’s “splendid form” and put it in marked contrast to the status quo.
Before assessing the reference to the Declaration of Independence, however, it is
important to note the effect of Long’s incorporation of “you” into the question. Long moves to
engage his audience, to put the question in their hands, as rhetorical and controlled as it may be.
This is a strategy Long uses throughout the speech so as to give his audience a sense of
empowerment. However, it is only a sense, an illusion of agency. While the illusion is created
that Long’s auditors are thinking for themselves and personalizing his message as if it were a
simple truth told from friend to friend, the reality is quite different. The Kingfish guides his
auditor through his rather simple argument scheme, securing their uncritical agreement with one
premise while simultaneously introducing the next. The working of this dynamic will be
exemplified in much greater detail in other sections of the speech, though it is important to have
it in mind from its beginning.
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Shifting from this “you” back to “we,” Long introduces the Declaration of Independence,
thus enacting the metaphor of America’s great past religion: “It said, ‘We hold these truths to be
self-evident that there are certain inalienable rights of the people, that there are certain
inalienable rights of the people, and among them are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’;
and it said, further, ‘We hold the view that all men are created equal.’” Long then asks, again
rhetorically,
Now what did they mean by that? Did they mean, my friends, to say that all men were
created equal and that that meant that any one man was born to inherit $10,000,000,000 and
that another child was to inherit nothing? Did that mean, my friends, that someone would
come into this world without having had an opportunity, of course, to have hit one lick of
work, should be born with more than it and all of its children’s children could ever dispose
of, but that another would have to be born into a life of starvation?
Boldly calling the state of the nation into question, asserting that it has drifted from the precepts
upon which it was originally founded, Long portrays himself as prophet among the people.
Delivering a jeremiad calling for America to recover its noble past and drive out the infidels or
risk losing its identity, Long passionately argues the inconsistency of what he asserts to be the
Declaration of Independence’s vision of America and the real America—what the chosen nation
has become. He creates a disturbing dissonance and appeals to the discontents of his audience,
informing them that life as they know it is not how it was intended to be. After asking
jeremiacally the rhetorical question about child starvation, Long asserts, “That was not the
meaning of the Declaration of Independence. . . .” In so doing, Long explicitly declares the first
premise of his need argument: The status quo is not in accordance with the meaning of the
Declaration of Independence.
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Asking two more rhetorical questions, Long again recites the question he opened with
and then introduces a second:
Is that, my friends, giving them a fair shake of the dice or anything like the inalienable right
to life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness, or anything resembling the fact that all people are
created equal; when we have today in America thousands and hundreds of thousands and
millions of children on the verge of starvation in a land that is overflowing with too much to
eat and too much to wear? I do not think you will contend that, and I do not think for a
moment that they will contend it.
Shifting to “you” at the end, Long places, for an instant, the auditor outside the “we” created by
the rhetor, a “we” that agrees with the tenets of the Declaration of Independence, with the rule of
fair play and freedom and abundance that the framers’ envisioned. In this instant, the auditor
must make up his or her mind, concluding whether or not the current situation of the United
States is indeed in agreement with the meaning of the Declaration. However, the choice before
the auditor is not so much the choice it might seem. The auditor can either agree and cede this
ground to Long, verifying his prophetic-like credibility, or fall outside the “we” and risk being
placed outside the tenets Long uses to identify with his audience. This coercive element of the
fear of being cast outside the celebrated group of the common man is a recurring theme in
“Every Man a King,” and the I-we-you shifts work quite effectively in creating it. To speak even
further of the unwillingness of Long to give any control to his audience, he authoritatively
declares at the end of his rhetorical question that “this is not the meaning.” The Kingfish has
already instructed his audience, leaving the auditor to join with him or be cast into the sort of
dreaded out-groups that anti-intellectual speech is so adept at creating.
God’s Command: Distribution of Wealth
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Immediately moving onto the next section of the speech, Long clearly marks his second
premise: “Now let us see if we cannot return this Government to the Declaration of
Independence and see if we are going to do anything regarding it.” Agreeing with the first
premise, the audience is affirmed in the “us” and “we” of Long’s transition. Typical of Long’s
speech, the answer is found authoritatively, though posed again in a rhetorical question:
Why should we hesitate or why should we quarrel with one another to find out what the
difficulty is, when we know what the Lord told us what the difficulty is, and Moses wrote it
out so a blind man could see it, then Jesus told us all about it, and it was later written in the
book of James where everyone could write about it?
Recognizing the need to take this answer slowly, I will consider it in parts. “We” once again
used excessively, Long moves his audience from revelation to revelation in a number of
dependent clauses with each leading to the next creating a crescendo effect of overwhelming
credibility. The auditor experiences a sense of progress as the argument unfolds itself, and
Long’s comforting control is again experienced.
He offers simple, age-old solutions to what he claims are not complicated economic
phenomena. The answer is in what the Lord, Moses, Jesus, and James have told ordinary people.
Long bolsters his egalitarian argument in terms of presenting these figures as accessible
exemplars for all to follow. The common man and woman can access God equally if they follow
such good examples and if they are enabled to act according to them in a fashion Catherine
Albanese describes as melodramatic. 52 The common man to whom Long speaks, and in which
he includes himself, is but a mass of people living according to the dogmas they adhere to. They
are righteous believers oppressed by the wealthy capitalist class. As Jonathan Edwards
instructed his New Light Congregationalists, faith is to be lived and enacted. Through a parallel
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dynamic, Long encourages people to live and enact faith as he authoritatively describes it
through the Lord, Moses, Jesus, and James. Antinomianism thus becomes nothing but a guise
for conformity. In true evangelical fashion, Long declares that all have access to the solution as
it unfolds itself in the Scripture. Catachresis aside, the conversion of his Christian audience’s
wisdom is all that is needed as Long recites Scripture:
I refer to the Scriptures, now, my friends, and give you what it says not for the purpose of
convincing you of the wisdom of myself, not for the purpose ladies and gentlemen, of
convincing you of the fact that I am quoting the Scripture means that I am to be more believed
than someone else; but I quote you the Scripture, rather refer you to the Scripture because
whatever you see there may rely upon will never be disproved so long as you or your children
or anyone may live. . . [Emphases added].
Affirming his sincerity, Long’s use of “you,” as I have before said, again creates the illusion of
the audience’s agency. Yet, his introduction of Scripture introduces a dogmatic element. The
Scriptures are not to be questioned, and Long leaves no room to question his interpretation of
them. Instead, he relies on Scripture as a source for his own arguments, rendering the masses
unthinking and unable to question the validity of his interpretation or their applicability to the
circumstance in which Long is applying them. Using Scripture, Long presents his second
premise and the most authoritative of all: True societies live according to what the Scriptures
tells us, and the Scriptures command the distribution of wealth
Long promulgates as a preacher would, “But the Scripture says, ladies and gentlemen,
that no country can survive, or for a country to survive it is necessary that we keep the wealth
scattered among the people, that nothing should be held permanently by one person. . . .”
Assessing it to be the judgment of the Lord that “we would have to distribute wealth every so
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often, in order that there not be people starving to death in a land of plenty,” Long shifts back to
using “we” and using the phrase, once more, to excess in outlining a number of problems we, as
Americans, as good common men and women, face. Indeed, Long uses the phrase “We have” to
start the next five sentences after his declaration of what he believed the law of the Lord to be in
explanation of the many problems America faces before introducing the conclusion of his need
argument. The parallel structure works to enforce the authority of his argument and to add to the
sense of progress that his jeremiacal prophetic tone creates.
America’s Salvation: A Sharing of Wealth
Linking God’s command of wealth distribution to a tarnished America, Long explains
American society’s inconsistency with the vision of the framers’ as a result of its inability to live
by God’s command. Long declares:
We have trouble, my friends, in the country, because we have too much money owing, the
greatest indebtedness that has ever been given to civilization, where it has been shown that we
are incapable of distributing to the actual things that are here, because the people have not
money enough to supply themselves with them, and because the greed of a few men is such
that they think it necessary that they own everything, and their pleasure consists in the
starvation of the masses, and in their possessing things they cannot use, and their children
cannot use, but who bask in the splendor of sunlight and wealth, casting darkness and despair
onto everyone else [Emphases added].
Explaining America’s “incapability” to exist according to Scripture, Long demonstrates his
controlling style in his multiple use of conjunction. Linking multiple clauses together through
his use of “and,” Long secures the feeling from his audience that “the story is confirmed and
inevitable; that there are no contingencies, and everything happens with double assurance of
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something foretold.” 53 Achieving this effect, Long moves to assert his concluding premise:
America’s inability to abide by God’s command is the cause of its troubles, and America must
redistribute wealth in order to attain its former splendor.
The shift into this conclusion is again clearly marked with Long’s transition, “Now, let us
take America today.” Discussing the debt Americans owe and the exorbitant interest that only
goes to strengthen the position of the already wealthy, Long affirms his position: “I am going to
tell you what the wise men of all ages and all times, down even to the present day, have all said:
That you must keep the wealth of the country scattered, and you must limit the amount any one
man can own.” After this reiteration, the Kingfish moves to further divide “we” (Long’s
supporters up to this point—the ordinary, God-fearing man and woman) from “they” (the
wealthy financiers, industrialists, and corrupt politicians). Shifting quickly to “you,” Long
preaches
Now, my friends, if you were on an island where there were 100 lunches, you could not let
one man eat up the hundred lunches, or take the hundred lunches and not let anybody else eat
any of them. If you did, there would not be anything else for the balance of the people to
consume. So, we have in America today, my friends, a condition by which about ten men
dominate the means of activity in at least 85 percent of the activities that you own. . . . They
own the banks, they own the steel mills, they own the railroads, they own the bonds, they own
the mortgages, they own the stores, they have chained the country from one end to the other,
until there is not any kind of business that a small, independent man could go into today and
make a living. . . .
The division between big businessmen and the “small, independent man” is vast. The ordinary
man and woman who abides by the Scriptures is righteous. The big businessman who eats all the
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lunches is usurious and filled with sin. America’s salvation and hope to once more find accord
with the natural rights principles of the Declaration of Independence rests in the need for the
redistribution of wealth.
Further arguing from authority, Long alludes to Socrates and Plato: “Read what they said.
Read what Plato said; that you must not let any one man be too poor, and you must not let any
one man be too rich. . . .” Long then remarks about redistribution, “It is a very simple process of
mathematics that you do not have to study, and that no one is going to discuss with you.” Long’s
audience does not even need to endeavor to find the answers for themselves. Instead, they have
Long. Long continues:
So that was the view of Socrates and Plato. That was the view of the English statesmen. That
was the view of the American statesmen. That was the view of American statesmen like
Daniel Webster, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, William Jennings Bryan, and Theodore
Roosevelt, and even as late as Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Both of these men,
Mr. Hoover and Mr. Roosevelt, came out and said there had to be decentralization of wealth,
but neither one of them ever did anything about it. But, nevertheless, they recognized the
principle. The fact that neither one of them did anything about it is their own problem that I
am not undertaking to criticize. . . .
Citing even more authorities and throwing the whole of the American tradition irrefutably behind
his argument, Long strengthens the rhetorical effect of his audience in the same way he did in
alluding to the Lord, Moses, Jesus, and James. Yet, here he does more than just that. Here he
provides two illustrations of men who acknowledged the teachings, but went against them.
Long, in typical antinomian fashion, realizes the problem as uniquely the audience’s. The
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problem is morally grave and caused by the corrupt intellect of Hoover and Roosevelt who have
caused Americans to wonder astray from inward moral truths.
The parallel use of “that” again emphasizes the revelatory prophetic authority with which
Long speaks. In addition, the fear of being cast into the damned along with Roosevelt and
Hoover is illustrative of the coerciveness of the anti-intellectual style. The common man and
woman shall inherit the earth by virtue of inner goodness. The man and woman who questions,
who criticizes, who dares to remain a “you” might well be damned. Long the prophet knows of
salvation, and it is only the morally corrupt who refuse to accept his vision. Utilizing an
evangelical technique, Long overwhelms his audience with “evidence” to create a crescendo
effect designed to force the submission of his audience to his point of view. Stringing relative
clauses together and incorporating numerous conjunctions, he bombards his audience with
“reasons” as to why they must support what he is saying if they are to live by the righteousness
of tradition that is the pathway to their moral salvation.
The Righteous Shall Prevail: The Share Our Wealth Society
After remarking on the philosophies of Socrates and Plato as great authorities who also
supported redistribution and warned societies about the dangers of the accumulation of
exorbitant amounts of wealth in the hands of a few, Long moves into the remedy section of his
argument after, once more, pitting the common man against the corrupt capitalist. Transitioning
to his remedy argument, Long promulgates,
It is necessary to save the Government of the country, but it is much more necessary to save
the people of America. We love this country. We love this government. It is a religion, I
say. It is a kind of religion people have read of when women, in the name of religion, would
take their infant babies and throw them into the burning flame, where they would instantly be
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devoured by the all-consuming fire, in days gone by; and there probably are some people of
the world even today, who, in the name of religion, throw their tear-dimmed eyes into the sad
faces if their fathers and mothers, who cannot give them food and clothing they both needed,
and which is necessary to sustain them, and that goes on day after day, and night after night,
when day gets into darkness and blackness, knowing these children would arise in the
morning without being fed, and probably go to bed at night without being fed [Emphases
added].
Declaring America “is a religion,” Long affirms the metaphor he introduced in the preface of his
speech and heightens the salvation-damnation effect. Again employing the repetitive
conjunctions, Long pits the religious ordinary man and woman against the conspiring and corrupt
man and woman. The Kingfish’s audience is by this time even more willing to accept the
inevitable reforms of his remedy and are at this point in the speech rendered passive spectators of
whatever vision Long will unfold. He is there to comfort, and at this point they will largely
accept whatever policy he espouses.
Long announces his solution: to make “every man a king.” Long then lays out a number
of proposals, all of which employ “we propose” versus “I propose.” Long and the audience’s
thoughts become the same. The rhetor and auditor have become one. In proposing the limiting
of fortunes, the guaranteeing of fixed incomes, old-age pensions, veterans benefits, limits on
hours of work, and a highly-graduated taxation system, Long employs “we” throughout his
various descriptions.
Man of the People: A Political Savior
Securing identification with his audience though his use of colloquialisms, his elevation
of common sense, and his stated belief that ordinary religious men are far superior to
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complicated corrupt men, Long also secures a powerful place for himself in the psychology of
his audience. Kenneth Burke writes, the rhetor who “may have to change an audience’s opinion
in one respect . . . can succeed only insofar as he yields to that audience’s opinions in other
respects. Some of their opinions are needed to support the fulcrum by which he would move
other opinions.” 54 In the case of “Every Man a King,” not only does Long yield to his
audience’s opinions in some respect (identification), he yields to their opinions, and then,
dominating their thought process and identifying with them as “friends,” moves them to accept
his need argument and the remedies he offers as part of the Share Our Wealth Plan. At the
conclusion of his speech, Long once again reverts to “I”:
Now, my friends, I am going to stop. I thank you for this opportunity to talk to you. I am
having to talk under the auspices and by the grace and permission of the National
Broadcasting System tonight, and they are letting me talk free. If I had the money, and I wish
I had the money, I would like to talk to you more often on this line, but I have not got it, and I
cannot expect these people to give it to me free except on some rare instance. But, my
friends, I hope that you will get up and help in the work, because the resolution and bills are
before Congress, and we hope to have your help in getting together and organizing your Share
Our Wealth Society [Emphases added].
Long’s shift to using “I,” and using it repetitively, serves to elevate his status as a prophet
predicting the inevitable and comforting the auditor with his power and grasp of the desperate
situation of the Depression. In addition, Long’ use of “you” again provides the auditor with
some sense of agency as he or she looks to Long as a political savior. However, it is “we” who
shall prevail and be saved. All “we” has to do is simply follow the all-encompassing wisdom of
the omnipotent “I.”
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Encouraging the people to join Share Our Wealth societies across the nation, Long tells
millions of Americans to “Enroll with us. Let us make known to the people what we are going to
do. . . . We have got a little button that some of our friends designed, with our message around
the rim of the button, and in the center ‘Every man a king.’” The prospect of joining such a
group of wise common men was no doubt a great comfort to many of the Depression’s most
hopeless victims, and Long offered a strong personality with which to identify strongly with and
submit to. Although Share Our Wealth was utterly bogus in terms of its feasibility, and though
Long never took very seriously the drafting of actual policy to accompany its framework, “Every
Man a King” won the Kingfish a devoted following that would stick with him until his
assassination in September 1935. It would strike fear into the Roosevelt Administration, and it
would catapult a series of criticisms that Long represented a Fascist threat to the United States.
Caught in a series of carefully controlled and leading clauses, Long’s audience easily became
trapped in the need premises of the speech and an over-identification with the rhetor that equated
to submission. More than identity politics as usual, Long’s followers worshipped him as a
demigod that represented not only their interests, but their very being.
The Anti-Intellectual Style as Over-Identification, Possession, and Incapacitation
“Every Man a King” launched Share Our Wealth societies across the nation and was the
start to what Swing has characterized as the most successful time in Long’s political career. 55
With the speech and the creation of Share Our Wealth societies throughout the country it was
clear that Long aimed to work far outside traditional party politics. With “Every Man a King,” it
was further clear that he would break with the Democratic Party and battled against President
Roosevelt in the 1936 election. Indeed, the increasing number of Share Our Wealth societies and
massive enrollment in the program throughout 1934 and 1935 “furnished an index to the
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Senator’s growing political strength. . . .” 56 Long turned administration of Share Our Wealth
over to Gerald K. Smith, who H.L. Mencken described as “the gutsiest and goriest, loudest and
lustiest, the deadliest and damndest orator ever heard on this or any other earth . . . , the
champion boob bumper of all epochs.” 57 Under Smith’s zealous leadership, the number of
societies across the country increased as the “boob bumper” traveled from town to town. All of
the Society’s activities were run by Long and Smith from Baton Rouge; and though no one was
precisely sure what its purpose was, by 1935 it was commonly believed that the Share Our
Wealth would support political candidates. 58 Share Our Wealth pamphlets abounded, and by
1935 Share Our Wealth clubs were prominent from the South to Philadelphia to New England,
one Newark man declaring that he saw no reason why his town could not have 50,000
members. 59 A great success, “Every Man a King” commenced an enthusiasm that would sweep
the nation.
In highlighting its anti-intellectual style, it must understand how the forms Long utilizes
throughout the speech function together to accomplish a political effect. In that “Every Man a
King” is rhetorical watershed in Long’s career as “Messiah of the Rednecks,” 60 the speech
exemplifies Long’s effort to denigrate intellect and the intellectual by undermining individual
agency, pitting thought against morality, subsuming the individual into a groupthink mentality,
and revealing reality as a prophet might in opposition to common reason and better judgment. In
shifting agency from “you” to “we,” Long creates the illusion through rhetorical questions and
inclusive pronouns that the audience is in control has an active role in what is being said, though
this is not at the case. Indeed, the audience is merely being told what to think and do, and is in
fact being downright coerced into agreement for fear of being cast into a group outside of the
common man and woman that “Every Man a King” so celebrates.
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A number of dichotomies are used to facilitate this fear of alienation. The moral man and
woman who suffers and toils is lauded for his or her moral endurance and earthly suffering.
However, always rendered passive, they are not celebrated for their potential to think and act
independently. The immoral man and woman thinks and acts independently for his or her own
good, and to do so might well risk the auditor being perceived as belonging to this immoral class
rather than the righteous class of which Long speaks. The Kingfish’s frequent and deft use of
division, contrasting a good and Heaven-bound “we” to an evil and damned “they,” heightens the
impact of these moral-immoral, good-evil, moral-intellectual dichotomies. While those not
included in the category of the common man and woman are held to be a cause of Depression
woes, those who place themselves in the in-group receive the benefit of being cleansed of their
own failure to succeed.
To compound this effect, Long’s constant use of a prophetic and revelatory tone gives the
discourse a sense of inevitability that renders its arguments beyond question and makes
spectators out of the audience. The evangelical crescendo effect created à la his use of relative
clauses and repetitive conjunction overwhelms his audience into accepting his message. Still
passive, Long’s moral sufferers easily fall victim to the misperception that they will be saved if
they embrace the Kingfish’s inevitable vision of Share Our Wealth and elevate him as their
leader. Instead of judging the merit of Long’s arguments and his application of the frequent
authorities he cites, the audience is instead caught in a spell in which the confident and superior
Long tells the people what their problem is and offers them a solution. As if received on high,
the Share Our Wealth Society seems designed to save the chosen people of America from what
would otherwise be a gloomy fate. Long offers Americans an opportunity to restore their city on
a hill.
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Most of all, and as the cumulative effect of all these various functions, “Every Man a
King” secures for Long an over-identification of the audience with the rhetor by which Long is
able to subsume his audience as they strive to surrender their freedom to his superior strength
and skill. As Swing writes of Long,
His is a mastering as well as masterful mind, which goes far to explain the unstinting
admiration of his followers. They are used to his bad manners, they forgive the ruthlessness
of his political methods, they condone the corruption of his regime, they overlook his
innumerable impetuous blunders, because the man has the gift of an amazing, almost baffling
mental ability. He towers over them, he out-smarts them, he knows. He is the hill-billy come
to power, with the crudity of the hill-billy and his native shrewdness multiplied tenfold. Hillbillies have been the underdogs of the South; now through Huey Long they are supreme in
Louisiana. 61
Long, provincial yet intelligent, is driven by a common sense intelligence that is more efficient
than intellect. He enacts his own argument as to the virtue of the common man and woman,
standing before them as the manifestation of all their hopes and aspirations. His followers, long
shut out of the political system, may vicariously exercise power through his will. The Kingfish
gives his audience something and someone to believe in, and he comforts them insofar as he
provides them with an example of what they might achieve and a set of scapegoats on which to
blame their troubles. One critic once acknowledged of Long “his ability to comport himself ‘like
a politician who is all things to all men. He weeps with the afflicted, jests with the jolly, storms
with the vindictive, argues gravely with the mentally alert.’” 62 Yet, none of these actions is
necessarily sincere. All are roles Long plays to secure power through achieving a ‘oneness’
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with his audience by which he may subsume the entirety of their being. The “we” Long
generates and constantly employs is the foundation of his demagogy.
Manipulating the fear of being grouped outside the “we” he creates, Long secures a
position of power for himself over his audience. He has them surrender their freedom and gain
instead “a new security and a new pride in the participation of power in which one submerges.” 63
Though his audience might be under the illusion that power is still theirs and is only being
exercised through the figure of Long, the fact of the matter is instead quite different. Long,
making every effort to identify with his audience and being successful in so doing, uses this
identification not just as a fulcrum by which to sway their thoughts, but rather as a device by
which to take their being. He possesses them. Once under his spell, their very identity so
entangled with his that they cannot resist, their intellect is incapacitated and they are left merely
to execute with all the efficiency of intelligence what their leader deems to be righteous, moral,
and appropriate. Ironically, without intellect, they lose all sense of morality. Thus is the
function of the anti-intellectual style.
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CHAPTER 4
THE WARRIOR PRIEST &
HIS SIXTEEN PRINCIPLES
. . . He is stirring up the animals, and that has got to be done by someone. The masses
are sluggish-minded and have not shown any faint signs of rebellion until recently.
The recovery program opposed by the moneyed interests cannot be carried through on an
intellectual plane alone. The masses must be enlisted to fight for it before you can put it over.
Father Coughlin is arranging that kind of thing to a considerable extent,
and in doing so is a useful citizen. 1
--John Ryan, The New York Times, December 5, 1933

Though Catholic University theology professor and social justice activist John Ryan
would first see Father Coughlin as a useful tool in promoting the New Deal and other reform
measures most liberal Catholics supported, he would later reverse himself and denounce
Coughlin as full of “ugly, cowardly, and flagrant calumnies.” 2 Ryan was not alone among those
who supported Coughlin in his early years only to denounce him when his cause ran contrary to
their own. It seemed that Ryan was comfortable with Coughlin’s anti-intellectual speech insofar
as it worked to accomplish his own political agenda. However, when Coughlin changed his
position to attack President Roosevelt in early 1935, Ryan changed his mind.
In order not to commit such hypocrisy, Father Coughlin’s speech must be recognized for
what it inherently is regardless of its alignment with any one political agenda. As best as one can
tell from reading Ryan’s characterization of Coughlin, Ryan knew exactly how Coughlin’s
speech functioned and was fully aware of its power. Yet, he did not denounce it. Though more
joined Ryan’s position, especially after the failure of the Union Party in the 1936 election,
Coughlin’s rise on the radio is partly explained by those who tolerated his Sunday radio sermons
despite their increasing demagogy. Indeed, many such as Ryan, and perhaps even Roosevelt in
the early stages of his presidency, regarded Coughlin and his audience as valuable political tools.
It was only when Coughlin’s vitriol against Roosevelt became too much for many people to
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swallow that many began to denounce the radio priest; and by then his power and the fanaticism
of many of his followers had swelled to make Coughlin an increasing threat to democracy.
Coughlin’s discourse, like Huey Long’s, dominated the public sphere of the 1930s and, as
has been noted, received more mail than any other man in America. His program garnered as
many as forty-five million listeners. 3 From his Sunday radio sermon’s start in 1926, Coughlin’s
audience grew as his themes became more secularized, more political, and more retaliatory
against the wealthy classes and corrupt Washington politicians. Coughlin conjured up the
preexisting resentment felt by the lower middle-class. Like Long, he managed to direct that
resentment against whatever or whomever he deemed the enemy to be, whether communism, the
concentration of wealth, the monetary system, President Roosevelt, or, as he targeted later in his
career, the Jewish people. After obtaining a radio following across the Midwest that penetrated
sections of the Atlantic seaboard, Coughlin began to speak increasingly about the Depression as
a result of greed and the failure of American society to structure its economic system according
to what he considered to be God’s will. The number of radio stations where he could be heard
and the number of listeners he attracted increased as he talked more about these issues
traditionally held to be outside the domain of a priest’s expertise.
Coughlin used the radio as a device by which to console Depression-suffering Americans
long before Roosevelt took to the air in March 1933. Aligning himself first with Roosevelt,
Coughlin drifted slowly away from the President (more slowly than Long) until the radio priest
began to criticize the Administration in 1934. The break with Roosevelt was never really
complete until 1935, however. In November 1934 Coughlin delivered his speech introducing the
National Union for Social Justice and its Sixteen Principles of Justice.
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Like “Every Man a King,” “The National Union for Social Justice” is a deliberative speech that
exemplifies the anti-intellectual style. Similar to Long, Coughlin’s announcement of his own
organization is comprised of a need-remedy argument. The need is identified in Coughlin’s
description of a deteriorating America; the remedy, like Long’s, is the good that might come
from the proposals from and membership allegiance to a created organization. While Coughlin’s
group was not organized as well as Long’s Share Our Wealth Society, it did attract many
members from among the same audience Long targeted. The intent of the organization was also
unclear, as Coughlin became “even more frenetic, as if he were competing with the man in the
White House whom he sought to impress, to counsel, and perhaps, in his more arrogant moods,
to control. Failing all of this, he struck out on his own and formed his own organization in. . . the
National Union for Social Justice.” 4
The National Union eventually worked to support political candidates, and it was clear
that it would likely become a third-party ticket in 1936 or merge with other organizations in so
doing. Like Share Our Wealth, the National Union worried the Roosevelt Administration and
the numerous critics who largely regarded the organization as a creeping Fascist threat. The
Nazi Party had started out slow and whacky, and the National Union could become a similar
threat to democracy in America. Later, in 1938, long after his power had declined, Coughlin told
listeners that his political purpose was to transform the United States into a corporate state
resembling Fascist Italy. Though he denounced totalitarianism, racism, and class hatred,
Coughlin wished for “a single national religion, recognized by the state.” 5 Condemning
totalitarianism, racism, and class hatred, Coughlin indeed would indeed propagate all three at
some time in his career.
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The Radio Priest’s Rise to Power: Coughlin and His Flock
Born a Canadian in Hamilton, Ontario in 1891 the son of two third-generation Irish
immigrant parents, Coughlin’s father was the sexton at the local Catholic Church where he and
his wife had met. 6 Coughlin’s parents desired him to be a priest from birth, and he received a
strict religious education from his very early beginnings in Hamilton. First enrolled at St.
Michael’s prep school, which was attached to St. Michael’s College of the University of
Toronto, Coughlin entered the University of Toronto in 1907 to complete his degree in 1911. 7
Upon graduation, he entered St. Basil’s Seminary in Toronto to prepare himself for the
priesthood. Coughlin was trained for the priesthood by the Basilians who largely “opposed
modern economic development and the role of money, banking, and, particularly, usury.” 8 He
would take many of the Thomistic doctrines he learned from the Basilians and the social justice
papal encyclicals, “Rerum Novarum” and “Quadragesimo Anno,” and transform them into a
powerful message for political change by God’s commandment. 9 Though later denounced by
the social justice movement and prominent scholars like Ryan, Coughlin lifted these themes and,
amalgamating them with the American Populist tradition of which he was familiar, molded them
into something bold and dangerous. The social doctrines of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Pope Leo
XIII, and Pope Pius XI, when blended with the Populism of Bryan and others, would become a
powerful fomenting force for the Midwestern man and woman of the lower middle-class. Indeed
this strange elixir of Coughlin’s message would gain large audiences across the nation. It would
lead the radio priest to form a nationwide party that, though resulting in a circus spectacle and
huge electoral defeat in 1936, nonetheless could have easily been successful under slightly
different circumstances and changed the course of history.
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The Priest and the Shrine of the Little Flower
Coughlin trained for the priesthood for six years at the novitiate in Toronto, and it was
there that he first acquainted himself with Pope Leo XIII’s “Rerum Novarum” from which he
would, according to his authorized biography, “interpret the Industrial Revolution of England,
the mechanization of labor, [and] the use and abuse of money.” 10 Ordained in June 1916, he was
assigned to a Detroit parish, and in February 1923 he was incardinated into the Detroit diocese
by the Reverend Michael Gallagher. 11 In 1926, he was assigned his own church in the growing
and fast changing community of Royal Oak, north of Detroit. Coughlin made his first radio
broadcast just four months after celebrating his first mass at the Shrine of the Little Flower in an
effort to raise money for his church. Making a deal with CBS station WJR-Detroit, Coughlin
delivered his first radio sermon on October 17, 1926, just six years after the birth of commercial
broadcasting. 12
Largely religious, Coughlin’s Sunday radio sermons were first directed to children. 13
Soon, Coughlin renamed his program from “The Children’s Hour” to “The Golden Hour” and
began to reach a broad audience and a growing following. Coughlin’s program was lucrative
during these early years, though no one is sure exactly how much so. 14 By late 1928 he had
earned enough money to begin construction of Crucifixion Tower at the little church. The Tower
would become a monument to Coughlin’s legacy; and he would come to broadcast from it every
Sunday. In 1929, Coughlin added two new stations in Chicago and Cincinnati to his now
established broadcasting network, the Radio League of the Little Flower. 15 His success
continued to burgeon. In 1930, the radio priest began to broadcast nationally over CBS to a
national audience that would reach up to 40 million people.
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The Priest Tackles Politics
Until 1930, Coughlin’s speeches remained largely religious sermons. The radio priest
would begin to address politics in 1930 when he moved to criticize Communism as a threat to
the United States following various economic crises in Detroit. 16 Though denouncing
Communism was largely uncontroversial, Coughlin did find himself in trouble when he began
speaking against the Treaty of Versailles in January 1931. Learning of the controversial nature
of Coughlin’s material before he went on the air, CBS moved to instruct Coughlin not to speak
on the issue. After promising he would not, Coughlin did so anyway. 17 After escaping
castigation by CBS, Coughlin began to feel free to speak out on any issue; as a result, he soon
became exclusively political in his focus. Tying national political, social, and economic issues to
religious principles, Coughlin began to criticize harshly the Hoover Administration and the
failure of America’s economic system to address the increasing problems of the Depression.
Over the next year, Coughlin began to speak of Prohibitionists, bankers, President
Hoover, and those who opposed the Patman Bonus Bill. Though the issues he discussed were
important, Alan Brinkley notes that it was not the issues “alone that accounted for his popularity.
Other public figures espoused the same sort of vague radicalism during the period without
evoking a comparable response. What made Coughlin different was his medium.” 18 Over these
years, Coughlin, as biographer Donald Warren explains, “invent[ed] the political soap opera.” 19
As his political style matured, Coughlin began to discuss economic policy with increasing
frequency and, in so doing, began to denounce American industry. 20 When Roosevelt
announced his candidacy in early 1932 against the now largely unpopular Hoover, Coughlin met
the President and began to support Roosevelt wholeheartedly. Even before Coughlin had even
managed to defeat Catholic Al Smith in the Convention, he backed Roosevelt all the way. 21
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Roosevelt used Coughlin as a political tool throughout his campaign. Upon Roosevelt’s win in
1932, it was clear that the two men would have a very interesting relationship over the next four
years of the President’s term. Engaging himself in monetary policy, Coughlin began to submit
recommendations to the Roosevelt Administration and routinely harass White House staff
members on this or that problem or issue. 22
“Roosevelt or Ruin”
Eventually, the Coughlin-Roosevelt relationship grew thin as Coughlin became
increasingly irritated at Roosevelt’s total neglect of his policy recommendations. At the same
time, the Roosevelt Administration became increasingly annoyed at the presumptuous radio
priest submitting such recommendations. Despite a year of constant flattery in 1933, 23 Coughlin
became less friendly to the President as he entrenched himself deeper and deeper into monetary
issues he quite frankly did not have the economics background to understand. Urging silver
remonetization in late 1933, Coughlin’s frustration with Roosevelt began to show. Roosevelt
adviser and confidante James P. Warburg, a Wall Street financier, reviewed Coughlin’s idea of
coining gold and silver in the same coin and dismissed it as utter rubbish. The radio priest then
“retaliated by accusing Warburg of being a spokesman for the bankers and insinuating that he
had profited from American participation in World War I.” 24 Though Coughlin never again
proposed his policy of symmetalism, his break with Roosevelt was aggravated when, on March
4, 1934, “the radio priest conceded that the New Deal had been ‘more or less successful.’” 25
Despite these criticisms and Coughlin’s increasingly desperate calls for monetary reform, he was
always respectful of Roosevelt. Yet, his always changing and pie-eyed policies did begin to
attract criticism. 26 In 1934, the Nation charged that Coughlin’s monetary policies were “based

Freedom in Dialogue 99

upon the theory that the imbecility of the people is usually greatly exaggerated. . . . He illustrates
perfectly the way of the demagogue.” 27
The real fracture with Roosevelt came that April when the Treasury Department
published the names of individuals who had made significant investments in silver. Included on
the list was Coughlin’s Radio League of the Little Flower and its secretary. Though Coughlin’s
secretary insisted that Coughlin knew nothing of the investments, the appearance afflicted much
political and personal pain on Coughlin who was humiliated in the national press and who felt
personally betrayed by Roosevelt. 28 It is unclear exactly how Coughlin felt about Roosevelt
between April and November, when he announced the formation of the National Union, just as it
is unclear as to exactly what his political motivations in launching the organization were. His
statements throughout these months changed daily: one day he was half-endorsing Roosevelt
and the next he was opposing the two-party system. 29 The ambiguity of his announcement of the
National Union probably reflects much of this inconsistency and the inability of Coughlin to
make up his mind. He wanted to make a strong statement in reaction to the failure of the New
Deal to consider his policies, yet he did not want to alienate Roosevelt. “The National Union for
Social Justice” announcement would become a turning point in Coughlin’s career. Broadcast
over the now forty stations that were part of his Radio League of the Little Flower, the address
stormed the nation.
“The National Union for Social Justice”: A Rhetorical Analysis
Coughlin announced his plan to establish the National Union for Social Justice on
November 11, 1934, in his usual Sunday radio sermon. The speech epitomizes his rhetorical
skill and initiated what was to be an almost two year campaign that would eventually aim to
unseat Roosevelt. Calling for the repudiation of capitalism and communism alike, Coughlin
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urged his followers to take up a “new call to arms for the establishment of social justice!” 30
Stirring in its emotionalism and fervent calls to execute “God’s will,” Coughlin’s announcement
exemplifies the anti-intellectual style. More aggressive in many ways than Long’s “Every Man a
King” address, “The National Union for Social Justice” speech utilizes many of the same
rhetorical forms Long did in “Every Man a King” to achieve the same rhetorical effect.
A brilliant and riveting speech in its entirety, “The National Union for Social Justice”
makes it much easier to understand the anxious positions of critics like Swing and the Lees.
Possessing all the intensity and directness of Edwards’ “Sinners in the Hands of Angry God,”
Coughlin’s address adopts Edwards’ prophetically fiery style for a new century and purpose.
Not crafted to the purpose of religious conversion and raising awareness of the depravity and
futility of man, “The National Union for Social Justice” is a battle cry designed to capture the
minds of Coughlin’s audience, not turn them to God. As “Sinners” works to drive good
Christian men and women into good Christian existences, “The National Union for Social
Justice” address works to put fearful men and women into the hands of Coughlin. The speech
functions to incapacitate the intellect of Coughlin’s audience while directing their passions to
whatever purpose he, their chosen and selfless leader, decrees. This incapacitation is achieved
using many of the same rhetorical forms that Long uses in “Every Man a King,” including the
use of rhetorical questions, repetitive conjunctions and relative clauses, and the clever
manipulation of pronouns.
The speech proceeds in five sections and advances in a fashion also similar to “Every
Man a King.” This is, admittedly, one of the reasons why both of these speeches were chosen.
While touchstone pieces of each man’s rhetoric, both speeches present need-remedy arguments
as they make the case to establish each man’s national organization. The first three sections of
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Coughlin’s discourse form a need argument consisting of two premises and a conclusion. The
fourth section presents the National Union for Social Justice” as the remedy to the need Coughlin
seeks to have people “recognize.” The fifth section positions Coughlin as a prophet chosen to
assume the burden of representing the common man and woman, the righteous laborer, in a
struggle against injustice. Like Long, Coughlin portrays himself as a political savior, similarly
acquiring a great amount of political capital vis-à-vis his dramatic identification with his
audience. Although such likenesses between the two speeches abound, I will refrain from
commenting further on these similarities until the conclusion of this chapter after a recreation of
“The National Union for Social Justice” has been performed. This analysis will follow the same
structure as did that in the third chapter, recreating the speech section by section according to its
arrangement.
The Demand for Social Justice: The Constitution No Longer Realized
Coughlin opens the “National Union for Social Justice” by imagining the afternoon
sixteen years prior to his address. Declaring that the years after the Treaty of Versailles
witnessed a horrific series of events in the rise of Bolshevism, internationalism, and universal
poverty, Coughlin tells his audience “I honestly believe that in all history such destruction of
ideals and such miscarriage of justice were never chronicled save during the years which
witnessed the assassination of Christ.” Prophetically announcing the impending dooms that
threaten America, Coughlin instructs his audience that “Instead of making the world safe for
democracy, the bells which tolled their message sixteen years ago this afternoon were sounding
its requiem. Instead of announcing that here was the end of all war, we were being ushered into
a new conflict too terrible to contemplate.” Immediately identifying with the fear and
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dispossession of his audience, Coughlin’s priestly ethos shimmers through his words as he warns
of a day “beyond our reckoning.”
The radio priest’s use of anaphora is a common form appearing in the address from its
beginning. Coughlin introduces the the second and third sentences of “The National Union for
Social Justice” with “Instead of,” providing the speech momentum and catching his audience in a
set of arguments coming one after the other. Coughlin gives his audience little time to think on
what he has said, and the reiteration merely links the arguments he makes together in such a way
that they are hard to sort out and easy to simply accept. The use of anaphora disables the
audiences’ intellectual capacity insofar as it disguises new arguments and new things to accept in
terms of phrases that have before been used, and when reiterated, tend to loan the speech a sense
of unfolding inevitability. Hence, Coughlin’s use of anaphora contributes to his prophetic style
as he sermonically informs his audience of what has come and what will be. Like Long,
Coughlin also employs rhetorical techniques common to evangelical persuasion, including the
use of multiple conjunctions and relative clauses. The radio priest’s frequent citing of authorities
and the stylistic devices used to present these authorities produce a crescendo effect that
overwhelm the audience into submission.
The chief subject of Coughlin’s prophecy is modernity. The harms and impending
threats of modernity are a common problem felt by Coughlin and his audience, and the radio
priest wisely begins his speech by appealing to this feeling and prophesying what may come
from a failure of the people to act. Contrasting the “cynical smile that we hope for peace”
against the “laboratories of destruction the chemists of greed and of poverty, of hate and of lying
propaganda,” Coughlin creates a we-they dichotomy from the very beginning of his address.
The chemists he reveals as evil are “menaces” to which “we are not blind.” It will be his job to
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see “their ghastly presence” and to find hope among the despair. Coughlin sees the evil of those
who would destroy humanity in this modern world of destruction, and, acknowledging that his
fellow persecuted citizens must see it as well, he sets out to empower his audience against the
horror of “their ghastly presence.” We will prevail against them, Coughlin instructs. In
Coughlin, it seems the people have a prophet in which to place their faith.
Following his introduction, Coughlin moves to establish the major premise of his need
argument. Criticizing the Democratic Party for its failure to “answer the simple question of why
there is want in the midst of plenty,” Coughlin characterizes the New Deal as “useless efforts for
the preservation of a system, both economic and political, which once before watered the fields
of Europe with blood and the highways of America with tears.” Drawing analogies between
capitalism’s failure to answer the “simple” problems of the Depression and its role in bringing
about the much resented First World War, Coughlin plays on the unpopularity of the First World
War and tries to identify with his audience in affirming its wrongness while linking it, without
justification, to capitalism and the Depression. The answer is simple, Coughlin reassures his
audience. The fault is with capitalism and the unwillingness of those who benefit under the
status quo to reverse the Depression’s course. Just as World War I led to the needless death of
hundreds of thousands of Americans to protect what many in his audience considered moneyed
interests and an aristocratic Europe, these same people were now the cause of the Depression.
“Truly, democracy itself is on trial,” Coughlin tells his audience. “Today the American
people are the judge and jury who will support this Administration and accord it a sportsman’s
chance to make good.” Giving the appearance of resting agency with his audience, Coughlin
tells them that the choice of supporting Roosevelt is theirs. He then moves to preach, taking up
the same prophetic tone he prefaced his address with:

Freedom in Dialogue 104

It has (the Roosevelt Administration) already subscribed to the principle that human rights
must take precedence over financial rights. It recognizes that these rights far outweigh in the
scales of justice wither political rights or so-called constitutional rights. It appears to be an
Administration determined to read into the Constitution the definition of social justices which
is already expressed in its very preamble. There we are taught that the very object of this
Government is the establishment of justice, to insure domestic tranquility, to promote the
general welfare and to provide the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.
Seeking again to identify with his audience and persuade people who might also be supporters of
Roosevelt, Coughlin speaks of the Administration as appearing to be in accord with the
principles he describes as fundamental to the Constitution. Though Coughlin, the prophet, will
soon reveal otherwise, it is important that he ascribe this appearance to Roosevelt so he can later
show it to be false. Again utilizing anaphora, Coughlin instructs his audience that more than
financial rights, political rights, or civil liberties, the Constitution places “the establishment of
justice” as its first and most fundamental principle.
Justice being the purpose of government, Coughlin establishes his first premise: The
Constitution demands the establishment of social justice above all else, and any good
government must act in accordance with this first and most fundamental aim. Coughlin then
storms boldly into a discussion of what he considers the “unconstitutional causes of the
Depression” and how far the Roosevelt Administration has gone in “recognizing and utilizing
this constitutional truth.” Though Coughlin will assume the position of a benevolent instructor
telling his audience what the problems of the status quo are and what Roosevelt has done to
address them, it will be his audience with whom judgment ultimately rests, or at least ostensibly.
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Deception and Lies: The Current System Is Not Just
Coughlin begins this section of his speech with “let me rehearse for you a few facts
relative to the history of labor and of industry, of production and of unemployment. As we turn
back the pages which tell us the story of the World War, we are convinced that it was organized
and operated for commercial purposes and commercial gains.” First, Coughlin makes it a point
to say “let” me. He does this throughout the address. In saying “let me,” or “may I ask you,”
Coughlin is asking for his audience’s permission to explain to them the circumstances of the
Depression. He thus affords them some feeling of power as they sit back and listen to his
explanation (over radio no less); and this of course assists him in creating the illusion his
audience has that they are in control.
Another worthwhile aspect of this sentence is Coughlin’s use of the word “facts,” a word
he frequently repeats throughout the address. The word “fact” creates a sense of authority for
what Coughlin has to say. It is not him telling “the story,” but the pages of history. Such
statements place Coughlin in the position of being a benevolent informer instructing his flocks of
what the simple problem is and what they can do to solve it. In addition, Coughlin relies heavily
on his use of “we.” From the beginning, the radio priest generates a sense of communion with
his audience in depicting history and the suffering of the Depression as something he and his
audience together share and experience. He is one of them: he can be trusted as he reveals, as
any good priest would, the objective simple truth.
Further bolstering his audience’s sense of agency, Coughlin incorporates rhetorical
questions throughout his address, and especially in his most authoritative sections. These
questions seem to put power in the audiences’ hands and involve them directly in discovering
problems and seeking answers. However, this is not the case in reality. Coughlin makes
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frequent use of “you” in framing these questions, heightening the effect of this illusion while
almost creating a sense of fear on the part of his audience if they happen to answer his rhetorical
question with anything less than a firm “yes!” to these strongly leading questions.
Are you not aware of the fact that in 1914 England’s financial and commercial supremacy
were in jeopardy due to the rapid advance of German commerce? Are you not ignorant of the
fact that during the first two years of the World War the United States industrialists and
bankers had poured billions of credit dollars into the war chests of Great Britain? Need I
remind you of the pledging on the part of English statesmen for is to enter the war. . . ?
Given little chance to question Coughlin’s facts, he plows through his analysis of the First World
War as “fought to make the world safe for Wall Street and the industrial bankers.” Indeed,
according to Coughlin, it is the bankers who “pervert” America. They “perverted” the mind of
President Wilson, tricking him into the “fallacy that it was more sacred to protect the capitalistic
dollar than to preserve the life of a mother’s son!”
Following his analysis of the First World War, Coughlin begins his analysis of the
Depression “born in 1918,” telling his audience to “Be patient for a moment and I shall try to
weave a few thoughts relative to his subject into a simple fabric of understanding.” Adopting a
rather paternal tone, Coughlin will “simplify” these answers for his audience. They become his
helpless flock whom he will deliver from the storm and show the light. 31 According to
Coughlin, America engaged in rapid production during the War to meet needs both abroad and at
home, and, with a labor force lacking in young men, somehow managed to rapidly enhance it
production power. Offering “mathematical, official figures,” it is not so much Coughlin’s
substantive explanation of the causes of the Depression that prove interesting as much as it is the
stylistic devices he uses in going about that explanation. Throughout its entirety, history is
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always experienced by “we,” and the international bankers, financiers, industrialists, and
politicians are always “they.” History is always occurring “naturally,” unfolding itself inevitably
on the people as if they had no control of their material condition. Coughlin seems to play up
this sense of helplessness in his use of long, flowing sentences composed of phrases that lead
into one another. All the audience can do is to follow. Juxtaposed to these syntactical
observations is Coughlin’s frequent use of rhetorical questions to create the illusion of agency
and frequent use of “you” so that the individual auditor can feel some sense of empowerment in
affirming his observations. Although Coughlin’s audience might be victims of inevitable
history, they can at least gain some power over the course of events in asserting that they are
victims of a corrupt system which has taken advantage of them.
According to Coughlin’s second premise, the first and most fundamental aim of the
Constitution, social justice, has not been established and is not being worked toward. The
“facts” contradict the Constitution’s most treasured principle. A “new problem of distribution”
had seized America after the War, and Wall Street and the wealthy creditors were determined to
keep production at war-time levels no matter the later disastrous effect on the economy.
Coughlin asks his audience again rhetorically, “When we weave together the threads which the
loom of fact has so clearly fabricated, to what conclusions are we forced as we view the labor
situation between 1919 and 1929?” The conclusion to be drawn is so obvious that his audience
is “forced” to draw it. Though the great majority of his audience had little to no understanding
of economic policy, the radio priest told them that the explanations he offered were simple,
natural, and so obvious that the audience member might well fear feeling stupid if they asked for
further explanation. The truth is that Coughlin had only a slightly greater understanding than
they did. Focusing more on the fact that they had been deceived, lied to, and generally taken
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advantage of, which most of Coughlin’s audience members understandably felt they had been,
Coughlin offered his audience a means by which to alleviate their anxiety. He offered them a
scapegoat on which to release their frustration and a set of answers by which to explain their own
economic failure in a nation in which economic failure equates with moral failure.
Justice Restored: The Need for Redistribution and the Rejection of Capital
In a world of plenty in which production should no longer be a problem, Coughlin
declares that “our problem shall be one of the distribution of the profits not only to the owners
and stockholders but also to the laborers and mechanics, enabling all to live prosperously even
when the wheels of industry have ceased operating.” According to Coughlin, if the problem of
distribution is not solved in two years, the United States will “witness a new form of government
that will face it and attempt to solve it by some communistic means.” Again utilizing anaphora,
Coughlin declares “we have more acreage under cultivation, more factories equipped with the
finest machinery, more educated scientists and skilled mechanics than any other nation in
history. . . . Today there is want in the mist of plenty.” Emphasizing his own authority and
prophesy, Long now positions himself to formulate the conclusion of his need argument: The
current system is not capable of securing social justice, and therefore, it nor the Roosevelt
Administration is in accordance with the Constitution.
Assessing Roosevelt’s New Deal policies, Coughlin judges them to be utterly ineffective
and incapable of solving the problems of the Depression that can only be solved by significant
wealth redistribution. According to Coughlin, Roosevelt has adopted a “philosophy of
destructionism” premised on undermining productive capacity instead of simply distributing
goods America is now capable of producing for everyone fairly.
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It is the philosophy which refuses to face the problem of distribution. It is the philosophy
which is attempting to hold us manacled to an obsolete system of finance and of production
for a profit only. It is the final attempt on the part of a decadent capitalism to destroy us into
prosperity. It is similar to the program of bankers who, for ten years following the War,
attempted to bond us with paper into gold prosperity. Now, my friends, let no one deceive
you with the economic lie that there is over-production when millions are hungry. . . .
Again utilizing anaphora, Coughlin denounces the philosophy of the New Deal as unjust and
cruelly responsible for the starvation of millions of Americans. Promulgating that the people are
not to be deceived, he seems to vest the power to choose the truth in his audience. Yet, if
questions are asked of Coughlin’s analysis, of “the truth,” then the people would only be
showing their vulnerability to deception.
In proclaiming so boldly that the people are not blind and that they will not choose to be
deceived, Coughlin makes it very hard for his followers to challenge him when he implicitly tells
them that doing so is tantamount to thinking as “they”—the wealthy capitalists—would have
“You” think. Instead, “you” the audience should join “we”/“us,” the formerly persecuted but
now revolutionary group of righteous common men and women gathered to defeat capitalism
and restore the principles of the Constitution. Closing this section of his speech, Coughlin
delivers a final repudiation of the status quo:
Our government still upholds one of the worst evils of decadent capitalism, namely, that
production must be only at a profit for the owners, for the capitalist, and not for the laborer.
This philosophy of finance, or of distribution of the profits, based on the theory of “paywhile-you-work” for the laborer can only be identified with the destruction of the entire
system of capitalism.
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Capitalism must be replaced, according to Coughlin; and stylistically the priest has done
everything in his power to put the people in charge of replacing it. They seem to be standing up
to the authority that has kept them in chains since long before the First World War. In reality
they act in fear of being considered duped—in fear of questioning Coughlin, in fear of seeking
deeper explanations of the Depression and more complicated solutions, and in fear of thinking
for themselves. The dogmatic power of “facts” and “official” numbers proves too cumbersome
to their understanding, and Coughlin, seeking to identify himself as one of them, provides a path
to security in a world that seems very much to be conspiring against them. To stave off the evils
of Communism and the despair of modern capitalism, Coughlin’s audience chooses
authoritarianism.
The People’s Solution
After coming to his conclusion that “the philosophy of finance” need be rejected and
before moving onto what he proposes as his remedy—the Sixteeen Principles of the National
Union for Social Justice—Coughlin engages in solidifying the conclusion of his need argument
while preparing a solution that “we” may use. The solution offered is that of the people versus
that of the wealthy industrialists. In drawing a stark contrast between the two, Coughlin
highlights the difference between the Roosevelt Administration’s New Deal and his own
proposal.
The many Coughlinites listening who were likely to be fans of the New Deal were now
probably on the fence in many ways about what they thought about Roosevelt and Coughlin. .
Coughlin tells his audience
Were I addressing a group of industrialists I would inquire of them whether or not they were
of the opinion that this technical unemployment . . . could continue. Surely, they must
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recognize that industrial competition must produce newer inventions, newer machinery and
longer breadlines. I would ask the industrialists whether or not they and their children
logically anticipate a time in the not distant future when they will become targets for the
wrath of a despoiled people. Do they not remember the French Revolution, the Russian
Revolution? Do they know that human nature does not change? I would plead with them, for
their own self-preservation, if not for no other reason, to cooperate with the government as it
will move, we hope, towards the shortening of hours for all engaged in mass production
activity and towards an annual wage system that is just and equitable and thus permit
American workmen to preserve the American standard of living.
Talking to his listeners as if they were confidants that acknowledge the need to reject capitalism,
Coughlin presents to his audience a series of rhetorical questions premised on a series of answers
that surely wealthy industrialists (“they”) must know. Wealthy industrialists should know that
capitalism can only continue for so long before leading to Communist revolution, they should
know that the current system will only create longer breadlines, and they should know that
America’s only hope is in changing the American system to provide greater benefits for the
people. In questioning this as the solution, “they” are foolish. In contrast, “we,” Coughlin and
his followers,” have hope. Upon drawing a sharp distinction between “we” and “they” in which
it does not seem possible for answers to lie anywhere in between, Coughlin emphasizes the “we”
into which he has now collectively bonded his audience:
The annual wage shall not be one that will permit us merely to subsist. It must be one that
will keep us on the level of the American standard of living. That is why our foreparents
forsook Europe to come to America. That is what we shall fight for. By no means shall we
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despairingly admit that all is lost. All is not lost if we only have the courage to adopt the
policy of producing for use at a profit for all—the owner and the laborer.
We have hope. They are only blinded by greed. Marginalizing his opponent, Coughlin creates a
righteous “we” that hopes and shares a common experience and commitment to the
constitutional principles of social justice that preserve a uniquely American way of life.
After emphasizing the “we” some more, Coughlin moves back to the position of the
industrialists who at this point are so corrupted by greed and the philosophies of finance and
destructionism that they are destined to be doomed. As Christ cursed the moneychangers,
Coughlin declares
You industrialists, surrounded as you are by your economists and anxious to form
organizations for the protection of property rights and for the perpetuation of your profit
system. But, may I ask you, of what value are property rights unless they are firmly
established on the sanctity of human rights? Are those of you who own and control wealth
ignorant of the fact that labor owes no rights to capital unless capital performs its duty
towards labor? Are you forgetful, ye princes of this world’s goods, that you are not better
than stewards designated to manage justly and fairly the property of this world which belongs
not to you but to the one God who created you? In the event of strikes produced under your
unjust economic system where men are forced to starve because there is no work at a profit
for the owner, are you men foolish enough to think that the moral law of God shall force the
working men to disobey the first command of all—the command of self-preservation—and
follow, in its stead, your man-made precept of property preservation? Are you so misguided
by your advisors as to believe that, because you own a factory, or a bank, or a fortune, you
can use it as you will to the detriment of the common good? And on this Armistice Day,
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when the murmurings of discontent are rumbling throughout the capitalists of this world,
when armies are being marshaled and new cannons forged, are you so bereft as to think for a
moment that the men and women, whom your system has starved for five long years, will
shoulder arms to protect your rights and your property and your rotten policies?
In many ways the climax of Coughlin’s address, this rapid-faced set of rhetorical questions
directed to the wealthy bankers and industrialists is not at all directed toward them, but rather to
the audience member still in doubt. “You,” formerly the audience member who must decide
between Coughlin’s proposal and the philosophy of destructionism, is now used to refer to the
wealthy bankers and industrialists, formerly “they.” The message: If you do not join us, you
must be they. Warring soldiers full of hope, Coughlin’s audience will fight for what their
foreparents came to America for. As Christ cursed the money changers and the Pharisees, so
Coughlin curses the wealthy and the corrupt politicians and economists who offer false, manmade precepts in conflict with God’s holy commands. Human rights are “sacred” and inviolate,
yet are being trumped by property rights in a nation in which money has become a graven image.
Coughlin, the prophet, will restore what has become “rotten.” He is the hope of the people, their
comfort in graven times.
After declaring in one simple declarative sentence, “Modern capitalism is destroying
itself at both ends,” Coughlin turns “you” back on the audience:
It (modern capitalism) speaks to the youth of the nation with this bright sentence: ‘You are
inexperienced. We do not want you.’ To the matured laborers in industry who are forty-five
years of age, it says: ‘You must retire simply because the compensation insurance rate is too
high for us and the insurance companies of this nation do not care to risk you.
Then, immediately, Coughlin shifts the referent of “you” back to the wealthy:
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There are 21-million boys and girls in our public school system. Approximately 1-million in
our colleges and universities will soon be knocking at your doors for employment. For the
older ones you will try to rewrite the natural law of God as you preach to them the
reasonableness of birth control when you really mean the godlessness of wealth control.
“You,” the audience member who has long been tortured and helpless now has the opportunity to
be empowered if “you” join with “us.” Shifting the referent of “you” back to the wealthy,
Coughlin completes the transformation. “You” is no longer the audience member, but the
condemned wealthy banker and industrialist left to fate. “You” preaches falsely and is
concerned only with world things. Contrasted to “we,” the people who struggle righteously, the
meek who shall inherit the earth, Coughlin creates a dichotomy that functions to secure his
followers under the auspices of his priestly control. Likening modern capitalism to slavery, the
radio priest declares that its yoke must be broken, that “There will be no expulsion of radicals
until the causes which breed radicals will first be destroyed!” Declaring both capitalism and
communism to be inherent evils, both allegiances to false prophets and false gods, Coughlin
creates, by contrast, devotion to him and his proposal as the only true way. He is the true
prophet of the one true God. “Away with both of them!” he decries. “But never into the discard
with the liberties which we have already won and the economic liberty which we are about to
win—or die in the attempt!”
Now the warrior priest, Coughlin tells his audience of his long days and hours spent
receiving letters from the suffering disenfranchised. Casting away the Republican and
Democratic parties, Coughlin somberly declares: “But happy or unhappy as I am in my position,
I accept the challenge to organize for obtaining, for securing and for protecting the principles of
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social justice.” The burden is Coughlin’s, and he has elevated himself as a Christ-figure, for
better or worse, to be sacrificed with the cause for which he fights.
I realize that I am more or less a voice crying in the wilderness. I realize that the doctrine
which I preach is disliked and condemned by the princes of wealth. What I care for that!
And, more than all else, I deeply appreciate how limited my qualifications are to launch this
organization which shall be known as the NATIONAL UNION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE.
The die is cast! The word has been spoken! And by it I am prepared to stand or to fall. . . .
“I, the prophet!” Coughlin might as well declare. Using “I” plentifully, Coughlin elevates his
own personality and position over that of his audience before asking them, again rhetorically,
what exactly the solution of his proposal is: “How shall we organize? To what principles of
social justice shall we pledge ourselves? What actions shall we take?” Coughlin then sets out to
preface his principles with a preamble “that we are creatures of a beneficent God, made to love
and to serve Him in this world and to love and enjoy Him forever in the next. . . .” Excluded
from this “we” are the wealthy. Coughlin’s sixteen principles only apply to the righteous.
Promulgating that it is “towards the realization” of these principles which “we must
strive,” Coughlin marks the actualization of each principle as a mission in which his followers
are united to accomplish. Similar to the Nicene Creed, each principle starts with the simple
phrase “I believe.” Substituting “I” for “we,” Coughlin moves agency back to his audience. To
join the righteous, they will join with Coughlin in declaring their individual submission to each
principle. Rather generic, the principles lay out the basic framework for a socialist corporate
state in which private property is protected, but many public resources “too important to be held
in the control of private individuals” are nationalized. Many of the principles, such as the
nationalization-private property principles, easily conflict with one another; and none of the
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principles declares much more than a vague belief in a general principle or an ascription to a
basic economic policy, e.g., the abolition of tax-exempt bonds and a stronger graduated
progressive taxation system. Yet, they are principles that “we” hold against “them,” and as a
result, serve the function of uniting the people under the radio priest.
I, the Prophet!: Executor of God’s Will
Upon declaring his principles, Coughlin concludes his speech in a rallying cry against the
status quo. This rallying cry affirms his position as the people’s leader and highlights their
submission to him as their warrior priest. “I have spoken to some of you for nine years over this
microphone and to most of you for more than three years,” Coughlin tells his audience.
Today I call upon you to assemble your ranks for action. Thus, in the name of the God of our
fathers, we can look forward to better days to come. But without His principles of justice and
of charity reduced into practice there is little hope either for ourselves or for the children who
will follow us.
The Sixteen Principles of the National Union for Social Justice are no longer just Coughlin’s, but
are God’s. Thus, Coughlin increases the penalty for not accepting them and positions himself as
bringing God’s principles to the people. Thus he affirms his standing as their prophet.
According to Coughlin, he is “not in it for the commercial profit, because I am talking to the
poor, talking to the dispossessed, talking to the jobless and talking against those who possess the
means to sustain this broadcast.” In it for the masses, Coughlin wraps up his address.
In his last request of his audience, Coughlin summarily states “All I ask is that those who
apply for membership will be men and women of courageous heart and intrepid spirit willing and
ready to suffer.” The costs of following a prophet are high, he reminds his audience, and the
National Union for Social Justice demands their full devotion. Extending the challenge,
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Coughlin again seemingly places power back into the hands of the people. Of taking up this
mission of suffering, Coughlin decrees: “God wills it! This is the new call to arms—not to
become cannon fodder for the greedy system of an outworn capitalism or factory fodder for the
slave whip of communism. This is the new call to arms for the establishment of social justice!
God wills it! Do you?” Concluding his speech, Coughlin shifts agency back on his audience. If
they have followed his arguments so far, how can they not will it? The Constitution wills it,
history wills it, God wills it, and never are these interpretations subject to doubt. They are
always presented by Coughlin as dogmas. In affirming Coughlin’s final rhetorical question, the
radio priest’s auditor joins his flock of disposed, united in the suffering “we” of the righteous
embattled against the evil “they” of the wealthy.
The Anti-Intellectual Style as Over-Identification, Possession, and Incapacitation
“The National Union for Social Justice” was a success insofar as it strengthened
Coughlin’s reputation across the country and fueled his campaign against Roosevelt. Largely
designed to acquire political capital for Coughlin and not to result in thousands of chapters, as
was the hope of “Every Man a King,” 32 Coughlin’s speech accomplished its goal. Media
coverage of his political activities increased, his mail grew, and talk of him as a political threat to
Roosevelt abounded.
Strengthening and solidifying the radio priest’s political program, Coughlin’s address is
representative of the whole of his speech and of the anti-intellectual style. Celebrating the
common man, the laborer, as “Every Man a King” did, “The National Union for Social Justice”
similarly aims to capture the mind of its audience. Utilizing many of the same rhetorical forms
Long did—the employment of “you”-“they”-“we” shifts, the use of anaphora, the syntactical
creation of a prophetic tone—Coughlin’s speech parallels Long’s in numerous ways. Working to
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generate the illusion of agency, a false sense of empowerment, and a harshly divisive and
intimidating we-they dichotomy, “The National Union for Social Justice” has many of the same
multifaceted political effects on the auditor as does “Every Man a King.” Most important, like
“Every Man a King,” it shares in the definitive function of anti-intellectual speech: the
subsuming of the auditor in the overwhelming presence of a powerful rhetor vis-à-vis a process
of over-identification.
Using identification as more than just a fulcrum by which to persuade, Coughlin, like
Long, approaches speech as a means to take possession of his auditor and so wield social control.
The “we” Coughlin creates with the invention of the National Union has the same effect as the
“we” Long creates in “Every Man a King.” The auditor, now comforted by Coughlin’s message
of hope against an evil and conspiring “they,” has found hope and security in the empty message
of authoritarianism. At the same time, the auditor is utterly fearful of being cast outside this
rhetorical “we” and into the damned “they.” Avoiding weeping and gnashing of teeth,
Coughlin’s followers are inclined to comply with the priest’s descriptions of the status quo and
instruction. Anxious in regard to their own economic-moral failings, Coughlin offers easy
solutions and a scapegoat by which to expiate his lower middle-class audience. Needing to be
perceived as predestined to receive Heaven’s bounty, and ever nervous about being perceived
instead as one of Coughlin’s identified damned, the radio priest’s followers are put in a very
difficult position if they wish to protest the priest’s conclusions. More style than substance, “The
National Union for Social Justice” remains completely vague in respect to its frequently
nebulous and conflicting principles. The speech seems little more at first than an articulating of
his audience’s discontent—Coughlin little more than a surrogate spokesman. 33 However, as
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close-textual analysis reveals, the radio priest is much more than just the mouthpiece of the
dispossessed laborer.
Throughout the address, Coughlin takes the frustrations and suspicions of the people and,
to use a favorite term of his, “weaves” them into a vision of good versus evil in which good must
be united and led to conquer a common evil. The black-and-white oversimplification of his
address should be enough to raise the brow of the responsible critic. Upon paying closer
attention to how the discourse functions, it is soon revealed to the critic that Coughlin’s principal
aim is to gain the trust and confidence of his audience by way of identification, disable their
intellectual ability to question, and lead them to whatever plan of hope he might offer. As with
“Every Man a King,” in submission comes comfort. In joining with Coughlin in a “we” that
shall prevail over this evil, the radio priest’s followers alleviate their anxieties in soul-soothing
dogmas that assure them of their own ultimate salvation. To think freely, to question, to look
beyond the surface is to risk this salvation. In seeking answers beyond God’s basic tenets as
Coughlin interprets them, those who dare to use their intellect risk being cast into Coughlin’s
dreaded out-group of wealthy bankers, industrialists, and politicians.
David H. Bennett insightfully points out, “Coughlin looked like a millennial savior and to
most he was a father figure.” 34 Noting that many of his followers wrote and referred to him
simply as “Father,” even his Protestant followers, Bennett concludes that Coughlin played
classically off the neurotic anxiety of the people. Making note of Franz Neumann’s findings,
Bennett writes that in Coughlin’s case it is clear that “anxiety can be overcome by means of
identification with a leader.” 35 However, more than just simple identification, Coughlin’s antiintellectual discourse is designed to incapacitate intellect and utterly subsume and possess the
freethinking individual. Consequently, like the rhetoric of Long, it is anathema to democracy.
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Anti-intellectual speech is an infection of the public sphere of which all lovers of democracy
must be concerned.
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CHAPTER 5
FREEDOM IN DIALOGUE
Until secrecy, prejudice, bias, misrepresentation, and propaganda as well as sheer ignorance
are replaced by inquiry and publicity, we have no way of telling how apt for judgment of
social policies the existing intelligence of the masses may be. 1
--John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems
Great men, great nations, have not been boasters and buffoons, but perceivers
of the terror of life and have manned themselves to face it. 2
--Ralph Waldo Emerson

Huey Long and Father Coughlin most captured public attention after they were
denounced the dining room of New York’s Waldorf-Astoria Hotel by General Hugh S. Johnson,
former director of the National Recovery Administration. The speech was broadcast live by the
National Broadcasting Company and heard over hundreds of thousands of people’s radios.
Johnson condemned Long and Coughlin as a double threat and asserted that the two men were
working together in attempt to topple the government. While Johnson’s accusation about the
two men’s collusion was utterly unfounded, the fear that drove his criticism is significant insofar
as it brought together concerns previously expressed by numerous critics of both men and
ossified them into a very public and very bold, even reactionary, response. Accusing Long and
Coughlin of “preaching not construction but destruction—not reform but revolution,” Johnson
castigated both as speaking “with nothing of learning, knowledge nor experience. . . .” 3
However, while both men were certainly grave threats to American democracy it is important not
to launch into the sort of anxious tirade that Johnson did. The threat of Long and Coughlin and
their infection of the public sphere is rather best dealt with by careful, considered analysis of the
rhetorical styles of both men—specifically, the anti-intellectual style and its effect on the
American public sphere.
While many in the media had carefully hinted at the threat of both politicians and the
parallels to the rise of Hitler and other authoritarians across Europe, the press’ response after the
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speech was “like the break-up of a long and hard Winter.” 4 Coughlin appeared on the cover of
Newsweek a few days after under the headline “Demagogues,” and Long and Coughlin were both
discussed in the cover story of Time the following week. 5 Johnson had created a media furor in
what Raymond Gram Swing characterized as an act of “political feeble-mindedness.” 6 The
ferocity and lack of consideration of the denunciation allowed Long and Coughlin to attract even
more public attention.
Most demonstrative of this effect was Long’s response to Johnson on March 7 in a fortyfive minute speech on NBC. 7 Focusing little on the General, Long claimed that “It will serve no
purpose to our distressed people for me to call my opponents even more bitter names than they
call me. Even were I able, I have not the time to present my side of the argument and match
them in billingsgate or profanity.” 8 Coughlin responded similarly in his radio sermon the next
Sunday. Instead of drawing the public’s attention in a calm, controlled, and rational manner to
the demagogic qualities in both man’s rhetoric, Johnson’s speech made for a media circus that
shifted power directly into the hands of Long and Coughlin. Instead of responding as irrationally
as Johnson, the Kingfish and the radio priest instead crafted messages designed to reach the
American people on the most personal levels. Skillfully appealing to their alienation and
feelings of dispossession, Long and Coughlin were able to identify with their audience in such a
way as to be able to wield social control over them.
In contrast to Johnson, what is needed from the critic in response to demagogy is a
consideration of just what exactly the demagogue is attempting to do and how he or she goes
about doing it. I have demonstrated that Long ‘sand Coughlin’s discourses functioned to
subsume the auditor into the identity of the rhetor. By first over-identifying with their audience,
Long and Coughlin then proceeded to take control of their thoughts and incapacitate their
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intellect. In this final chapter I will first present brief histories and assessments of the political
careers of Long and Coughlin. The chapter then discusses the anti-intellectual style in greater
depth, considering its impact on the modes of democratic participation and how it structures
political experience. I then move to examine the impact of radio, removing communication from
an interactive public sphere to many non-interactive private spheres, and how the medium of
radio combined with the anti-intellectual style to generate a powerful political impact on
democratic society. To end my treatment of the anti-intellectual style, I consider communication
as a shared experience essential to democracy and make a case for the importance of maintaining
a properly functioning deliberative democracy that provides for freedom in dialogue.
Forces to be Feared: Considering Long and Coughlin
After the Kingfish delivered his “Every Man a King” and Coughlin addressed “The
National Union for Social Justice,” both rose to even more prominent positions of power.
Though they would ultimately fail in their goal to defeat Roosevelt, the rhetoric driving their
rather incoherent and amorphous organizations created resurgence in the careers of both men.
Both speeches and their subsequent rhetoric won Long and Coughlin new supporters and put
increasing pressure on the Roosevelt Administration towards which both had become
increasingly hostile. Their ability to reach so many followers, raise fear in so many critics, and
continually put pressure on the President is an example of the power of modern political
communication. It is also an example of the danger such communication poses to society when
it targets the intellect and renders null and void the very first premise of sustainable
democracy—that of the freethinking individual.
Following “Every Man a King,” Long’s national career picked up sharply as Share Our
Wealth clubs formed across the country, subscriptions to the American Progress increased, 9 and
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talk of the Kingfish abounded on city streets, in country cafes, and through political circles from
St. Louis to Atlanta to Boston. Picking up members more slowly in the Midwest and New
England, Long gained huge numbers of followers after February in both the Western and midAtlantic states, particularly in California. 10 Throughout 1934 and 1935, Long made
breakthroughs in sections of the country that had paid him little notice—except perhaps the
occasional chagrin when he made the news for talking about potlikker or wearing his pajamas to
greet state officials. Alan Brinkley cites the observation of Utah resident Frank Joesten.
Attending a state meeting in early 1935 of Utah’s Reform Taxpayers League, Joesten wrote:
Jim, I never saw a crowd turn loose like that, not for a long time, they just about lifted the
roof and amongst them were several that had referred to Long not more than a year ago as a
damn fool and a ‘nut,’ also in a crowd I recognized a lot of local democrat politicians some
political appointees on the various F.E.R.A., H.O.L.C., and other Government organizations
too numerous to mention, and they were applauding with the rest. 11
Winning multitudes of new followers, Share Our Wealth caught the attention of many new
critics as well, and numerous articles began to appear in the Nation and the New York Times
about the political potential of Louisiana’s “backwoods” senator. As time passed, many of these
news items became increasingly critical and worried that Long might pose a serious risk to the
Democratic Party come the 1936 election.
These concerns were not reserved to the press. During the spring of 1935, the
Democratic National Convention, increasingly wary of a Long threat to the Democratic ticket in
the coming year, conducted its poll of 31,000 potential voters to assess the Kingfish’s impact.
The Roosevelt Administration was so worried about the possibility of a Long victory that they
seriously consider placing Louisiana under federal military occupation. 12 It has also widely been
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argued that Long had much to do with Roosevelt’s turn to the left in 1935 and his enactment of
the Second New Deal. An example of this is Roosevelt’s proposed Wealth Tax Act of 1935.
The legislation instituted a high surtax on the wealthy classes. Part of a broader public relations
campaign, the President was demonstrating his willingness to address the wealth concentration
problem and distance himself from accusations that he was in alliance with the rich. 13 “Every
Man a King” and the creation of Share Our Wealth clubs everywhere fueled the Long movement,
making politics more difficult for both Roosevelt and other traditional politicians. It is not at all
a stretch to view the Second New Deal as an attempt by Roosevelt to co-opt the forces of Long
and Coughlin. 14
In the spring of 1935 Long would broadcast seven speeches before his political
assassination on September 8, 1935, in Baton Rouge. No doubt an increasing threat, it is
impossible to know what might have happened had Long not been shot that summer day in
Louisiana’s capitol. Alan Brinkley does note that while “it was no secret by the summer of 1935
that [Long and Coughlin] were contemplating a challenge to the President in the 1936 election,”
there were indications that “they could not be sure their supporters would follow them.” 15
Roosevelt was an extremely popular president, and many of Long’s supporters, as well as
Coughlin’s, had a tremendous amount of respect for him. Indeed, the splits between Long and
Coughlin and Roosevelt created a great amount of cognitive dissonance for many Long and
Coughlin supporters. 16 While the Kingfish’s popularity burgeoned after “Every Man a King,”
there is simply no telling if he could have defeated Roosevelt in 1936. However, that it was even
a possibility attests greatly to Long’s political-rhetorical success.
The history of Coughlin and the National Union is a more complicated one. While
Coughlin became more specific in his speeches following his November 1934 address
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announcing the formation the National Union and its principles, “the means of turning those
ideals into practical reality remained purposefully vague.” 17 Indeed, it was not at all clear after
the address what exactly the organization was to be or how it would be structured. In answering
these questions, all Coughlin said was that it would ascribe to the Sixteen Principles. In the end,
the organization ended up functioning much like a third-party; Coughlin would later expand
upon its function as serving as “an articulate, organized lobby of the people to bring united
pressure upon the representatives at Washington for the purpose of securing passage of those
laws which we want passed.” 18 Although not at first to be engaged in electoral politics, the
nature of the organization would evolve as it formed throughout 1935 to culminate in the
National Union for Social Justice’s powerful role in the Union Party of 1936.
The National Union managed to attract enough followers and financial support by
January 1935 that Coughlin decided to engage it in direct battle with the Roosevelt
Administration and the Senate. Just as the treaty was about to be passed entering the United
States into the World Court, Coughlin decided to seize the opportunity to test the strength of his
organization and strike fear into the hearts of Roosevelt and the Congress. It was to be a grand
entry for a new political force. Ratification of the World Court treaty had been delayed for four
years under President Hoover, and come January 16, 1935, President Roosevelt sent the treaty to
the Senate. Though largely thought to easily pass the Senate with the necessary two-thirds
majority, Coughlin made an impassioned appeal against the bill: “Today—tomorrow may be too
late—today, whether you can afford it or not, send your Senators telegrams telling them to vote
‘NO’ on our entrance into the World Court. . . . Keep America safe for Americans and not the
hinting ground of international plutocrats!” 19 Barraged with telegrams and lines into
Washington jammed, the vote on Tuesday seemed no longer to favor the Roosevelt
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Administration. 20 The 52 for ratification-36 against result was a humiliation for Roosevelt.
After the vote, Coughlin congratulated his listeners and told them that “through the medium of
radio and the telegram you possess the power to override the invisible government; to direct your
representatives on individual matters of legislation.” 21
Following Coughlin’s World Court victory, he began to call for massive restructuring of
the Federal Reserve and attempted to use the National Union for Social Justice, or at least the
claim of its growing membership and its contributions, to this end. The National Union for
Social Justice had a huge night on May 22, 1935, when many of its members packed into
Madison Square Garden to hear Coughlin speak. To 23,000 people, some hearing the speech
from the basement, Coughlin announced that “The National Union, employing not only the
radio, but also utilizing the telegraph, or when time permits, the nationally owned post office,
proposes to revive the meaning of democracy as it was conceived by the fathers of this
country.” 22 Now professing itself as an “articulate, organized lobby of the people,” the National
Union was significant insofar as “It represented not only the fusing of politics with celebrity but
marked the beginning of audience participation, in which the passive mass became an action
group.” 23
Yet, the organization always remained largely synonymous with Coughlin and his prior
efforts directed from the Shrine of the Little Flower. Never did the National Union move to take
action independent from Coughlin’s dictates. Worried that “imposing a formal structure upon
the National Union” might bog the organization down in local affairs, the radio priest did not
move to create a genuine apparatus for the organization until December 1935. 24 Declaring his
intention to make the National Union more than just a glorified mailing list, as it was so often
accused by critics of being, Coughlin claimed that the organization would “now establish
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organizations in every Congressional district, elect officers, recruit members, and raise funds.
Each local unit was to support candidates without regard to party affiliation; their only criterion
would be their willingness to endorse the principles of social justice.” 25 However, Coughlin
would always wield significant control over the National Union from the top down.
The National Union merged with the Townsend movement that had taken a hold of the
West, and which, by 1935, was gaining popularity in the East. It was then that the organization
began to face significant internal problems. 26 Uniting with Dr. Francis Townsend and his
advocating for old-age pensions, as well as with Gerald K. Smith following Long’s assassination,
Coughlin began to merge the National Union with what would become the Union Party ticket.
Though the Union Party’s following would never effectively organize around a common set of
principles advanced by all three men, the Union Party selected a candidate in reluctant North
Dakota congressman William Lemke. After a humiliating convention in Cleveland in October
1936 in which Coughlin, Smith, and Townsend all sounded disparate notes and competed for the
national stage, the Union Party seemed most certainly doomed. Lemke seemed little more than a
sideshow and the press made numerous jokes about the infighting within the party. The Nation
was completely correct in its assessment: “There is nothing so damaging to a panacea as another
panacea on the same platform.” 27 Struggling to even appear on the ballot, Lemke won only two
percent of the vote. Following the Union Party’s sound defeat, Coughlin retreated from national
politics and resigned himself to a message that would grow increasingly intolerant and hateful
for the rest of his career. In his later years, in relative isolation at his church and broadcast booth
in the Shrine of the Little Flower and its Crucifixion Tower, Coughlin would endorse antiSemitism, hail Mussolini’s Italy as an example of fine government, express various Nazi
sympathies, and oppose U.S. entry into World War II. 28
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Despite his failure to come close to challenging Roosevelt and his rather sad demise,
Coughlin’s impact on the early 1930s was enormous. Attracting the largest radio audience in the
world, receiving more mail than the President, and managing to defeat the ratification of an
international treaty after delivering only one radio speech all demonstrate the radio priest’s
power to drive people to take action. Just as Long’s political power came from his ability to turn
out large electoral numbers, Coughlin’s power came from his rhetorical ability to win a large
following and incite that following whenever he saw fit. Had a president not as popular and
skilled as Roosevelt been seated, or had Long never been assassinated, or had Coughlin better
sense than to unite with Smith and Townsend, the story may well have been different. What is
important for the purpose of this thesis is that the Long and Coughlin movements progressed as
far as they did, and how they managed rhetorically to do so.
The Anti-Intellectual Style: Over-Identification, Possession, and Incapacitation
Assessing the impact of the anti-intellectual style on the structuring of political
experience takes this study back to the goal of Edwin Black’s critical device, the “second
persona.” Working to find “the image of a man” in the discourse of Long and Coughlin, this
study has embraced the assumption “that rhetorical discourses, either singly or cumulatively in a
persuasive movement, will imply an auditor, and that in most cases the implication will be
sufficiently suggestive as to enable the critic to link this implied auditor to an ideology.” 29
Extracting an ideology from the speech of Long and Coughlin has been a difficult task for
historians and journalists who have struggled with the substantive ambiguities of both men’s
arguments and had a difficult time deciding what ideological label to pin on either.
Alan Brinkley probably came the closest to an understanding of Long and Coughlin’s
ideology when he concluded it to be grounded in a reaction to modernity. One thesis of
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Brinkley’s study is that such answers are best illuminated in discussing the rhetorical style both
leaders utilized. As Robert Hariman notes, through political style politicians move to shape their
audience’s public actions, and the character of the political style utilized is largely determinative
of those actions. In other words, Long and Coughlin’s Depression Populist ideology can best be
understood after isolating the projection of man and woman that their discourse implies. For
both men, this image is of an insecure non-participant in a desperate search for security. The
ideology of Depression Populism, as has been noted, is not one of real political empowerment,
but rather of reactions to the fears and anxieties of economic collapse, social unrest, and political
anomie. The discourse of Long and Coughlin works to structure their audience’s political
experience insofar as the anti-intellectual style of both loans the auditor a false sense of
empowerment. Subsuming the individual auditor into a collective cult of authority in which all
are obliged to agree with the dogmas and dictates of their leaders, the anti-intellectual style
thwarts free dialogue and replaces communication between equals with submission to the
authoritarian. Discussing how this broad political effect is achieved, I will discuss the antiintellectual style as a tripartite process involving over-identification, possession, and the
incapacitation of intellect.
Over-Identification
Kenneth Burke describes identification as that process by which two separate individuals
with two different sets of interests come to identify with one another. 30 For Burke, the rhetor
who desires “to change an audience’s opinion in one respect” may be able to “succeed only
insofar as he yields to that audience’s opinions in other respects. Some of their opinions are
needed to support the fulcrum by which he would move other opinions.” 31 While identification
is an ever-occurring phenomenon in persuasion, when the rhetor moves beyond merely
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identifying with some of his auditor’s interests to instead identify with all of the auditor’s
interests, a phenomenon altogether unique occurs. I have termed this phenomenon overidentification. With over-identification the rhetor moves to deny any fundamental individual
difference between him or herself and the auditor, and instead treats rhetor and auditor as one.
Taking identification this one step further threatens the sanctity of the individual and undermines
the integrity of the speech-act.
Carroll C. Arnold describes the speech-act as occurring between speaker and listener.
For Arnold, the speech-act appeals to the listener to gain his or her agreement.
In speech the physical person and the existential self are invested—in what is prepared to be
spoken, in what is spoken, and in the instant-by-instant being of speaking. Listeners expect it
to be so, and if they listen, they ready themselves to close on instigated but private messages,
all the while regarding the speaker as an ‘other’ who seeks a role within their worlds. 32
Arnold requires that “each party retains its dominion over self” 33 for the speech-act to be
legitimate. Accordingly, for communication to be legitimate it must occur between two separate
beings who will influence each other throughout the communication process but who will not be
subsumed by each other.
Michael Signer’s analysis of Long says as much in applying Plato’s theory of appetitive
alignment to the Kingfish’s demagogy. According to Signer, the demagogue frequently seeks
“the perfect alignment of an audience’s appetites with the manipulate designs of a constantly
controlling demagogue.” 34 Considering Hitler, Signer quotes from Mein Kampf:
He (the rhetor) will always let himself be borne by the great masses in such a way that
instinctively the very words come to his lips that he needs to speak to the hearts of his
audience. And if he errs, even in the slightest, he has the living correction before him. As I
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have said, he can read from the facial expression of his audience whether, firstly, they
understand what he is saying, whether, secondly, they can follow the speech as a whole, and
to what extent, thirdly, he has convinced them of the soundness of what he has said. . . . He
himself will utter their objections, which he senses though unspoken, and go on confuting
them and exploding them, until at length even the last group of an opposition, by its very
bearing and facial expressions, enables him to recognize its capitulation to his arguments. 35
Hitler’s seeking to be “borne by the masses” marks his strategy to identify so strongly with them
that their desires are his and his desires are theirs. After analyzing the Fuhrer’s speeches, Burke
declared “Hitler’s blandishments so integrate leader and people, commingling them so
inextricably, that the politician does not even present himself as a candidate.” 36 Similar to
Hitler’s use of German nationalism as a device by which to identify with the people, Long and
Coughlin looked to the American populist tradition to reflect the general frustrations and
resentments of the people and order them in such a way as to integrate their person with that of
the speaker’s.
The “residual appeal of populism” 37 of which Long and Coughlin took advantage
enabled both men to find more than just common ground with their audiences. They united their
followers in common resentments. In making every effort to identify themselves as common
sufferers in a common suffering, they were able to eventually take control over their audience.
The rhetoric of Long and Coughlin provides clear examples of both men’s attempts to portray
themselves in such a way. Long’s attempts to, as Swing put it, make himself seem like “the hillbilly come to power,” start from the very beginning of the speech. Indeed, the primary purpose
of his introduction seems to build such identification with his audience. Plato warned of “rulers
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who behave like subjects and subjects who behave like rulers.” 38 Long often behaved like his
followers, and his followers frequently thought of themselves as rulers—“every man a king.”
Coughlin does the same in “The National Union for Social Justice.” Speaking of the
Depression as affecting all of “us,” he makes it a point to portray himself as suffering alongside
his audience. Susan Zickmund observes that this was a common strategy from his very
beginning on the radio. In his early sermons, Coughlin routinely identified himself as a sinner:
“It is with sincere sorrow, My Dear Jesus, that I look back to that day when my soul was stained
by actual sin. Willingly—yes, maliciously I traded You off for some pleasure of the flesh, for
some sin of pride of worldliness.” 39 Identification was probably much harder for Coughlin than
for Long. A priest, Coughlin was faced with the burden of appealing to an audience that, if
Catholic, instantly saw him in a light very different than they might a fellow layperson, and if
Protestant, would instantly associate him with the dogmas and hierarchical structure of the
Catholic Church. Nonetheless, Coughlin formed a strong identification with his audience. This
identification explains why Coughlin could appeal to an audience who seemed to bear “a strong
strain of anti-clerical feeling and hatred of the Church hierarchy among them.” 40
Possession
After subsuming the auditor into the identity of the rhetor vis-à-vis what I have termed a
process of over-identification, Long and Coughlin then moved to possess their audience. To
further clarify what I mean by possession, I want to make it clear that I am not referring to any
sort of subliminal or hypnotic control the rhetor exercises over the auditor’s thoughts. Rather, by
possession I mean the rhetor’s ability to control the auditor by making him or her fearful to
question the rhetor’s position and therefore, almost subconsciously, prompting the auditor to
agree energetically with almost everything the rhetor says. Through possession the rhetor
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engages the auditor in a cult of affirmation. Long and Coughlin’s frequent use of rhetorical
questions and “I”-“you”-“we” shift work together to accomplish this purpose, and the
psychological effect of these forms on the audience is an irrational endorsement of whatever the
rhetor claims. Rather than risk being wrong, considered duped, or worst of all, part of the
conspiring and damned “they” the rhetor speaks against, the auditor convinces him or herself that
what the rhetor says is true. More than this though, the auditor convinces him or herself that they
have reasoned it to be true and that they have exercised their own thought and reason to decide it
so. However, subsumed by the rhetor, this sense of control is only an illusion of agency—an
illusion of empowerment.
Most illuminatingly, Burke writes of Hitler’s rhetoric as seeming to emerge from some
great democratically chosen voice. Assessing Hitler’s rhetoric, Burke writes that the auditor of
Hitler might well think “‘German democracy’ has chosen. And the deployments of politics are,
you might say, the chartings of Hitler’s private mind translated into the vocabulary of
nationalistic events. He says what he thought in terms of what parties did.” 41 For Long and
Coughlin, their denunciations of the status quo and the solutions they offered seemed just as
democratically chosen. The audience listens as they are told about what they have long resented.
As their resentment is expressed in Long and Coughlin’s attempts at identification, it builds and
is woven into an elaborate explanation of their own failure and that which had become the
American economy.
Arthur Schlesinger describes Long’s “blistering frontier invective” as securing “the link
between his own superior intelligence and the surging envy of the crowds before him. He was
their idol—themselves as they would like to be, free and articulate and apparently without
fear.” 42 Identified with and idolized, Long and Coughlin possessed their audience by virtue of
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their own over-identification and by making their audience afraid that if they disagreed they
might come to fall out of favor with either man. Once over-identified with their audience, Long
and Coughlin both moved to create we-they dichotomies and to engage the audience in a series
of rhetorical questions to which the audience simply gives their affirmation. The audience
becomes convinced of whatever Long and Coughlin say. If they ever have any doubts, rather
than question their leaders and risk falling outside the celebrated group of the common man or
the righteous laborer they are more inclined to convince themselves that they are mistaken and
that Long and Coughlin know best. Against their better judgment, they conform to whatever
Long and Coughlin decree and convince themselves that it is entirely rational to do so. They
convince themselves that Long and Coughlin are great men and are to be admired. 43
Incapacitation of Intellect
Once so possessed, the anti-intellectual rhetor moves to accomplish what is the final and
most heinous act of all: the intellectual incapacitation of the auditor. Removing the will of the
individual auditor to think, question, and act for him or herself, the rhetor systematically disables
the critical capacities of the auditor. Though already subsumed into Long and Coughlin’s
righteous “we,” it is a result the rhetor’s ability to incapacitate the auditor that he or she remains
dependent on the rhetor. The helpless individual needs the assistance of the great and righteous
prophet. Isolating the individual according to his or her own antinomian struggle for salvation,
Long and Coughlin make it impossible for individuals to act collectively according to their own
rational and individual will to do so. Instead, they are dependent on the power of prophesy, the
false reassurances of dogma, and faith in a skillful and articulate leader to organize and change
the status quo. As Signer notes of Hitler, he “recognized his alignment ideal cannot be reached if
the audience is thoughtful and privately governable. . . . Hitler recognized that what might be
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called the ‘stupidization’ of the German demos would prepare a fallow field for demagoguery.”
Similarly, Long and Coughlin recognized the need to disable the critical capacity of their
audience.
Most unlike the populism of the 1890s that preceded it, Long and Coughlin’s Depression
Populism undercut the ability of people to organize on their own accord and think their own
thoughts. While the populism of the 1890s called for collective action, never did it sacrifice the
integrity of the individual. The anti-intellectual style of Long and Coughlin did. Dependent on
the leader for everything, Long and Coughlin’s audience did not interact with each other, much
less Long or Coughlin. Instead, they listened over their radios to what their leaders had to say.
Adopting Long and Coughlin’s ideas as their own, they proceeded to act as a collective mass
utterly void of intellectual capacity beyond that of their leaders. Not having the intellectual
ability to question the instruction they received, they could act with intelligence to execute with
efficiency whatever command they were given. However, they lacked the intellect needed to
hold their leaders accountable and ask the penetrating questions that must be asked if democracy
is to sustain itself.
In discussing over-identification, possession, and the incapacitation of intellect, it is
important to understand that these are gross terms for processes that are deeply interconnected
with each other. Over-identification’s submission of the individual auditor to the omnipotent
personality of the rhetor naturally incapacitates intellect insomuch as it destroys individual
thought, just as the incapacitation of intellect understandably enables the auditor to be possessed
by the rhetor. All three of these processes act in tandem with one another to secure the
submission of the individual to the authoritarian, to systematically destroy intellect. That said,
however, there exists some continuity between them. Only when the rhetor manages to over-
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identify with the individual auditor may the rhetor possess the auditor. Likewise, once the
individual auditor is possessed by the rhetor into affirming whatever he or she says without
question is the intellect truly incapacitated, and the dependence on the rhetor for security and
identity confirms the dependency. All three of these processes function together to structure the
auditor’s experience and define the anti-intellectual style.
The Antinomian Power of Radio & the Privatization of the Public Sphere
The use of radio cannot be overlooked in any consideration of Long and Coughlin’s rise
to power. Radio changed communication and politics in the United States from its very
emergence and further compounded the impact of the anti-intellectual style. The privatization of
the public sphere that occurred with the emergence of radio greatly changed American
communication dynamics, heightening the effects of an already dangerously tempestuous
rhetorical style by removing communication from an interactive public sphere. Radio relegated
communication to many private, non-interactive exchanges between often passive recipients and
emotive mediated voices.
In addition to all the other counts in which Long and Coughlin are remarkable historical
figures, they were also, along with Roosevelt, the first politicians to use radio effectively. As
Carlton Beals wrote of Long, apart from Roosevelt, “No other politician—Coughlin was his only
competitor—continuously used a national radio hook-up.” 44 Radio, in many ways, was a
quintessential Populist technology, bringing news, sports, and politics directly to the people.
Ironically, and as part of one of those great coincidences in history, the technology of the radio
became available to Americans all over the country just before America would be lured in by one
of the most significant Populist movements in its history. Michael Signer observes of that the
modern demagogue using radio “found himself able to go directly to the source—the individual
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citizen—through a personal, intimate medium.” 45 The significance of this fact is great. If Long
and Coughlin were able to reach their followers directly, then they were able to circumvent any
public dimension that might allow for a rational debate of their ideas. In addition, the intensely
personal and intimate style of both men, each reaching out to the hearts of their listeners, fit well
with the antinomian message of individual salvation both Long and Coughlin were in effect
preaching. Long and Coughlin frequently compared themselves to Christ, and it was in their
radio-delivered messages that they were to reach their most fervently dedicated disciples.
According to Arthur Schlesinger, Coughlin “probably had the largest steady audience in
the world.” 46 Long could attract as many listeners as Coughlin when he broadcast, reaching
primetime audiences of twenty million and more and receiving as many as 60,000 letters to his
Senate office afterward. 47 With one-third of all Americans having radio in their homes, the
audience potential of both men was tremendous—and they knew it. For many of the homes to
which Long and Coughlin broadcast, “radio was perhaps the only luxury and the greatest
comfort.” 48 As Signer takes note, radio allowed Long “to communicate directly with the
national American demos in a way wholly unanticipated by the Founding Fathers, who designed
a system solely for state-bound democratic politicians checked by in-state elites as well as state
boundaries.” 49 If Hamilton had known of the later advent of radio, then he would likely have
suggested an even more intricate system of checks and balances than he did. The threat of mass
democracy became increasingly worrisome to the old guard of politicians who feared it. Long
and Coughlin sensed this fear and lavished in it.
Radio undermined public exchange. Where people were more likely before to gain an
understanding of national issues and events through local newspapers and dialogue, radio
replaced many of these opinion outlets, including traditional face-to-face communication. The
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contrast between radio and the more public forms of interaction that existed prior to radio is
great, and goes to the heart of this thesis. Whereas “face-to-face communication permitted
discussions to develop over time,” 50 radio seized listeners in an immediate exchange of
information. This exchange essentially involved the one-way transmission of ideas, thoughts,
and ideologies to the listener without any sort of interaction on his or her part. Before radio
“Present dialogues might build on past dialogues to foster communicative relations that grew
over time, changing respects to reflect the changed perspectives of interlocutors.” 51 As Long
and Coughlin began to increasingly rely on radio for public appeals such was no longer the case.
In assessing Long’s impact as a modern demagogue, Signer concludes that
a citizen could simply be sitting in his own house and listening quietly, yet still allowing the
appetites in his own character to surge over any thoughtful, deliberative sensibility. And
these private reactions could achieve institutional significance. Millions of such private
reactions, by citizens listening to Huey Long on the radio in their homes, composed the
support for Huey Long’s national Share-the-Wealth Society and for his incipient presidential
campaign. 52
Radio as a communication medium allowed Long and Coughlin to bypass spheres of publicity
and to instead rely on the cumulative effect of millions upon millions of private reactions across
the country.
With the public much more removed from the reception of Long and Coughlin’s
messages, there was, as Signer acknowledges, little room for deliberation. That both men’s
messages were experienced so intensely by their audience undercut the possibility of any
meaningful deliberation occurring after the radio broadcasts. Instead of discussing Long and
Coughlin’s speeches over breakfast the next morning, Long and Coughlin’s followers held what
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they had experienced through their radios closer to their hearts than they might have had the
address been read in the newspaper or delivered in a public venue. Their regard of these radio
messages could almost be described as an unchallengeable emotional truth—a religious
conversion-type experience. Coughlin wrote that “Radio broadcasting, I have found, must not be
high hat. It must be human, intensely human. It must be simple.” 53 Such instruction could
easily be imagined as coming from George Whitefield, Ezra Stiles, or Jonathan Edwards.
Further, real dialogic participation in this religious experience is nonexistent; whereas with
Whitefield, Stiles, or Edwards, the subject contributed more uniquely to his or her conversion.
Radio, unlike itinerant ministering, reached huge numbers of people at a single moment
in time, involving all of them in a low-participation conversion experience. Marshall McLuhan
comments on radio’s low-participation quality in describing it as hot medium in contrast to cold
mediums.
There is a basic principle that distinguishes a hot medium like radio. . . . A hot medium is one
that extends one single sense in ‘high definition’ . . . the state of being well filled with data.
A photograph is, visually, ‘high definition.’ . . . On the other hand, hot media do not leave so
much to be filled in or completed by the audience. Hot media are, therefore, low in
participation. 54
Discouraging meaningful participation, radio functioned much more along the lines of a
hypodermic model of communication than other mediums might. What Long and Coughlin said
was real, and intense, and immediate, and the pathotic appeals on which both men relied were
not easily questioned by followers that regarded their messages as if they were religion. Added
to the anti-intellectual style’s relegation of individual thought and elevation of one singular and
ostensibly democratic voice, radio’s impact heightened the effect. Radio worked to engage the
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auditor in the kind of comfort and illusive agency with a singular over-identified being that only
public deliberation in a free and open public sphere can effectively counter.

Freedom in Dialogue: Discourse and Democracy
Extending the effect of the anti-intellectual style across time, the critic can consider its
effect on democracy and the public sphere. Doing so requires an understanding of what sort of
public sphere is necessary to maintain a properly functioning democracy. It also requires an
explanation of how the anti-intellectual style exercised by Long and Coughlin falls short of that
requirement. The anti-intellectual genre of speech I have isolated is not only a matter of past
concern. Much of contemporary discourse continues to function according to the description of
the anti-intellectual style offered in terms of Long and Coughlin’s discourse. Assessing the
political impact of anti-intellectual speech becomes a particularly important critical endeavor.
John Dewey considers communication as shared experience. According to Dewey,
communication is “the establishment of cooperation in an activity in which there are partners,
and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership.” 55 As a result,
“persuasion should be mutual. For Dewey, democracy is an adventure in mutual persuasion.
Democratic ends demand democratic methods.” Hence, a healthy democracy is continually in
flux, always responding to the evolving attitudes emerging from the constant deliberation of its
polity. Consequently, coercive discourse that interferes or prohibits this deliberation is a threat
to democracy. The only way democracy can be preserved is in the creation and maintenance of a
free and open public sphere in which all citizens may participate in the democratic adventure
Dewey describes.
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Democracies emerge from individuals coming together in communion to govern
themselves according to a popular, dynamic, and deliberative will that all participate in
determining. The essential criterion of democracy is thus the participation of the individual in
concert with others. Communities are the basic units of democracy, and “a community thus
presents an order of energies transmuted into one of meanings which are appreciated and
mutually referred by each to every other on the part of those engaged in combined action.” 56 A
democracy will likely consist of multiple communities. A functioning democracy as large as the
United States will to have many communities and many publics. In such a case, democracy as a
political system would involve the integration of these publics. In a healthy public sphere, never
would a democratic public remain static, and never would multiple communities and publics “be
subsumed into larger and larger publics to create one big public.” 57 Communities and publics
should always be in constant interaction with one another, just as communities of individuals
should be. According to Dewey, never should only one vision or idea be embraced by an
individual or a smaller community and held to represent the values of the larger community to
the exclusion of other visions and ideas. 58

Instead, democracy rests on a free and open

communication between multiple individuals and groups in which multiple visions and ideas are
discussed and experienced. In following these democratic means when reaching popular
consensus, democracy is protected as a joint project involving both individual and community.
The anti-intellectual style endangers this kind of free and open public sphere in which no
singular vision or idea can come to exclude other visions or ideas. The anti-intellectual style, as
exemplified in the cases of Long and Coughlin, produces a singular and simplified vision that is
the rhetor’s alone. Delivered over radio, Long and Coughlin’s addresses portray a vision of
America that the individual auditor cannot adequately refute or contribute to in a free and open

Freedom in Dialogue 145

public sphere. The vision is Long and Coughlin’s alone and their audiences are there only to
follow.
Further, in subsuming the auditor in the identity of the rhetor and denying the
fundamental separateness between speaker and listener, the anti-intellectual style effectively
inhibits deliberative democracy. As Cass Sunstein explains, deliberative democracy hopes to
“create institutions to ensure that people will be exposed to many topics and ideas, including
ideas that they reject, and topics in which they have, as yet, expressed little interest.” 59
Promoting only a singular vision of social problems and reducing the individual’s role to mere
spectatorship, the anti-intellectual style is anathema to democracy. Subsumed into the
authoritarian identity of the rhetor, the individual auditor cannot contribute to the democratic
process. Their intellect incapacitated, the auditor is unable to reflect on social problems and
issues in any meaningful way and is fearful to bring about alternative ideas and viewpoints that
might risk his or her alienation. Communication is thus no longer shared experience between
community members, but rather passive acceptance of whatever the authoritarian wills. The
antithesis to democracy, authoritarianism is inherently anti-intellectual insofar as it targets the
intellect and intellectual upon which democracy rests. If democracy “constitutes a continuous
process” that involves the individuals exercising their given intellectual capacities in concert
with one another, then it “signals an orientation toward action in various domains of human
activity rather than a singularly delineated end.” 60
The anti-intellectual speech of Long and Coughlin incapacitated the intellect and
subsumed the individual in the identity of the rhetor. Thus, neither man afforded any
opportunity for democracy to function properly. There was no room for dissent, no ability to
strike a thought outside the rhetor’s control, no power to question and move ideas forward by
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means of the kind of creative citizen engagement that is essential for any democracy to succeed.
Faith was in will and power—not in the reason and intellect of thinking men and women in
dialogue with one another.
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